388 U.S. 14 (1967)
In August 1964 Jackie Washington, an 18-year-old youth from Dallas, Texas, had been dating Jean Carter until her mother forbade further contact; Carter then began dating another young man who later became the deceased.1 On the night of August 29, 1964, Washington and several other boys drove around Dallas searching for a gun, eventually obtaining a shotgun from Charles Fuller along with shells from another source.2 The group went to Carter's home where some boys threw bricks; Washington and Fuller remained in front with the shotgun. The deceased and Carter's mother came onto the porch, a shot was fired, and the deceased was fatally wounded.3 Washington and Fuller then ran back to the waiting car.4
Washington was tried in Dallas County for murder with malice. He testified in his own defense that Fuller, who was intoxicated, had taken the gun from him, that he had tried unsuccessfully to persuade Fuller to leave, and that he had run back to the car before the shot was fired.5 In support of this account Washington offered the testimony of Fuller, who had already been convicted of the same murder and sentenced to fifty years in prison and who was then confined in the Dallas County jail.6 Fuller would have testified that Washington pulled at him, tried to persuade him to leave, and ran before Fuller fired the fatal shot.7
At the time of trial two Texas statutes provided that persons charged or convicted as principals, accomplices, or accessories in the same crime could not testify for one another, although they remained free to testify for the State.8 On the basis of these statutes the trial judge sustained the State's objection and refused to allow Fuller to testify.9 Washington's conviction followed and was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 400 S. W. 2d 756.10
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.11
Whether the Sixth Amendment right of a defendant in a criminal case to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment?12
The right of an accused to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth Amendment rights that we have previously held applicable to the States.13 The right to offer the testimony of witnesses and to compel their attendance is in plain terms the right to present a defense and a fundamental element of due process of law.14
Yes. The Court has held that due process requires that the accused have the assistance of counsel for his defense, that he be confronted with the witnesses against him, and that he have the right to a speedy and public trial.15 The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense. This right allows the defendant to present his version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.
In this case the Texas statutes prevented Washington from offering the testimony of Fuller. Fuller was the only person other than Washington who knew exactly who had fired the shotgun and whether Washington had at the last minute attempted to prevent the shooting. Fuller's testimony would have been relevant and material and vital to the defense.16
The Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurs in the result. He believes that the State may not constitutionally forbid the petitioner, a criminal defendant, from introducing on his own behalf the important testimony of one indicted in connection with the same offense. That witness would not be barred from testifying if called by the prosecution. Texas has put forward no justification for this type of discrimination between the prosecution and the defense in the ability to call the same person as a witness.18
Harlan does not accept that the Due Process Clause incorporates the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. He views the clause as forbidding arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.19 This is a case in which the State has recognized as relevant and competent the testimony of this type of witness but has arbitrarily barred its use by the defendant.
Whether that right was violated by a state procedural statute providing that persons charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories in the same crime cannot be introduced as witnesses for each other?20
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right under any circumstances to put his witnesses on the stand as well as the right to compel their attendance in court.21 It is difficult to see how the Constitution is any less violated by arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief.22
Yes. The testimony of Charles Fuller was denied to the defense not because the State refused to compel his attendance. A state statute made his testimony inadmissible whether he was present in the courtroom or not.23 The rule disqualifying an alleged accomplice from testifying on behalf of the defendant cannot be defended on the ground that it rationally sets apart a group of persons who are particularly likely to commit perjury.
The absurdity of the rule is shown by the exceptions allowing the accused accomplice to be called by the prosecution and to testify after acquittal at his own trial.24 In this case the petitioner was denied his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. The State arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed. That witness's testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense.25
The right was violated by the state procedural statute.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurs in the reversal of the judgment. This is not really a problem of compulsory process at all. It is rather a case in which the State has recognized as relevant and competent the testimony of this type of witness but has arbitrarily barred its use by the defendant. The Due Process Clause forbids such arbitrary action.
Harlan can think of no justification for Texas's discrimination between the prosecution and the defense in the ability to call the same person as a witness.27