446 U.S. 142, 151, 100 S.Ct. 1540, 1546, 64 L.Ed.2d 107 (1980)
On February 11, 1977, Ruth Wengler, wife of appellant Paul J. Wengler, died in a work-related accident in the parking lot of her employer, appellee Dicus Prescription Drugs, Inc.1
Her husband, appellant Paul J. Wengler, filed a claim for death benefits under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.240 (Supp. 1979).2 Under the statute a widower is not entitled to death benefits unless he either is mentally or physically incapacitated from wage earning or proves actual dependence on his wife’s earnings.3 In contrast, a widow qualifies for death benefits without having to prove actual dependence on her husband’s earnings.4
Wengler stipulated that he was neither incapacitated nor dependent on his wife’s earnings.5 He argued that the statute’s disparate treatment of similarly situated widows and widowers violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.6 The claim was administratively denied.7 The Circuit Court of Madison County reversed, holding that § 287.240 violated the Equal Protection Clause because the statutory restriction on a widower’s recovery of death benefits did not also apply to a surviving wife.8 Dicus and its insurer, appellee Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., were ordered to pay death benefits to appellant in the appropriate amount.9
The Missouri Supreme Court, distinguishing cases in this Court, reversed the Circuit Court’s decision.10 The equal protection challenge to § 287.240 failed because the substantive difference in the economic standing of working men and women justifies the advantage that the statute administratively gives to a widow.11 Because the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri arguably conflicted with precedents, the Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction.12 The Supreme Court reversed.13
Whether the provision of the Missouri workers’ compensation laws that requires a widower to prove mental or physical incapacity or actual dependence on his wife’s earnings to receive death benefits, while conclusively presuming a widow’s dependence on her husband’s earnings, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?14
Gender-based discriminations must serve important governmental objectives and the discriminatory means employed must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.15
Yes. The Missouri statute creates a gender-based presumption that discriminates against both working women and surviving male spouses.16 On February 11, 1977, Ruth Wengler died in a work-related accident, and her husband Paul J. Wengler stipulated that he was neither incapacitated nor dependent on her earnings, leading to denial of benefits under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.240.17 A widow in identical circumstances would have received benefits automatically without proof of dependency.18
Providing for needy spouses is surely an important governmental objective, and the Missouri statute effects that goal by paying benefits to all surviving female spouses and to all surviving male spouses who prove their dependency.19 But the question remains whether the discriminatory means employed itself substantially serves the statutory end.20 The state offered no persuasive demonstration as to what the economic consequences to the State or to the beneficiaries might be if men and women were treated equally under the workers’ compensation law.21 The bare assertion of economic differences between the sexes falls far short of justifying gender-based discrimination on the grounds of administrative convenience.22
The Circuit Court of Madison County correctly identified the constitutional violation and ordered payment of benefits to Wengler, but the Missouri Supreme Court erred in upholding the statute on grounds of administrative convenience and perceived economic standing. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction due to the conflict with its precedents and reversed the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision.23
The provision of the Missouri workers’ compensation laws violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. Nothing has happened since the decision in Califano v. Goldfarb to persuade him that this kind of gender-based classification can simultaneously disfavor the male class and the female class.25 He identified three relevant kinds of marriages to illustrate his difficulty with the analysis in Part II of the Court’s opinion.26
In his view the class against which the statute discriminates is the male class.27 He agreed that Missouri has failed to justify the disparate treatment of persons who have as strong a claim to equal treatment as do similarly situated surviving spouses.28 He concluded that its statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.