10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402
The plaintiff, Winterbottom, initiated legal proceedings against the defendant, Wright, following an injury sustained in the operation of a mail coach.1 Wright had previously entered into a contract with the Postmaster-General under which he assumed responsibility for the repair and maintenance of the mail coaches.2 Winterbottom was employed by Atkinson, who had a separate contract with the Postmaster-General to provide the horses and drivers for the mail service, and the coach in question was supplied to Atkinson by the defendant.3
Subsequently, the coach overturned due to its defective condition, resulting in personal injury to the plaintiff.4 The declaration in the action alleged that the defendant had taken upon himself the sole and exclusive duty to keep the mail coach in a fit, proper, safe, and secure state and condition by virtue of his contract with the Postmaster-General.5 The plaintiff was not a party to the contract between Wright and the Postmaster-General.6
The case was heard before the Court of Exchequer, with opinions delivered by Lord Abinger, C.B., Alderson, B., and Rolfe, B.7 The proceedings culminated in the entry of judgment for the defendant after consideration of the parties' positions.8
Whether a person not privy to a contract for the maintenance of a mail coach can maintain an action against the contractor for personal injuries caused by the coach's defective condition?9
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.10
No. The established facts show that Winterbottom was not a party to the contract between Wright and the Postmaster-General.11 The plaintiff was employed by Atkinson under a separate contract, and the coach was supplied to Atkinson by the defendant.12 Because no privity exists, the plaintiff cannot maintain an action against the contractor for injuries from the defective condition.13
A person not privy to the contract cannot maintain an action against the contractor for personal injuries caused by the coach's defective condition.14
Whether a duty to keep a mail coach in safe repair arises solely from the contract with the Postmaster-General or extends to third parties such as drivers employed by another contractor?15
The duty, therefore, is shown to have arisen solely from the contract, and the fallacy consists in the use of that word "duty." If a duty to the Postmaster-General be meant, that is true; but if a duty to the plaintiff be intended, and in that sense the word is evidently used, there was none.16
No. The declaration alleged that the defendant took upon himself the sole and exclusive duty to keep the mail coach in a fit, proper, safe, and secure state and condition by virtue of his contract with the Postmaster-General.17 The duty therefore arises solely from that contract and does not extend to third parties such as drivers employed by another contractor.18
The duty to keep a mail coach in safe repair arises solely from the contract with the Postmaster-General and does not extend to third parties such as drivers employed by another contractor.19
Whether hardship to an injured plaintiff or the risk of multiple actions justifies permitting suit by a stranger to the contract?20
This is one of those unfortunate cases in which there has been damnum, but it is damnum absque injuria. It is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a remedy, but by that consideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard cases, it has been frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law.21
No. The coach overturned due to its defective condition, resulting in personal injury to the plaintiff.22 The risk of an infinity of actions if suit by a stranger were permitted justifies confining recovery to those who entered the contract.23 Hardship alone does not justify expanding liability beyond the parties to the agreement.24
Hardship to an injured plaintiff or the risk of multiple actions does not justify permitting suit by a stranger to the contract.25