434 U.S. 374 (1978)
In January 1972 a paternity action was instituted against Roger G. Redhail in Milwaukee County Court alleging that he was the father of a baby girl born out of wedlock on July 5, 1971.1
After Redhail admitted paternity the court entered an order on May 12, 1972 adjudging him the father and ordering him to pay $109 per month as support until the child reached age eighteen.2 From May 1972 until August 1974 Redhail was unemployed and indigent and consequently was unable to make any support payments.3
As of December 1974 there was an arrearage in excess of $3,700.4 The child had been a public charge since her birth receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.5 In September 1974 Redhail applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County.6
County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki denied the application because Redhail had not obtained a court order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 245.10(1).7 Redhail would not have been able to satisfy either statutory prerequisite for permission to marry.8 After the license denial Redhail filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.9
The complaint alleged that the statute violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284.11 The plaintiff class was certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).12 After the parties filed a stipulation of facts and briefs were submitted the three-judge court held the statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and enjoined its enforcement.13
Zablocki brought a direct appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253.14 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and affirmed the District Court judgment.15
Whether the Wisconsin statute significantly interferes with the fundamental right to marry?16
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free persons.17 When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.18
Yes. The Wisconsin statute significantly interferes with the fundamental right to marry because it requires persons subject to its provisions to obtain a court order before they may marry.19 It operates as a broad prohibition against marriage for a substantial segment of the class of persons subject to its provisions.20 Redhail's application for a marriage license was denied by the County Clerk because he had not obtained a court order pursuant to the statute.21 Redhail had been unemployed and indigent.22
The child was a public charge and he was in arrears on his support payments.23 The statute applies to residents and nonresidents, to persons in arrears and not in arrears, and to persons who are able and unable to support their children.24
The Wisconsin statute significantly interferes with the fundamental right to marry.25
Related opinions on this issue
I concur in the judgment of the Court. I agree that the Wisconsin statute interferes with the fundamental right to marry and that the statute is not narrowly tailored to advance the State's interests.26 I write separately to emphasize that the right to marry is not absolute.27
The State may regulate the conditions under which marriage may be entered into provided that the regulation does not significantly interfere with the right to marry.28 In my view the Wisconsin statute significantly interferes with the right to marry and is not narrowly tailored to advance the State's interests.29
I join MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion for the Court. With all deference, MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion does not persuade me that the analysis in the Court's opinion is in any significant way inconsistent with the Court's unanimous holding in Califano v. Jobst.30
The Social Security Act provisions challenged in Jobst did not constitute an attempt to interfere with the individual's freedom to make a decision as important as marriage.31 At most it had an indirect impact on that decision.32 It is with this understanding that I join the Court's opinion today.33
Whether the statutory classification created by the Wisconsin statute is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests?34
When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. The statute is both overinclusive and underinclusive.35
No. The statutory classification cannot be justified by the State's interest in counseling or in the financial protection of the child or the custodial spouse.36 The statute does not provide for counseling and makes no provision for permitting a marriage where counseling would not be helpful.37 The State has numerous other means to enforce support obligations that do not infringe upon the right to marry, such as wage assignments, civil contempt proceedings, and criminal nonsupport proceedings.38
The statute is both overinclusive and underinclusive with respect to preventing the marriage of persons likely to have children that will become public charges.39
The statutory classification created by the Wisconsin statute is not supported by sufficiently important state interests and is not closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.40
Related opinions on this issue
I concur in the judgment of the Court. I agree that the Wisconsin statute is unconstitutional.41 I write separately to note that the statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to appellee Redhail.42
The statute prohibits marriage for a broad class of persons without providing for individualized determinations.43 The statute is not narrowly tailored to advance the State's interests in ensuring that persons with support obligations are able to support their children and that the public fisc is not burdened by additional public charges.44 The State has numerous other means to advance those interests that do not infringe upon the fundamental right to marry.45
Because of the tension between some of the language in MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S opinion for the Court and the Court's unanimous holding in Califano v. Jobst, a further exposition of the reasons why the Wisconsin statute offends the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is necessary.46
A classification based on marital status is fundamentally different from a classification which determines who may lawfully enter into the marriage relationship.47 The individual's interest in making the marriage decision independently is sufficiently important to merit special constitutional protection.48 This Wisconsin statute has a different character because a person's economic status may determine his eligibility to enter into a lawful marriage.49
Whether the Wisconsin statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?50
The Wisconsin statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the statutory classification significantly interferes with the fundamental right to marry and is not supported by sufficiently important state interests closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.51
Yes. The Wisconsin statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it significantly interferes with the fundamental right to marry without being supported by sufficiently important state interests and without being closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.52 Redhail was denied a marriage license under the statute despite the existence of alternative enforcement mechanisms available to the State.53
The Wisconsin statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.54
Related opinions on this issue
I dissent. The Wisconsin statute does not significantly interfere with the right to marry.55 The statute merely regulates the conditions under which persons with support obligations may marry.56
The statute is rationally related to the State's legitimate interests in ensuring that persons with support obligations are able to support their children and that the public fisc is not burdened by additional public charges.57 The statute is not unconstitutional on its face or as applied to appellee Redhail.58 The judgment of the District Court should be reversed.59