321 U.S. 414 (1944)
Congress enacted the Emergency Price Control Act on January 30, 1942, as a temporary wartime measure.1
Congress amended it by the Stabilization Act of October 2, 1942.2
The Act authorized the Price Administrator, after consultation with industry representatives, to issue regulations fixing maximum prices that in his judgment would be generally fair and equitable and would effectuate the Act's purposes of stabilizing prices and preventing inflation.3 On April 28, 1942, the Administrator issued the General Maximum Price Regulation effective May 11, 1942, setting maximum prices at the highest price charged by the seller during March 1942.4 On December 10, 1942, the Administrator issued Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 169, establishing specific maximum prices for wholesale cuts of beef and veal.5
Petitioners Yakus and others operated wholesale meat businesses in Massachusetts. Between December 1942 and early 1943 they sold wholesale cuts of beef at prices exceeding the maximums prescribed by Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 169.6 Federal grand juries in the District of Massachusetts returned indictments charging them with willful violations of sections 4(a) and 205(b) of the Act.7 When the indictments were returned, the sixty-day period for filing administrative protests against the regulation had already expired.8
At trial the petitioners offered evidence on the validity of the regulation.9 They contended that the prices it fixed were not generally fair and equitable and that enforcement would compel them to sell at a loss.10 The district court excluded the evidence as irrelevant.11 It refused to submit the validity issue to the jury and convicted the petitioners on verdicts of guilty.12 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions.13
Petitioners in related cases were likewise convicted in the same district court for selling processed textile futures above maximum prices established by Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 and Supplementary Regulation No. 271.14 Those convictions were also affirmed on appeal.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in all cases because of the importance of the issues to administration of the Act.16
Whether the Emergency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942, as amended, unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Price Administrator?17
Congress may delegate authority under prescribed standards to the executive to administer the law, provided the standards are sufficiently definite to enable Congress, the courts, and the public to ascertain whether the Administrator has conformed to them.18
No. The Act in section 2(a) directs the Administrator to fix prices that in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of stabilizing prices and preventing inflation.19 This direction follows after consultation with industry representatives. These standards match those upheld in Field v. Clark and J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States.20 The Administrator applied them by issuing the General Maximum Price Regulation setting March 1942 levels and Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 169 for beef, both accompanied by statements of considerations showing conformity to the statutory objectives.21
The Act does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that the Act sets no limits on the Administrator's discretion.23 He noted that the seven purposes listed in section 1(a) are so broad that any action the Administrator believes will preserve a sound economy during the emergency falls within the granted power.24 In his view the supposed standards of fairness and equity are swallowed by the requirement that the regulation effectuate the purposes, leaving the Administrator's judgment as the final touchstone of validity.25
Roberts concluded that the decision effectively overrules Schechter and permits transfer of the legislative function to an autocrat whose judgment constitutes the law.26
Whether section 204(d) of the Act was intended to preclude a district court from considering the validity of a maximum price regulation as a defense to a criminal prosecution for its violation?27
Section 204(d) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Emergency Court of Appeals and this Court to determine the validity of any regulation. No other court has jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of any such regulation.28
Yes. The statutory language is broad enough to deprive the district court of power to consider validity as a defense.29 The Senate Committee report distinguished between constitutional validity of the statute itself, which enforcing courts may examine, and validity of a regulation, which is reserved exclusively for the Emergency Court.30 Petitioners had not filed protests within the sixty-day period, so the district court correctly refused to submit the validity issue to the jury or admit evidence on that question.31
Section 204(d) precludes consideration of the regulation's validity as a defense in the criminal prosecution.32
Whether the exclusive statutory procedure for administrative and judicial review of regulations provides a sufficiently adequate means of determining validity to meet the demands of due process?33
Yes. The protest procedure before the Administrator, followed by review in the Emergency Court of Appeals and certiorari here, affords an adequate opportunity to challenge a regulation.36 Petitioners could have filed protests within sixty days, introduced evidence, and sought modification.37 The wartime emergency justified denying interlocutory relief, as Congress balanced the risk of inflation against individual hardship.38 Petitioners failed to pursue the available remedy and did not show that the procedure was incapable of affording due process.39
The statutory review procedure satisfies due process.40
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Murphy
Justice Rutledge dissented on the ground that the procedure fails to meet constitutional requirements for criminal trials.41 He emphasized that the statute splits the trial into two parts, one summary civil proceeding before the Administrator and Emergency Court and the other a truncated criminal trial in which validity cannot be considered.42 Rutledge argued that this denies the accused the right to a full defense on issues essential to guilt, including constitutional questions, and that the single narrow route with a short limitations period does not provide an adequate substitute for the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.43
He concluded that the combination of devices, though each used before, had never before been combined in this way and could not be sustained even in wartime.44
Whether section 204(d), if construed to preclude consideration of the validity of the regulation as a defense to a prosecution, contravenes the Sixth Amendment or works an unconstitutional legislative interference with the judicial power?45
Congress may create specialized courts with exclusive jurisdiction over questions of regulatory validity.46 It may require that validity of administrative regulations be determined in a separate proceeding, so long as the procedure affords due process and the enforcing court retains power to decide whether the charged conduct occurred.47
No. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a jury trial on the facts constituting the crime, which here was whether petitioners willfully sold beef above the prescribed maximums.48 The validity issue is one of law reserved for the Emergency Court.49 Congress exercised its power to define federal court jurisdiction when it channeled validity questions to a single specialized court.50 Petitioners had an adequate opportunity to litigate validity through the protest procedure but did not do so.51
Section 204(d) does not violate the Sixth Amendment or constitute an unconstitutional interference with judicial power.52