446 U.S. 740 (1980)
In August 1975, petitioner, a carpenter residing in Oklahoma, suffered permanent injury to his right eye when the head of a nail he was pounding into a cement wall shattered and struck him.1 Respondent Armco Steel Corp., a foreign corporation with its principal place of business outside Oklahoma, had manufactured the nail.2 Petitioner alleged that a defect in the nail, caused by respondent’s negligence in manufacture and design, led to the injury.3
On August 19, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, invoking diversity jurisdiction.4 Summons was issued the same day, but service of process on respondent’s authorized agent did not occur until December 1, 1977.5 Oklahoma's statute of limitations, Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 95 (1971), provided a two-year period from the date of injury.6
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on January 5, 1978, asserting that the action was barred because service had not been effected within the limitations period or the additional sixty days allowed under Oklahoma law when the complaint is filed timely.7 The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.8 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeals regarding the application of state law and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 in diversity actions involving state statutes of limitations.10
Whether, in a diversity action, the federal court should follow state law or, alternatively, Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in determining when an action is commenced for the purpose of tolling the state statute of limitations?11
In diversity actions, when no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure directly conflicts with state law, state statutes of limitations including their integral service requirements control the commencement of an action for tolling purposes under the Erie doctrine.12
Yes. The federal court should follow state law rather than Rule 3.13 The Oklahoma statute requires service of the summons to commence an action for limitations purposes and supplies a sixty-day extension when the complaint is filed timely.14 Petitioner filed the complaint within the two-year period but effected service only after both the limitations period and the sixty-day extension had expired.15
This case is indistinguishable from Ragan because the state service rule forms an integral part of the limitations statute and promotes the policies of repose and fair notice to defendants.16 Rule 3 states only that a civil action is commenced by filing the complaint and contains no indication that it was intended to toll state statutes of limitations or to displace state tolling rules.17 Because no direct conflict exists, the policies of Erie and Ragan require application of the Oklahoma service requirement to prevent inequitable administration of the law between state and federal plaintiffs.18
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed because Oklahoma law governs and bars the action.19