526 U.S. 603 (1999)
In early 1992 the Attorney General approved Operation Gunsmoke, a national program in which United States Marshals and local police targeted armed fugitives wanted for serious drug and violent felonies.1 One target was Dominic Wilson, who had violated probation on robbery, theft, and assault charges and whose computer record listed caution indicators for being armed and resisting arrest.2 The listed address was 909 North Stone Street Avenue in Rockville, Maryland, the home of his parents Charles and Geraldine Wilson.3 In April 1992 the Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued three arrest warrants for Dominic Wilson addressed to any peace officer and commanding immediate arrest; the warrants contained no reference to media presence.4
On April 16, 1992 a Gunsmoke team of Deputy United States Marshals and Montgomery County officers assembled to execute the warrants.5 The team was accompanied by a Washington Post reporter and photographer invited under the Marshals Service ride-along policy.6 Shortly after 6:45 a.m. the officers entered the Wilson home.7 Charles Wilson, wearing only briefs, confronted the armed men in street clothes and was subdued on the living-room floor.8 Geraldine Wilson, wearing only a nightgown, entered and saw her husband restrained.9 After a protective sweep revealed Dominic Wilson was absent, the officers left; during the entry the Post photographer took numerous pictures while the reporter observed.10
The Washington Post never published the photographs.11 Charles and Geraldine Wilson sued the federal officers under Bivens and the county officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the media presence during the warrant execution violated their Fourth Amendment rights.12 The district court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds.13 On interlocutory appeal a Fourth Circuit panel reversed; after two en banc rehearings the court upheld qualified immunity without deciding whether the media presence violated the Fourth Amendment.14
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that no prior decision had held media entry into a home during warrant execution unconstitutional, so the asserted right was not clearly established.15 Noting a circuit split on the issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether police officers violate the Fourth Amendment by inviting media representatives to accompany them during the execution of an arrest warrant inside a private home?17
The Fourth Amendment requires that police actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion.18 The presence of third parties such as media representatives not in aid of that execution exceeds the scope of the warrant and violates the Amendment.
Yes. The officers invited media representatives who took no part in executing the warrant for Dominic Wilson and whose presence served no law-enforcement purpose tied to the arrest.19 The media entry therefore exceeded the limited authority granted by the arrest warrant under Payton v. New York and related precedents.20
The officers violated the Fourth Amendment by bringing media representatives into the Wilson home during execution of the arrest warrant.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens joined Parts I and II of the majority opinion on the merits.22 He agreed that bringing media representatives into a private home during warrant execution violates the Fourth Amendment when their presence is not in aid of the warrant's objectives and the homeowner has not consented.23 Stevens emphasized that the principle limiting police action to the warrant's purposes flows directly from the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home, English common-law traditions, and the American rejection of general warrants.24
He noted that the Court spoke unanimously on the constitutional violation, underscoring that the media ride-along in this case had no connection to apprehending Dominic Wilson and therefore fell outside any permissible exception.25
Whether officers who invited media into a private home during warrant execution are entitled to qualified immunity because the constitutional right was not clearly established in April 1992?26
Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages. This applies unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.27 The right must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity so that its contours would be clear to a reasonable officer.28
No. In April 1992 no controlling precedent had held that media presence during execution of an arrest warrant inside a home violated the Fourth Amendment.29 The only published decision on point was a Wisconsin intermediate appellate court opinion that found such conduct not unreasonable, and two unpublished district court decisions had upheld similar entries on non-Fourth Amendment privacy theories.30 The officers relied on the Marshals Service ride-along policy that explicitly contemplated media entry into homes to obtain action footage during fugitive arrests, and the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department maintained a similar program.31
At the time of the search the state of the law on third-party entry was undeveloped, and reasonable officers could look to their formal policies for guidance.32 If judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy.33 The appropriate specificity inquiry confirms that a reasonable officer could have believed the media ride-along was lawful under then-existing law.34
The officers are entitled to qualified immunity because the Fourth Amendment right at issue was not clearly established in April 1992.35
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented from the qualified-immunity holding.36 He maintained that the right against media trespass during warrant execution had been clearly established long before April 1992 by the Fourth Amendment's core protection of the home, the common-law principle that the purposes of an intrusion strictly limit its scope, and a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3105.37 Stevens argued that the absence of on-point judicial opinions did not justify the officers' conduct because the constitutional rule itself was longstanding and obvious; the officers' invitation to the media plainly exceeded the warrant's scope.38
He rejected reliance on the Marshals Service public-relations booklet as far-fetched and noted that the Court's own unanimous condemnation of the practice on the merits demonstrated the violation should have been apparent to any reasonable officer.39