582 U.S. 286, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 198 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2017)
In 2003, a 15-year-old boy was shot and killed in Boston.1 A witness saw a young man fleeing the scene and saw him pull out a pistol.2 A baseball hat with a distinctive airbrushed Detroit Tigers logo fell off the man's head.3 The hat was later linked to 16-year-old Kentel Weaver by distinctive markings and DNA.4 Two weeks after the crime the police questioned petitioner.5 He admitted losing his hat around the time of the shooting but denied involvement.6 After his mother pressed him, he went to the police station and confessed.7 Petitioner was indicted for first-degree murder and unlicensed possession of a handgun, pleaded not guilty, and proceeded to trial.8
The venire comprised about 60 to 100 potential jurors, while the assigned courtroom accommodated only 50 to 60 seats.9 The judge brought the entire venire into the courtroom to introduce the case and ask preliminary questions.10 Many potential jurors stood.11 After preliminary questions, those who had been standing were moved outside the courtroom to wait during individual voir dire questioning.12 Because the courtroom seats were occupied by the venire, an officer of the court excluded any member of the public who was not a potential juror.13 Petitioner's mother and her minister, who had come to observe, were turned away.14
During voir dire petitioner's mother informed defense counsel about the closure.15 Counsel believed that courtroom closure for jury selection was constitutional, so he did not discuss the matter with petitioner.16 Counsel did not inform him that jury voir dire is included in the right to a public trial and did not object.17 The government presented strong evidence, including petitioner's admission to police and the hat DNA.18 The jury convicted on both counts, and the court sentenced petitioner to life on the murder charge and about a year on the gun-possession charge.19
Five years later petitioner moved for a new trial in Massachusetts state court, arguing as relevant here that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the courtroom closure.20 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found a violation of the right to a public trial, concluding the courtroom had been closed, the closure was full and unjustified, and defense counsel failed to object because of serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention.21 The trial court found no evidence or argument establishing prejudice and denied relief.22 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in relevant part, recognizing the closure as structural error but holding that petitioner failed to show that counsel's conduct caused prejudice warranting a new trial.23
Federal and state courts disagree whether a defendant who shows that counsel unreasonably failed to object to a structural error is entitled to a new trial without a showing of prejudice, or must still demonstrate prejudice.24 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve that disagreement, limited to trial counsel's failure to object to courtroom closure during jury selection.25
Whether a defendant who raises a structural error through an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must demonstrate prejudice to obtain relief?26
Structural errors affect the framework within which the trial proceeds rather than being merely trial-process errors and ordinarily require automatic reversal on direct review without inquiry into prejudice.27 When a structural error is instead raised through an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington, however, the defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.28 Prejudice is shown by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, or, under the assumption made for this case, that the errors rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.29 The public-trial right is structural, yet not every violation produces fundamental unfairness, and the effects of closure are often intangible and difficult to measure.30
Yes. Kentel Weaver raised the structural public-trial violation only through an ineffective-assistance claim after failing to object at trial or on direct review.31 The record shows counsel's performance was deficient because he did not object to the full and unjustified closure during the two days of voir dire.32 Weaver presented no evidence establishing a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted but for the failure to object.33
The strong evidence of guilt from the confession and DNA on the hat confirms the absence of outcome prejudice.34 The limited closure to two days of voir dire, with the evidentiary phase open to the public and no indication of juror misconduct or other unfairness, also fails to demonstrate that counsel's error rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.35
A defendant who raises a structural error through an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must demonstrate prejudice to obtain relief, and because Kentel Weaver made no such showing the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is affirmed.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Gorsuch
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment but writes separately to note two observations about the scope of the holding.37 He expresses doubts about whether Presley v. Georgia, which extended the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial to jury selection, is consistent with the original understanding of the right.38 He would be open to reconsidering that precedent in a future case.39
He also observes that Strickland itself identified three ways to establish prejudice and did not hold that demonstrating fundamental unfairness is an independent mode of proof.40 He does not read the majority opinion to preclude the approach set forth in Justice Alito's concurrence.41
Justice Alito concurs in the judgment and emphasizes that the case calls for straightforward application of Strickland v. Washington.42 He explains that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated only if counsel's performance was deficient and that deficient performance prejudiced the defense.43 Prejudice arises from the nature of the right itself.44
Characterizing an error as structural for harmless-error purposes does not relieve a defendant of the Strickland prejudice requirement.45 Weaver has not shown a reasonable likelihood that counsel's failure to object affected the verdict.46 Nor does the situation fall within the narrow class of errors for which prejudice is presumed.47 The claim must therefore be rejected on Strickland grounds alone.48
Joined by Justice Kagan
Justice Breyer dissents, joined by Justice Kagan, and concludes that when counsel's constitutionally deficient performance produces a structural error the defendant should not face the additional Strickland hurdle of proving that the error changed the outcome.49 He notes that structural errors affect the framework of the trial and have been held to defy harmless-error analysis and to warrant automatic reversal on direct appeal.50 Because the benefits of a public trial are frequently intangible and difficult to prove, requiring proof of actual prejudice would often make relief practically impossible.51
He would therefore hold that a showing that counsel's deficient performance caused a structural error is sufficient to entitle a defendant to relief.52