566 U.S. 189 (2012)
In 2002, Congress enacted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, including section 214(d), which provides that for purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of birth as Israel.1
The State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual directs that passport officials enter JERUSALEM and should not write Israel or Jordan when recording the birthplace of a person born in Jerusalem on a passport.2
Petitioner Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem on October 17, 2002.3 His mother filed an application for a consular report of birth abroad and a United States passport, requesting that his place of birth be listed as Jerusalem, Israel on both documents.4 U.S. officials issued the documents listing only Jerusalem, consistent with State Department policy.5
Zivotofsky’s parents filed a complaint on his behalf against the Secretary of State in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction ordering the Secretary to identify his place of birth as Jerusalem, Israel in the official documents.6 The District Court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Zivotofsky lacked standing and that the complaint presented a nonjusticiable political question.7
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the standing determination and remanded the case. On remand, the District Court again dismissed the case, concluding that resolving the claim would require deciding the political status of Jerusalem.8 The D.C. Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Constitution gives the Executive the exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns and that the exercise of that power cannot be reviewed by the courts.9 Zivotofsky petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.10
Whether the political question doctrine bars judicial review of a claim seeking to enforce section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, by requiring the Secretary of State to record the place of birth as Israel on the passport of a United States citizen born in Jerusalem?11
A controversy involves a political question where there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.12
No. The lower courts misunderstood the issue presented by assuming that resolution would require the Judiciary to define United States policy regarding the status of Jerusalem.1314 In fact this case asks the courts to determine only whether Zivotofsky can vindicate his statutory right under section 214(d) to choose to have Israel recorded as his place of birth on his passport.15 Making such determinations is a familiar judicial exercise.16 Moreover because the parties do not dispute the interpretation of section 214(d) the only real question for the courts is whether the statute is constitutional.17
There is no textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of that question to another branch.18 Nor is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the question.19
The political question doctrine does not bar judicial review of Zivotofsky's claim and the case is remanded for further proceedings on the merits.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Ginsburg (as To Part Ii)
The political question doctrine does not bar this suit.21 The statute at issue is a clear exercise of Congress's authority under the Naturalization Clause and the Passport Clause.22 The Executive's refusal to follow the statute presents a constitutional conflict that the courts are obligated to resolve.23
The inquiry required by the political question doctrine is more demanding than that suggested by the Court.24 Yet the claim to a statutory right is relevant to the justiciability inquiry and is not textually committed to another branch.25
This case presents a narrow question, namely, whether the statutory provision at issue infringes the power of the President to regulate the contents of a passport.26 This case does not require the Judiciary to decide whether the power to recognize foreign governments and the extent of their territory is conferred exclusively on the President or is shared with Congress.27
Delineating the precise dividing line between the powers of Congress and the President with respect to the contents of a passport is not an easy matter.28 But it does not constitute a political question that the Judiciary is unable to decide.29
Four sets of prudential considerations taken together lead to the conclusion that this case presents a political question.30 The issue arises in the field of foreign affairs where decisionmaking is highly political and delicate.31 If the courts must answer the constitutional question they may well have to evaluate the foreign policy implications of foreign policy decisions.32
The countervailing interests in obtaining judicial resolution are not particularly strong because the asserted interest is akin to an ideological interest.33 The political branches have nonjudicial methods of working out their differences.34