394 U.S. 705 (1969)
After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, petitioner was convicted of violating a 1917 statute which prohibits any person from “knowingly and willfully . . . [making] any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States . . . .”1
The incident which led to petitioner’s arrest occurred on August 27, 1966, during a public rally on the Washington Monument grounds.2 The crowd present broke up into small discussion groups and petitioner joined a gathering scheduled to discuss police brutality.3 Most of those in the group were quite young, either in their teens or early twenties.4 Petitioner, who himself was 18 years old, entered into the discussion after one member of the group suggested that the young people present should get more education before expressing their views.5 According to an investigator for the Army Counter Intelligence Corps who was present, petitioner responded: “They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L. B. J.” “They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”6
At the close of the Government’s case, petitioner’s trial counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal.7 He contended that there was “absolutely no evidence on the basis of which the jury would be entitled to find that [petitioner] made a threat against the life of the President.”8 He stressed the fact that petitioner’s statement was made during a political debate, that it was expressly made conditional upon an event — induction into the Armed Forces — which petitioner vowed would never occur, and that both petitioner and the crowd laughed after the statement was made.9
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed by a two-to-one vote.10 The Supreme Court granted the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari.11
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the petitioner made a threat against the President under the 1917 statute?12
The statute requires the Government to prove a true threat, which must be distinguished from constitutionally protected speech, and political hyperbole does not fit within that statutory term when interpreted against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.13
No. The petitioner's statement occurred during a political debate at a public rally on the Washington Monument grounds after another participant suggested young people needed more education.14 The statement was expressly conditional on induction into the Armed Forces, an event the petitioner vowed would never occur, and both the petitioner and the crowd laughed afterward.15 Taken in context, the statement amounted to a crude offensive method of stating political opposition to the President rather than a true threat to take his life.16
The evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the petitioner made a threat against the President under the 1917 statute.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas concurs in the result.18 He provides a detailed historical account demonstrating how laws punishing threats or seditious words have been misused to suppress political speech.19 Tracing the statute's ancestry to the English Statute of Treasons, Douglas recounts cases where individuals were executed for statements such as promising to make his son heir to the crown or predicting the king's death.20
He further details abuses under the Alien and Sedition Laws, including the conviction of Luther Baldwin for a crude joke about firing at the president.21 Douglas emphasizes that the present statute has led to similar convictions for mere expressions of dislike for presidents, arguing that such suppression of speech is outlawed by the Constitution.22
Joined by Justice Harlan
Justice Fortas, joined by Justice Harlan, dissents from the Court's decision to reach the merits without a full hearing.23 He argues that the Court should not adjudicate the constitutionality of the statute or its application to the petitioner's statement without proper briefing and argument.24 Fortas notes that even if the rulings are correct, they should not be made without hearing.25
He points out that the case is trivial because of its peculiar facts and the suspended sentence imposed on the petitioner, which should have led the Court to deny certiorari rather than decide the difficult questions presented.26
Whether the trial judge erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal?27
We hold that the trial judge erred in denying this motion.28
Yes. Petitioner's trial counsel moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the Government's case, stressing that the statement occurred in political debate, was conditional on induction that would never occur, and drew laughter from the crowd.29 The trial judge erred in denying the motion because the evidence showed only crude political opposition rather than a true threat.30
The trial judge erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas supports the reversal by cataloging historical abuses under treason and sedition statutes.32 He details numerous instances where mere words were punished as constructive treason or sedition, from medieval England to the American Sedition Act cases, where criticism of the president led to fines and imprisonment.33 Douglas highlights that the tendency of words to produce acts was stretched to its utmost latitude, punishing what has become commonplace in American political life.34
This historical perspective underscores why the petitioner's political hyperbole should not be criminalized under the statute.35
Joined by Justice Harlan
Justice Fortas, with Justice Harlan, maintains that the trivial nature of the case, involving a suspended sentence and peculiar facts, does not provide justification for the Court to decide the merits without a full hearing.36 He contends that the peculiar facts and lenient sentence should have prompted denial of certiorari instead of adjudication of complex constitutional questions on an incomplete record.37
Whether the 1917 statute is constitutional on its face?38
The Nation has a valid and overwhelming interest in protecting the safety of its Chief Executive and allowing him to perform his duties without interference from threats of physical violence.39 This renders the statute constitutional on its face.40 However, any such statute making criminal a form of pure speech must be interpreted with First Amendment commands clearly in mind.41
Yes. The statute under which petitioner was convicted is constitutional on its face because of the valid interest in protecting the President from threats of physical violence, as recognized in the legislative history.42 Nevertheless, the statute must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind to distinguish threats from protected speech.43
The 1917 statute is constitutional on its face.44