337 U.S. 241 (1949)
In a New York state court, a jury found the appellant guilty of murder in the first degree.1 The trial lasted more than two weeks.2 The appellant was represented by three appointed lawyers who conducted his defense with fidelity and zeal.3 The jury recommended life imprisonment, but the trial judge imposed a sentence of death.4
About five weeks after the verdict, a statutory pre-sentence investigation report was submitted to the judge.5 The defendant was brought to court for sentencing.6 He protested his innocence.7 After his three lawyers appealed to the court to accept the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, the judge gave reasons for imposing death.8 The judge referred to the pre-sentence investigation revealing the appellant's involvement in thirty other burglaries in the same vicinity.9 Some of these the appellant had confessed to, and he had been identified as the perpetrator of others.10 The judge also noted activities indicating a morbid sexuality and classification as a menace to society.11 The accuracy of these statements was not challenged by the appellant or his counsel.12
The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the conviction and sentence.13 The affirmation was over the contention that the death sentence was based upon information supplied by witnesses with whom the accused had not been confronted and as to whom he had no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal.14 The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).15
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit a sentencing judge from considering information about a convicted defendant's background and character obtained outside the courtroom from sources with whom the defendant had no opportunity for confrontation or cross-examination?16
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit a sentencing judge from considering such information.17 Historical practice has long permitted sentencing judges broad discretion to consider a wide range of out-of-court information.18 Practical considerations distinguish sentencing from the strict evidentiary rules applicable at trial.19
No. The trial in this case lasted more than two weeks. The appellant was represented by three appointed lawyers who conducted his defense with fidelity and zeal. The evidence proved a murder committed during a burglary.20 About five weeks after the verdict recommending life imprisonment, the judge received a statutory pre-sentence investigation report.21 At sentencing the judge referred to the appellant's involvement in thirty other burglaries in the same vicinity.22 The judge also noted activities indicating morbid sexuality and classification as a menace to society.23 The accuracy of these statements was not challenged by the appellant or his counsel. Nor was any request made for cross-examination or rebuttal.24 The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed over the due process objection.25 The information was obtained pursuant to New York Criminal Code § 482 authorizing the court to seek any information aiding proper treatment of the defendant.26
This procedure fits the established distinction between trial rules and sentencing rules. Trial rules narrowly confine evidence to the charged offense. Sentencing rules allow the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics. The goal is to fit the punishment to the offender rather than merely the crime.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit the sentencing judge from considering such out-of-court information in imposing sentence.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rutledge dissents from the majority's conclusion that the sentencing procedure satisfied due process.28