521 U.S. 702 (1997)
Washington has prohibited assisting suicide since its territorial days.1 In 1854, the first Territorial Legislature outlawed assisting another in the commission of self-murder. The current statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060, provides that a person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide, and classifies it as a class C felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.2 Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979, states that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at a patient's direction shall not constitute a suicide, but the state has consistently rejected efforts to legalize physician-assisted suicide, including a 1991 ballot initiative defeated by voters.3
The respondents in this case are four physicians who practice in Washington and treat terminally ill patients, three terminally ill patients who sought to end their lives with physician assistance and have since died, and Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide.4 The physicians declared that they would assist their patients in ending their lives if not for the assisted-suicide ban.5 Petitioners are the State of Washington and its Attorney General.6
In January 1994, the respondents filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.7 They sought a declaration that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060 is unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its enforcement.8 The District Court held that the statute was unconstitutional.9 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, but the full court sitting en banc reversed the panel and affirmed the District Court.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.11
Whether the State of Washington’s prohibition against causing or aiding a suicide violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?12
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental liberty interests that are deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.13 A state law infringing a non-fundamental liberty interest is valid if rationally related to legitimate government interests.14
No. The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide demonstrates that there is no fundamental right to commit suicide or to receive assistance in doing so.15 The Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of assisting suicide for over 700 years.16 Washington has prohibited assisting suicide since 1854 when the first Territorial Legislature outlawed assisting another in the commission of self-murder.17 The current statute Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060 makes promoting a suicide attempt a class C felony.18 Voters rejected a 1991 ballot initiative to legalize physician-assisted suicide by a 54 to 46 percent margin.19 The State's interests in preserving human life, preventing suicide among vulnerable populations, protecting the integrity of the medical profession, and guarding against euthanasia are legitimate and the prohibition is reasonably related to advancing those interests.20 The statute applies to all persons and the State's interests remain undiminished when the patient is terminally ill.21
The Court begins substantive due process analysis by examining the Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices.22 In almost every State and western democracy it is a crime to assist a suicide.23 These bans are longstanding expressions of commitment to the protection and preservation of all human life rather than innovations.24 The plaintiffs assert a liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one's death that they claim is fundamental.25 This Court has never held that the right to die is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.26 The decision in Cruzan assumed a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition but noted that the right is not absolute and that the State retains legitimate interests in preserving life.27
The Washington statute does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Ginsburg And Breyer, Jj.
Justice O’Connor agrees that there is no generalized right to commit suicide.29 She also agrees that the State has a compelling interest in protecting vulnerable individuals from the risk of undue influence and abuse that could occur if assisted suicide were permitted.30
She sees no need to reach the narrower question whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death.31 That question is not before the Court in these facial challenges to the New York and Washington laws.32
Dying patients in Washington and New York can obtain medication from qualified physicians to alleviate suffering even when doing so would hasten death.33 The State's interests in protecting those who are not truly competent or facing imminent death justify the prohibitions on assisted suicide.34
Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment.35 He emphasizes that the Court correctly holds that the right to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.36 The historical evidence is overwhelming that the States have always had the power to prohibit assisted suicide.
Scalia underscores that the Anglo-American common law tradition has long disapproved of assisting suicide for over 700 years, providing ample support for the States' power to maintain such prohibitions without constitutional interference. This longstanding tradition confirms that the matter remains one for legislative resolution rather than judicial recognition of a new fundamental right.
Justice Kennedy joins the opinion of the Court.37 The liberty protected by the Due Process Clause does not include a right to assisted suicide.38 The conclusion rests on the established substantive due process framework requiring careful description of any asserted interest together with examination of the Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices to determine whether that interest qualifies as fundamental.
Justice Stevens concurs in the judgment but writes separately to emphasize that the holding does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the statute might be invalid.39 The right to determine the time and manner of one's death is a fundamental liberty interest.40
The State's interests, while legitimate, do not justify a complete ban on assisted suicide in all cases.41 He would remand for further proceedings to determine whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve the State's interests.42
Some applications of the statute might well be invalid even though the facial challenge fails.43 The liberty interest in controlling the manner and timing of death can outweigh state interests in particular circumstances involving terminally ill patients.44
Justice Souter concurs in the judgment but writes separately to advocate using a balancing test rather than the fundamental-rights analysis employed by the majority.45 The statute's application to the doctors has not been shown to be unconstitutional at this time.46
The State's interests in protecting nonresponsible individuals are sufficiently serious to defeat the present claim that its law is arbitrary or purposeless.47 He leaves open the possibility that future factual developments could alter the analysis.48
The claim to physician assistance in these narrow circumstances raises serious questions about containment, but legislative experimentation provides the better forum for resolving the factual uncertainties at present.49
Justice Ginsburg concurs in the Court's judgments substantially for the reasons stated by Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion.50 She joins Justice O’Connor's separate opinion except insofar as it joins the majority.51
The views expressed by Justice O’Connor have greater legal significance than the Court's opinion suggests regarding the formulation of the liberty interest at stake.52 The laws of New York and Washington do not force a dying person to undergo severe physical pain because they permit doctors to provide sufficient pain-relieving drugs.53
Justice Breyer concurs in the judgments and shares Justice O’Connor's views.54 He would formulate the claimed interest as a right to die with dignity that includes personal control over the manner of death and avoidance of unnecessary severe physical suffering.55
He agrees that the laws do not force a dying person to undergo that kind of pain because they permit doctors to provide sufficient pain-relieving drugs.56 Therefore the laws are justified regardless of whether the interest is deemed fundamental.57
The avoidance of severe physical pain connected with death would have to constitute an essential part of any successful claim.58 The legal circumstance that the laws permit palliative care means they do not infringe directly upon the core interest in dying with dignity.59