124 U.S. 190 (1888)
The plaintiffs are merchants doing business in the city of New York.1 In August 1882 they imported a large quantity of centrifugal and molasses sugars, the produce and manufacture of the island of San Domingo.2 These goods were similar in kind to sugars produced in the Hawaiian Islands.3
The plaintiffs entered the goods at the custom house at the port of New York.4 They claimed that by the treaty with the Republic of San Domingo the goods should be admitted free of duty as similar articles from the Hawaiian Islands were admitted under a separate treaty and act of Congress.5 The defendant, collector of the port, refused the claim, treated the goods as dutiable articles, and exacted duties on them to the amount of $21,936.6
The plaintiffs appealed from the collector’s decision to the Secretary of the Treasury.7 The appeal was denied.8 They then paid under protest the duties exacted and brought the present action to recover the amount.9
The complaint set forth the facts as to the importation of the goods, the claim of the plaintiffs that they should be admitted free of duty, the refusal of the collector to allow the claim, the appeal from his decision to the Secretary of the Treasury and its denial by him, and the payment under protest of the duties exacted.10 The defendant demurred to the complaint.11 The demurrer was sustained, and final judgment was entered in his favor, to review which the case is brought here.12
Whether the ninth article of the treaty with the Dominican Republic requires that sugars imported from San Domingo be admitted free of duty on the ground that similar sugars from the Hawaiian Islands are admitted free under a separate treaty?13
The ninth article of the treaty with the Dominican Republic is substantially like the fourth article in the treaty with the king of Denmark and constitutes a pledge of the contracting parties that there shall be no discriminating legislation against the importation of articles which are the growth, produce, or manufacture of their respective countries, in favor of articles of like character, imported from any other country. It has no greater extent and was never designed to prevent special concessions, upon sufficient considerations, touching the importation of specific articles into the country of the other.14
No. The established facts show that the plaintiffs imported centrifugal and molasses sugars produced in San Domingo.15 These sugars were similar in kind to sugars from the Hawaiian Islands admitted free of duty under a separate treaty and act of Congress.16 The ninth article pledges the parties against discriminatory duties on like articles from any other foreign country.17 It does not reach the special reciprocal arrangement made with Hawaii for valuable consideration.18 Application of this rule to the named facts of the 1882 importation, the collector's refusal, and the exacted duties of $21,936 demonstrates that the treaty creates no obligation to admit the San Domingo sugars free of duty.19
The reasoning begins from the text of the ninth article and compares it directly to the Danish treaty language already construed by the court.20 Because the Hawaiian concession rested on an exchange of privileges rather than a general most-favored-nation pledge, the San Domingo claim falls outside the treaty's scope.21 The demurrer was therefore properly sustained on this ground.22
The ninth article of the treaty with the Dominican Republic does not require that sugars imported from San Domingo be admitted free of duty.23
Whether an act of Congress passed after the treaty with the Dominican Republic and making no exception for goods of any country controls the exaction of duties on the imported sugars?24
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.25
Yes. The act of Congress under which the duties were collected was passed after the treaty with the Dominican Republic and is of general application, making no exception in favor of goods of any country.26 The established facts confirm that the collector treated the San Domingo sugars as dutiable under this later statute and exacted $21,936 in duties after the Secretary of the Treasury denied the plaintiffs' appeal.27 Because the statute is the latest expression of sovereign will and conflicts with any broader reading of the treaty, it controls the exaction.28
The analysis recognizes that a treaty and a statute stand as equal legislative enactments. When inconsistency appears, the later enactment prevails in the courts.29 The plaintiffs' payment under protest and subsequent suit therefore cannot succeed against the clear command of the post-treaty statute.30
The act of Congress passed after the treaty with the Dominican Republic controls the exaction of duties on the imported sugars.31