525 U.S. 70, 119 S. Ct. 391, 142 L. Ed. 2d 361, 1999 A.M.C. 201 (1998)
In 1970, petitioner Ceasar Wright began working as a longshoreman in Charleston, South Carolina.1 He was a member of Local 1422 of the International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, which uses a hiring hall to supply workers to several stevedore companies represented by the South Carolina Stevedores Association.2
Clause 15(B) of the CBA between the Union and the SCSA provided that matters under dispute which cannot be promptly settled shall be referred to a Port Grievance Committee.3 If not resolved, the dispute would go to a District Grievance Committee, with a professional arbitrator if necessary.4 The Longshore Seniority Plan provided that any dispute concerning or arising out of the terms and conditions of the agreement shall be referred to the Seniority Board.5
On February 18, 1992, while Wright was working for respondent Stevens Shipping and Terminal Company, he injured his right heel and back.6 He sought compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and ultimately settled the claim for $250,000 and $10,000 in attorney's fees.7 He was also awarded Social Security disability benefits.8
In January 1995, Wright returned to the Union hiring hall and asked to be referred for work.9 Between January 2 and January 11, Wright worked for four stevedoring companies.10 When the companies realized that Wright had previously settled a claim for permanent disability, they informed the Union that they would not accept Wright for employment.11
Wright contacted the Union to ask how he could get back to work.12 The Union told him to obtain counsel and file a claim under the ADA.13 Wright filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the South Carolina State Human Affairs Commission.14 In January 1996, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina against the SCSA and six individual stevedoring companies.15 The District Court adopted the report and recommendation and dismissed the case without prejudice.16 The Fourth Circuit affirmed.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.18
Whether a general arbitration clause in a collective-bargaining agreement requires an employee to use the arbitration procedure for an alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?19
A union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to a judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination must be clear and unmistakable.20 The presumption of arbitrability under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act applies only to disputes over the application or interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement itself.21 It does not extend to independent statutory claims arising under federal law such as the ADA.22
No. Petitioner Ceasar Wright commenced his employment as a longshoreman in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1970.23 As a member of Local 1422 of the International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, Wright participated in a hiring hall system that supplied workers to stevedore companies affiliated with the South Carolina Stevedores Association.24
The collective-bargaining agreement contained Clause 15(B), which directed that unresolved matters under dispute be referred in writing to a Port Grievance Committee no later than forty-eight hours after initial discussion.25 Should that committee fail to reach agreement within five days, the dispute would advance to a District Grievance Committee, and ultimately to a professional arbitrator if necessary.26 A parallel grievance mechanism appeared in the Longshore Seniority Plan, requiring disputes concerning the terms and conditions of the agreement to be submitted to the Seniority Board for final determination.27
Wright sustained injuries to his right heel and back on February 18, 1992, during his work for respondent Stevens Shipping and Terminal Company.28 He pursued compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, ultimately settling the claim for two hundred fifty thousand dollars plus ten thousand dollars in attorney’s fees, and he also received Social Security disability benefits.29
Upon returning to the hiring hall in January 1995 and obtaining medical clearance, Wright performed work for four stevedoring companies between January 2 and January 11 without incident.30 Once the companies discovered his prior permanent disability settlement, however, they declined to accept him for further employment on the ground that such certification rendered him unqualified under the CBA.31 The Union responded by directing Wright to retain counsel and pursue a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act rather than initiating the contractual grievance procedure.32
Wright accordingly filed administrative charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the South Carolina State Human Affairs Commission.33 After receiving a right-to-sue letter, he commenced an action in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina in January 1996 against the South Carolina Stevedores Association and six stevedoring companies.34 The District Court adopted the report and recommendation and dismissed the case without prejudice. The Fourth Circuit affirmed that disposition.35 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the arbitrability question.36
The CBA arbitration provisions in Clause 15(B) refer only to matters under dispute without any explicit reference to statutory claims or the ADA.37 Clause 15(F) states that the Agreement covers all matters affecting terms and conditions of employment but expressly provides that anything not contained in the Agreement shall not be construed as part of it.38 Clause 17 merely recites that no provision shall violate federal law and does not incorporate the ADA as a contractual commitment subject to arbitration.39 The Seniority Plan limits its grievance procedure to disputes related to the agreement.40 Wright was directed by the Union to pursue an ADA claim in court rather than through the grievance process.41 Therefore, there is no clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to a judicial forum for the statutory claim.42
The collective-bargaining agreement does not contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of the covered employees' rights to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment discrimination, so Wright was not required to arbitrate his ADA claim.43