385 U.S. 188 (1966)
Watkins initiated this litigation by filing a tort action against Conway in a Florida circuit court.1 On October 5, 1955, the Florida court entered a $25,000 judgment in Watkins's favor.2 More than five years later, Watkins sued on that judgment in a Georgia superior court.3 Conway raised Georgia Code § 3-701 as a defense, which requires that suits upon foreign judgments be brought within five years after the judgments were obtained.4
The Georgia trial court granted summary judgment to Conway.5 It rejected Watkins's argument that § 3-701, when compared with the longer limitation period applicable to domestic judgments under Ga. Code §§ 110-1001 and 110-1002 (1935), violated the Full Faith and Credit and Equal Protection Clauses.6 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment and likewise rejected the constitutional challenge to the statute.7
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to review the Georgia Supreme Court's decision affirming the summary judgment for Conway.8
Whether Georgia Code § 3-701 violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause by imposing a five-year limitation period on suits to enforce foreign judgments?9
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is not violated by a statute of limitations on foreign judgments that bars suit only if revival is impossible in the rendering state. This construction ensures that the forum state honors the judgment state's own rules regarding the continuing validity of its judgments.10
No. The established facts show that Watkins obtained a $25,000 Florida judgment on October 5, 1955, and filed suit on it in Georgia five years and one day later, prompting the Georgia courts to apply § 3-701 as a bar.11 The Georgia courts have interpreted the statute to bar foreign-judgment suits only when the plaintiff cannot revive the judgment in the rendering state.12 The operative date is therefore the date of the latest revival rather than the original judgment date.13 Watkins therefore remains free to return to Florida, revive the judgment under that state's twenty-year limitation period, and then sue in Georgia within five years of revival.14
This construction means the Georgia statute focuses on and respects the law of the judgment state instead of overriding it.15 If Florida maintained a five-year or shorter limitation on its own judgments, the same bar would apply.16 That result would stem directly from Florida's legislative judgment about the dormancy of its judgments.17 Full faith and credit is thereby preserved rather than denied.18
Georgia Code § 3-701 does not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissents from the per curiam affirmance of the Georgia Supreme Court's decision upholding the constitutionality of Georgia Code § 3-701.20 By entering a dissent, he indicates his disagreement with the majority's determination that the statute does not impermissibly discriminate against foreign judgments.21 His position suggests that the shorter limitation period for foreign judgments violates the Full Faith and Credit and Equal Protection Clauses, contrary to the majority's conclusion that the statute respects the law of the judgment state and creates no invidious classification.22
Whether Georgia Code § 3-701 violates the Equal Protection Clause by imposing a five-year limitation period on suits to enforce foreign judgments that is shorter than the period applicable to domestic judgments?23
The Equal Protection Clause forbids invidious discrimination.24 A statutory scheme that applies different limitation periods to foreign and domestic judgments does not deny equal protection.25 The distinction must rest on the judgment state's own rules governing the validity and revival of its judgments rather than on any purpose to handicap out-of-state creditors.26
No. The established facts reveal that the Georgia trial court granted summary judgment under § 3-701 after rejecting Watkins's claim that the statute, read against the longer limitation for domestic judgments in Ga. Code §§ 110-1001 and 110-1002, violated equal protection.27 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed that constitutional ruling.28 Because the statute's operative date is the latest revival in the rendering state, the shorter period for foreign judgments does not reflect a Georgia policy of handicapping out-of-state creditors.29 It merely tracks whatever limitation the judgment state itself places on enforcement of its own judgments.30
A scheme that defers to the judgment state's assessment of its judgments' continuing validity creates no invidious classification.31 Any resulting difference in treatment arises from the foreign legislature's choices, not from Georgia's desire to discriminate.32 The statute therefore satisfies equal protection.33
Georgia Code § 3-701 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.34