539 U.S. 510 (2003)
In September 1988, police discovered the body of 77-year-old Florence Lacs drowned in the bathtub of her ransacked apartment in Woodlawn, Maryland.1
The State indicted Kevin Wiggins for the crime on October 20, 1988, and later filed a notice of intention to seek the death penalty.2 Two Baltimore County public defenders, Carl Schlaich and Michelle Nethercott, assumed responsibility for Wiggins' case.3
In July 1989, Wiggins elected to be tried before a judge in Baltimore County Circuit Court.4 On August 4, 1989, after a four-day trial, the court found Wiggins guilty of first-degree murder, robbery, and two counts of theft.5
After his conviction, Wiggins elected to be sentenced by a jury, and the trial court scheduled the proceedings to begin on October 11, 1989.6 On September 11, 1989, counsel filed a motion for bifurcation of sentencing, intending first to prove that Wiggins did not act as a principal in the first degree and then, if necessary, to present a mitigation case.7
The court denied the motion on October 12, 1989, and sentencing proceedings commenced immediately.8 In her opening statement, Nethercott told the jurors they would hear evidence suggesting that someone other than Wiggins actually killed Lacs.9
Nethercott also told the jury that Wiggins had a difficult life with no prior convictions.10 Counsel introduced no evidence of Wiggins' life history during the proceedings.11
Before closing arguments, Schlaich made a proffer to the court outside the presence of the jury detailing the mitigation case counsel would have presented, including psychological reports and expert testimony on Wiggins' limited intellectual capacities.12
At no point did Schlaich proffer any evidence of Wiggins' life history or family background.13 On October 18, 1989, the jury returned with a sentence of death.14 A divided Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed.15
In 1993, Wiggins sought postconviction relief in Baltimore County Circuit Court with new counsel, arguing that his attorneys had rendered constitutionally defective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background.16
To support his claim, Wiggins presented testimony by Hans Selvog, a licensed social worker, concerning an elaborate social history report based on state social services, medical, and school records as well as interviews with Wiggins and family members.17
Selvog's report chronicled severe physical and sexual abuse by Wiggins' alcoholic mother and foster parents, time spent homeless, and diminished mental capacities.18
During the postconviction proceedings, Schlaich testified that he did not remember retaining a forensic social worker to prepare a social history despite available state funds.19
Schlaich explained that he and Nethercott had decided to focus on retrying the factual case and disputing Wiggins' direct responsibility for the murder.20
In October 1997, the trial court denied the petition.21 The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that counsel had made a deliberate tactical decision to concentrate on convincing the jury that Wiggins was not directly responsible for the murder.22
The Maryland Court of Appeals also concluded that counsel knew of Wiggins' unfortunate childhood from the presentence investigation report and social services records.
In September 2001, Wiggins filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court.23 The District Court granted relief, holding that the Maryland courts' rejection of his ineffective assistance claim involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.24
Reviewing de novo, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that counsel had made a reasonable strategic decision to focus on Wiggins' direct responsibility.25 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.26
Whether Wiggins' trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his background?27
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a claim of ineffective assistance requires showing that counsel's performance was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.28
Yes. Schlaich and Nethercott limited their investigation to the PSI report and DSS records showing Wiggins' alcoholic mother and foster care placements but did not retain a forensic social worker despite available state funds or commission a social history report as required by standard practice in Maryland capital cases at the time.29 Their decision to focus exclusively on retrying the factual case and disputing direct responsibility for the murder left unexplored leads in the DSS records concerning physical and sexual abuse.30
The record of the sentencing proceedings shows that counsel sought bifurcation until the eve of sentencing and presented only a halfhearted mitigation case after the motion was denied, indicating that the limited investigation resulted from inattention rather than strategic judgment.31
Wiggins' trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his background.32
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Thomas, J.
Justice Scalia dissented on the ground that Schlaich's postconviction testimony established his awareness of Wiggins' background including reports of sexual abuse and the hand-burning incident.33 This made the Maryland Court of Appeals' conclusion that counsel conducted an adequate investigation reasonable under § 2254(d).34 He argued that the majority improperly disbelieved the testimony and failed to defer to the state court's factual findings under § 2254(e)(1).35
The dissent emphasized that the state court's factual determinations bound the federal habeas court unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.36
Whether the Maryland Court of Appeals' rejection of the ineffective assistance claim involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)?37
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal writ may be granted if the state court decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.38 A state court unreasonably applies the law when it identifies the correct governing legal principle but applies it in an objectively unreasonable manner to the facts of the case.39
Yes. The Maryland Court of Appeals identified Strickland as the governing standard but unreasonably applied it by assuming that counsel's possession of the PSI and DSS records made their decision not to investigate further a reasonable strategic choice without assessing whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.40 The court also relied on the erroneous factual premise that the social services records documented incidences of sexual abuse.41
The Maryland Court of Appeals' rejection of the ineffective assistance claim involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).42
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Thomas, J.
Justice Scalia maintained that the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision did not unreasonably apply Strickland because the state court reasonably credited Schlaich's testimony that he knew the essential details of Wiggins' background and made a deliberate tactical decision to focus on the principal-in-the-first-degree defense.43 He argued that the majority's refusal to defer to the state court's factual findings violated the requirements of § 2254(e)(1) and that no new law had been made in Williams v. Taylor that was clearly established at the time of the state decision.44
Whether counsel's investigation into Wiggins' background was reasonable under prevailing professional norms?45
Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.46 The reasonableness of a decision not to investigate must be assessed directly in all the circumstances with deference to counsel's judgments, measured against prevailing professional norms including ABA standards for capital defense work.47
No. Counsel's decision not to expand their investigation beyond the PSI report and DSS records fell short of the professional standards prevailing in Maryland in 1989, which included preparation of a social history report, and of the ABA Guidelines requiring efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence.48 The DSS records revealed facts about Wiggins' alcoholic mother and foster care problems that would have led any reasonably competent attorney to pursue further investigation.49
Counsel's investigation into Wiggins' background was not reasonable under prevailing professional norms.50
Whether counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence prejudiced Wiggins' defense?51
To establish prejudice a defendant must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.52 Prejudice is assessed by reweighing the aggravating evidence against the totality of the mitigating evidence adduced at trial and in the habeas proceedings.53
Yes. The mitigating evidence counsel failed to discover and present was powerful, including severe privation and abuse by Wiggins' alcoholic mother, physical torment and repeated rape in foster care, time spent homeless, and diminished mental capacities.54 Wiggins' sentencing jury heard only the mitigating factor of no prior convictions, and there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance had the jury been able to place his life history on the mitigating side of the scale.55
Counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence prejudiced Wiggins' defense.56
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Thomas, J.
Justice Scalia contended that Wiggins failed to show prejudice because his trial attorneys would not have altered their chosen strategy even with the additional information in the social history report and because much of the report consisted of inadmissible hearsay that the jury would not have credited.57 He noted that the only way to present the allegations would have been to place Wiggins on the stand, exposing him to cross-examination, and that the state court's factual findings bound the federal court on the question of counsel's knowledge.58