494 U.S. 113 (1990)
Darrell Burch was found wandering along a Florida highway on December 7, 1981, appearing hurt and disoriented.1 He was taken to Apalachee Community Mental Health Services in Tallahassee, a private mental health care facility designated by the State to receive patients suffering from mental illness.2 Upon arrival at ACMHS, staff evaluation forms stated that Burch was hallucinating, confused, and psychotic and believed he was in heaven, with his face and chest bruised and bloodied.3 Burch was asked to sign forms giving his consent to admission and treatment, which he did, and he remained at ACMHS for three days during which the facility’s staff diagnosed his condition as paranoid schizophrenia and gave him psychotropic medication.4
On December 10, 1981, the staff found that Burch was in need of longer-term stabilization and referred him to Florida State Hospital, a public hospital owned and operated by the State as a mental health treatment facility.5 Later that day Burch signed forms requesting admission and authorizing treatment at FSH, and he was taken there by a county sheriff.6 Upon arrival at FSH, Burch signed other forms for voluntary admission and treatment, including a Request for Voluntary Admission witnessed by petitioners Janet V. Potter and Marjorie R. Parker and an Authorization for Treatment witnessed by petitioner Zinermon.7 Medical records from FSH described Burch on admission as disoriented, semimute, confused, bizarre in appearance and thought, not cooperative, extremely psychotic, paranoid, and hallucinating, and noted that he remained disoriented, delusional, and psychotic.8
Burch remained at FSH until May 7, 1982, five months after his initial admission to ACMHS, during which time no hearing was held regarding his hospitalization and treatment.9 After his release, Burch complained that he had been admitted inappropriately to FSH and did not remember signing a voluntary admission form.10 His complaint reached the Florida Human Rights Advocacy Committee of the State’s Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services, which investigated and replied by letter dated April 4, 1984, stating that there was documentation Burch was heavily medicated and disoriented on admission and was probably not competent to be signing legal documents, and that hospital administration had been made aware they were very likely asking medicated clients to make decisions at a time when they were not mentally competent.11
In February 1985, Burch filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against the eleven petitioners, who are physicians, administrators, and staff members at FSH.12 He alleged that petitioners, acting under color of Florida law and as part of their regular and official employment at FSH, took part in admitting him to FSH as a voluntary patient, that they knew or should have known he was incapable of voluntary informed consent, and that they seized and confined him against his will for 149 days without counsel or any hearing at which he could challenge his admission and treatment, thereby depriving him of liberty without due process of law.13
The District Court granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), reasoning that Burch did not contend Florida’s statutory procedure was inadequate but only that petitioners failed to follow it, and that under Parratt and Hudson the State’s postdeprivation tort remedies provided all the process due.14 An Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed the dismissal, but upon rehearing en banc the court reversed and remanded.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether the Parratt rule necessarily means that Burch’s complaint fails to allege any deprivation of due process because he was constitutionally entitled to nothing more than an opportunity to sue petitioners in tort for his allegedly unlawful confinement?17
The Parratt rule provides that a random unauthorized deprivation by a state employee does not violate procedural due process when the state cannot predict the deprivation in advance. It offers adequate postdeprivation remedies because predeprivation process would be impossible or impracticable.18
No. The established facts demonstrate that petitioners held delegated state authority to admit patients to FSH and bore the concomitant duty to ensure informed consent or initiate involuntary placement procedures.19 Upon arrival at ACMHS, staff noted that Burch was hallucinating, confused, and psychotic.20 Burch signed admission forms at ACMHS.21 He was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.22 He was transferred to FSH on December 10 where he again signed voluntary admission forms witnessed by petitioners Potter, Parker, and Zinermon despite medical notes recording him as confused, delusional, and hallucinating.23 No hearing occurred during his five-month confinement until May 7, 1982.24 The Human Rights Advocacy Committee later documented that Burch was probably incompetent to consent and that staff routinely sought decisions from medicated patients.25
These facts show the deprivation occurred at a predictable stage of the admission process when officials exercised their broad power to accept signed forms.26 This makes predeprivation safeguards both feasible and required under the Mathews balancing test rather than impossible as in Parratt.27
The Parratt rule does not bar Burch’s § 1983 claim, and the complaint sufficiently alleges a procedural due process violation.28
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, And Justice Kennedy
Justice O’Connor dissented on the ground that Parratt and Hudson should govern this case.29 Burch alleged only a wanton unauthorized departure from established Florida procedures by petitioners who knew or should have known he was incompetent yet deliberately or recklessly admitted him as voluntary without a hearing.30 The dissent emphasized that the complaint disavowed any challenge to the facial adequacy of the statutes.31 Instead it charged petitioners with willful reckless disregard in subverting the voluntary admission rules that required informed consent.32 Because the state could not foresee or prevent such random misconduct by individual officials, postdeprivation tort remedies under Florida law satisfied due process.33
The dissent warned that the majority’s delegation theory erases the distinction between established procedures and unauthorized acts.34 It revives an argument explicitly rejected in Hudson.
Whether the Parratt rule applies to deprivations of liberty interests as well as property interests?35
The Parratt rule is not limited to property deprivations. It may apply to liberty deprivations when the state cannot feasibly provide predeprivation process because the deprivation is random and unpredictable. The weight of the liberty interest remains relevant to the Mathews analysis.36
Yes. The established facts involve a five-month confinement at FSH without any hearing or determination of competence, implicating Burch’s substantial liberty interest in avoiding involuntary mental hospitalization.37 The complaint alleges petitioners knew or should have known Burch could not give informed consent yet processed him as voluntary, resulting in 149 days of confinement without counsel or judicial review.38 The Court’s precedents recognize that commitment to a mental hospital constitutes a massive curtailment of liberty requiring due process.39 Yet the reasoning of Parratt and Hudson focuses on the state’s inability to predict random acts rather than the nature of the interest at stake.40
Therefore the rule is capable of applying to liberty deprivations, although it does not control here because the officials possessed authority to provide process at the moment of admission.41
The Parratt rule can apply to liberty deprivations, but the facts of this case do not trigger its limitation on § 1983 liability.42
Whether the alleged conduct of state officials in admitting Burch as a voluntary patient when he was incompetent to consent constitutes a random and unauthorized deprivation for which postdeprivation remedies are constitutionally sufficient?43
A deprivation is random and unauthorized under Parratt only when state officials lack delegated authority to effect the deprivation and the state cannot anticipate or control the misconduct in advance. When officials possess broad power to admit patients and a duty to implement procedural safeguards, the deprivation is neither random nor beyond the state’s ability to prevent through predeprivation process.44
No. The established facts show petitioners were the very state actors entrusted with determining whether patients could give express and informed consent under Florida Statutes § 394.465 and with initiating involuntary placement under § 394.467 when consent was lacking.45 Burch’s medical records at FSH explicitly noted his disorientation, psychosis, and hallucinations on admission, yet petitioners accepted his signed forms without further inquiry or hearing.46 The Human Rights Advocacy Committee confirmed that staff had been advised they were seeking consent from incompetent medicated patients.47 Because the risk of incompetent consent was inherent in the mental health admission process and occurred at the predictable point of signing forms, the state was in a position to require competence screening or involuntary procedures before the deprivation.48
The conduct therefore cannot be characterized as random or unauthorized in the Parratt sense.49
The alleged conduct does not constitute a random unauthorized deprivation, and postdeprivation remedies alone are constitutionally insufficient.50
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, And Justice Kennedy
Justice O’Connor maintained that petitioners’ actions were unauthorized because they contravened Florida’s clear command that only competent patients may be admitted voluntarily and that incompetent patients must receive the full involuntary placement hearing.51 The dissent stressed that the complaint charged petitioners with willful wanton and reckless disregard rather than mere negligence or routine error, placing the misconduct squarely within the random unauthorized category addressed by Parratt and Hudson.52 Additional predeprivation safeguards would be impracticable against officials bent on subverting established practice, and Florida’s existing tort and habeas remedies therefore supplied all the process due.53