575 U.S. 433 (2015)
Florida entered the Union in 1845 with judges elected by the legislature.1 Over subsequent decades the state shifted to popular election of trial and appellate judges.2
Following corruption scandals in the early 1970s that prompted four justices to resign, Florida amended its constitution to provide merit selection for appellate judges while retaining popular election for trial judges.3 In response to those scandals the Florida Supreme Court adopted a Code of Judicial Conduct containing Canon 7C(1).4
Lanell Williams-Yulee, who had practiced law in Florida since 1991, filed paperwork in September 2009 to run for a seat on the county court in Hillsborough County.5 She drafted a letter announcing her candidacy that described her experience and desire to bring fresh ideas to the bench.6 The letter then solicited contributions of twenty-five, fifty, one hundred, two hundred fifty, or five hundred dollars payable to the Lanell Williams-Yulee Campaign for County Judge and asked recipients to help meet primary election fundraising goals.7
Yulee signed the letter, mailed it to local voters, and posted it on her campaign website.8 Yulee lost the primary to the incumbent judge.9 The Florida Bar filed a complaint charging her with violating Rule 4-8.2(b) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar by failing to comply with Canon 7C(1).10 A referee appointed by the Florida Supreme Court held a hearing, recommended a finding of guilt, and proposed a public reprimand together with an order to pay one thousand eight hundred sixty dollars in costs.11
The Florida Supreme Court adopted the referee's recommendations in a 2014 decision.12 Yulee sought review in the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.13
Whether the First Amendment permits Canon 7C(1) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct to prohibit judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds?14
The First Amendment permits a State to restrict the speech of a judicial candidate only if the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.15 Florida has a compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary because the judiciary's authority depends on public respect rather than force or the purse.16 Canon 7C(1) is narrowly tailored because it prohibits only personal solicitations by candidates while permitting committee solicitations, thank-you notes, issue discussions, speeches, and all other forms of campaign communication.17
Yes. Florida's interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary is compelling.18 The judiciary, unlike the political branches, has no influence over the sword or the purse and therefore depends on the public's willingness to respect and follow its decisions.19 Yulee practiced law in Florida since 1991 and in September 2009 filed to run for county court judge in Hillsborough County.20
She then signed and mailed a letter soliciting contributions of twenty-five, fifty, one hundred, two hundred fifty, or five hundred dollars and posted the same letter on her campaign website, directly violating the personal-solicitation ban.21 The canon applies evenhandedly to all judicial candidates regardless of viewpoint and contains no exceptions that would render it underinclusive.22 Personal solicitation by the candidate herself creates a categorically different appearance of impropriety than solicitation by a campaign committee.23 The candidate places her name and reputation behind the request, and the recipient knows the same person may later sign the judgment.24
The restriction is not overinclusive because candidates remain free to discuss any issue, give speeches, contact supporters in person or online, and direct their committees to raise funds.25 Recusal rules and contribution limits are not adequate substitutes.26 Mandatory recusal in every contribution case would disable jurisdictions, and contribution limits already exist yet do not eliminate the distinct appearance created by personal requests.27 The canon therefore survives strict scrutiny as applied to Yulee's mass-mailed and online solicitation.28
The First Amendment permits Canon 7C(1)’s ban on the personal solicitation of campaign funds by judicial candidates.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion to emphasize his longstanding view that the Court's doctrine referring to tiers of scrutiny functions as guidelines informing the approach to each case rather than as mechanical tests to be applied rigidly.30 He joined the Court's opinion on that understanding.31
Joined by Justice Breyer (as To Part Ii)
Justice Ginsburg joined the opinion except for Part II and wrote separately to stress that States possess substantial latitude to enact campaign-finance rules geared to judicial elections.32 She reiterated that judges are not politicians and that precedents governing political elections therefore have little bearing on judicial contests.33 States may differentiate judicial elections from political ones to protect impartiality without equating the two.34
Ginsburg would not apply exacting scrutiny to a State's sensible effort to separate elections for political offices from elections designed to select judges who must administer justice without respect to persons.35 She concluded that States should have leeway to balance judicial integrity and free expression within the unique setting of an elected judiciary.36
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Justice Thomas, arguing that the canon fails strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored.37 The canon prohibits candidates from asking for money from anybody even from someone who is neither lawyer nor litigant even from someone who because of recusal rules cannot possibly appear before the candidate as lawyer or litigant.38 Florida's selective prohibition of campaign solicitations while permitting other requests for favors reveals that the rule reflects hostility to judicial campaigning rather than a genuine effort to protect appearances of integrity.39
Scalia maintained that the Court flattens settled First Amendment principles to uphold the canon.40 He concluded that the peaceful coexistence of judicial elections and personal solicitations for most of American history calls into doubt any claim that allowing personal solicitations would imperil public faith in judges.41
Justice Kennedy dissented to underscore the irony of weakening First Amendment protections in the very context of elections where robust speech is most essential.42 He maintained that the decision rests on incorrect premises about voter judgment and judicial dignity.43 The proper response to concerns about campaign practices is more speech and disclosure, not state censorship that silences candidates and deprives the electorate of information.44
Kennedy observed that the individual speech here is political speech and the process is a fair election.45 These realms ought to be the last place, not the first, for the Court to allow unprecedented content-based restrictions on speech.46 He concluded that the Court's decision imperils the content neutrality essential both for individual speech and the election process.47
Justice Alito dissented, largely agreeing with Justices Scalia and Kennedy that the rule is not narrowly tailored.48 He observed that the canon applies to mass mailings, newspaper advertisements, and solicitations of non-lawyers who have no prospect of appearing before the candidate.49 Such breadth demonstrates that the restriction cannot survive the demanding requirements of strict scrutiny.50
Alito noted that the Florida rule regulates speech that is part of the process of selecting those who wield the power of the State.51 He concluded that when petitioner sent out a form letter requesting campaign contributions she was well within her First Amendment rights.52