422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)
In January 1972, Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc., and eight individual plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York against the Town of Penfield and members of its Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards.1 The individual plaintiffs included Rochester residents who owned property and paid taxes there, as well as low and moderate income persons, some of whom were members of racial or ethnic minority groups, who sought to live in Penfield.2 Organizational plaintiffs included Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc., a nonprofit corporation focused on housing issues for low and moderate income persons.3
Penfield's zoning ordinance, adopted in 1962, allocated 98 percent of the town's vacant land to single-family detached housing and imposed requirements relating to lot size, setback, floor area, and habitable space that increased the cost of such housing beyond the means of persons of low and moderate income.4 Only 0.3 percent of land available for residential construction was allocated to multifamily structures, and even on that limited space low density and other requirements made low and moderate income housing economically infeasible.5 No land was zoned for apartments or mobile homes.6
The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance and its enforcement, including delays on proposals, denials of variances and permits, refusals to allow tax abatements, and failures to provide support services, had the purpose and effect of excluding low and moderate income persons and members of minority groups from residing in Penfield.7 Low and moderate income plaintiffs claimed they had attempted to locate suitable housing in Penfield but could not due to the restrictions, resulting in higher commuting costs, substandard living conditions, and fewer municipal services.8 Rochester taxpayer plaintiffs alleged that Penfield's practices forced Rochester to provide more low and moderate income housing than it otherwise would, requiring tax abatements that increased their own tax burdens.9
The record referenced two specific development efforts: Penfield Better Homes Corp. applied in late 1969 for rezoning to build subsidized cooperative townhouses for moderate income persons but was denied a variance, and O'Brien Homes, Inc. proposed a project in late 1971 that was also denied or remained under consideration.10 Affidavits from individual plaintiffs detailed their income levels, family sizes, maximum affordable housing payments, and unsuccessful searches for housing in Penfield through newspaper ads and other means.11
On May 2, 1972, Rochester Home Builders Association moved to intervene as a plaintiff, alleging that its member firms had been prevented from building low and moderate income housing in Penfield and had lost profits.12 On June 7, 1972, the original plaintiffs moved to add Housing Council in the Monroe County Area, Inc., as a plaintiff; an accompanying affidavit stated that one of its members, Penfield Better Homes Corp., had been actively attempting to develop moderate income housing in Penfield but had been unable to secure approvals.13 The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, denied the motions to add parties, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Whether low and moderate income individuals residing outside Penfield who allege unsuccessful attempts to locate housing there have standing to challenge the town's zoning ordinance?15
Article III standing requires a plaintiff to allege a distinct and palpable injury fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and likely redressable by a favorable decision.16 Prudential limits further bar generalized grievances shared by a large class and attempts to assert the rights of third parties.17
No. The low and moderate income petitioners alleged that they attempted to locate housing in Penfield through newspaper ads and other searches but could not due to the 1962 zoning ordinance's lot size, setback, and density requirements that made such housing economically infeasible.18 Yet they identified no specific project denied to them personally.19 Their ability to reside in Penfield depended entirely on the willingness of third-party developers such as Penfield Better Homes Corp. and O'Brien Homes, Inc., whose 1969 and 1971 proposals were rejected or remained unresolved.20 These allegations establish only a generalized grievance shared by all low and moderate income persons in the Rochester area rather than a particularized injury to the named plaintiffs.21
The causal chain remains too speculative because the complaint filed in January 1972 supplies no facts showing that court-ordered relief would result in housing these individuals could afford.22
The low and moderate income individuals lack standing to challenge the Penfield zoning ordinance.23
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Justice Douglas dissented from the majority's standing analysis.24 He contended that the low and moderate income petitioners alleged concrete injuries from exclusion that are particularized to them even if shared by others.25 The fact that many others suffer the same injury does not make it any less real to these petitioners.26
Douglas viewed the majority's requirements for unique harm and specific projects as artificial barriers inconsistent with the principles established in Baker v. Carr and later cases that expanded standing concepts.27 He believed the petitioners had shown a sufficient personal stake to invoke federal jurisdiction and that the Court should lower technical barriers to allow resolution of festering social issues on the merits.28 Douglas would have reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings.29
Whether Rochester taxpayers who allege increased tax burdens resulting from Penfield's zoning practices have standing to challenge those practices?
Article III requires a distinct and palpable injury traceable to the defendant.30 Prudential rules normally prohibit litigants from asserting the legal rights of third parties absent a statute granting a right of action or a close relationship that makes the litigant the proper party to assert the claim.31
No. The Rochester taxpayer petitioners alleged that Penfield's refusal to permit low and moderate income housing forced Rochester to provide more such housing with resulting tax abatements that raised their own property taxes.32 But the line of causation runs through independent decisions by Rochester officials who are not parties to the suit.33 The asserted injury remains conjectural.34 Even assuming traceability, the taxpayers rest their claim solely on the constitutional rights of third-party low and moderate income persons excluded from Penfield.35 They allege no protected relationship with those persons and no statutory authorization to sue on their behalf.36
This places the claim squarely within the prudential bar against third-party standing.37
The Rochester taxpayers lack standing to challenge Penfield's zoning practices.38
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice White And Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the taxpayer petitioners alleged concrete economic injuries fairly traceable to Penfield's exclusionary scheme.39 The majority improperly imposed a specificity requirement foreign to Article III.40 It viewed each group of plaintiffs in isolation rather than recognizing their intertwined interests in challenging the overall pattern of exclusion.41
Brennan emphasized that the petitioners had alleged harms including higher commuting costs and lost opportunities that satisfied injury in fact.42 He would have found standing for these petitioners and allowed the case to proceed rather than closing the courthouse doors at the pleading stage.43
Whether nonprofit housing organizations and contractor associations have standing to challenge Penfield's zoning ordinance based on their members' inability to develop or build low and moderate income housing?44
An association may assert standing on behalf of its members only if the members themselves would have standing.45 The interests must be germane to the organization's purpose.46 Neither the claim nor the relief requires individualized participation.47 When seeking damages the association must show direct injury to itself or an assignment of members' claims.48 For prospective relief the members must allege imminent injury of sufficient ripeness.49
No. Rochester Home Builders Association alleged that its members lost profits because the zoning ordinance and enforcement practices prevented construction of low and moderate income housing.50 Yet the complaint identified no specific current project by any member that had been denied a permit or variance.51 It sought damages that are peculiar to individual members rather than common to the association.52 Housing Council alleged that its member Penfield Better Homes Corp. had been stymied in developing moderate income housing.53
But the 1969 variance denial was no longer a live controversy by the time the 1972 complaint was filed.54 No other member had a pending project in Penfield.55 This rendered the asserted injury insufficiently immediate or ripe for judicial intervention.56
The nonprofit housing organizations and contractor associations lack standing to challenge the Penfield zoning ordinance.57
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the organizational petitioners including the contractor associations and Housing Council alleged concrete economic and mission-related injuries from the exclusionary ordinance.58 These injuries are sufficient to confer standing.59 The associations represent the communal interests of actual residents and members seeking desegregated housing.60
Douglas viewed the majority's refusal to let these groups litigate on behalf of their members as closing the courthouse doors to legitimate claims of purposeful exclusion.61 He would have permitted the associations to proceed and reversed the Court of Appeals.62
Whether an organization has standing to assert claims on behalf of its members who are low and moderate income persons affected by the zoning ordinance?63
An organization may have representational standing if its members would have standing in their own right.64 The interests are germane to the organization's purpose.65 The claim or relief does not require individual member participation.66 But the members must still allege particularized injury rather than a generalized grievance.67
No. Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc. alleged that its low and moderate income members were unable to find housing in Penfield.68 It also alleged that its Penfield-resident members were deprived of the benefits of an integrated community.69 Yet it identified no specific member who had been denied housing or a permit.70 Its claims on behalf of Rochester taxpayers and low-income persons were precluded by the same lack of particularized injury that defeated the individual petitioners.71
The organization's attempt to rely on Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. failed because no statutory right of action under the 1968 Civil Rights Act was alleged.72 Prudential considerations barred assertion of third-party rights without a protected relationship.73
Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc. lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of its members.74
Whether statutory rights of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 eliminate the Article III injury-in-fact requirement for standing in challenges to exclusionary zoning?75
Although Congress may create statutory rights the invasion of which confers standing, the constitutional requirement of a distinct and palpable injury in fact remains applicable regardless of the source of the asserted right of action.76
No. Petitioners contended that their status as persons aggrieved under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983 supplied standing.77 But the fact that Congress provided a statutory cause of action does not dispense with the Article III requirement that each plaintiff allege a personal injury fairly traceable to the defendants and redressable by the court.78 The complaint's allegations of exclusionary zoning practices therefore must still satisfy the injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability elements.79 None of the petitioners met those elements.80
Statutory rights of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 do not eliminate the Article III injury-in-fact requirement.81
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice White And Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the petitioners met the injury-in-fact standard through allegations of concrete harms including higher commuting costs, substandard housing, and lost business opportunities.82 The majority's approach effectively required proof of success on the merits at the pleading stage.83 It failed to accept the well-pleaded allegations as true for standing purposes.84
Brennan stressed that the petitioners had supported their claims with affidavits showing palpable injuries and that the Court should not impose impossible specificity requirements before discovery.85 He would have allowed the case to proceed.86