Concept
Destination Court and Venue
Removal
Destination Court and Venue
A removed case has exactly one place to go. Section 1441(a) sends it to "the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending."1 The location of the state courthouse therefore fixes the federal courthouse, and the defendant makes no choice in between. A case pending in the Texas District Court for Lipscomb County, once removed, goes to the federal district court for the Northern District of Texas, whose hearings take place in Amarillo, some 149 miles from Lipscomb.2 The defendant's filing duty points to the same court, because the notice of removal is filed in the district court for the district and division within which the action is pending.3
Removal changes the court system and leaves the geography in place. Transfer does the opposite: it displaces the plaintiff's geographical choice, while removal displaces the plaintiff's choice of a state court system in favor of a federal court within the same geographical area.4 The device that moves a case from one federal district court to another, in a different state or district, is transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), not removal under § 1441.5 A single suit may even see both devices used.6
The one-court rule follows from what removal is for. It gives the defendant a federal forum. It does not give the defendant a way to escape the state in which the plaintiff permissibly chose to litigate.7 Suppose Sumner sues Davis in a state court that is a proper venue under that state's own venue rules. Davis removes to the federal district embracing that court and then moves to dismiss for improper venue. The motion should be denied. Davis has gotten the case out of the state court and into a federal court, which is all removal provides, and the case stays in the state where suit was properly brought. Were it otherwise, defendants would have a powerful means of avoiding trial in a state where they had properly been sued.8 The short window for removal supports the same certainty. It settles quickly which court will hear the case, so the parties and the court can proceed without fear that the case will be bounced into another court.9
The general venue provisions play no part in choosing the destination. Section 1390(c) says so directly: the venue chapter "shall not determine the district court to which a civil action pending in a State court may be removed."10 Section 1391 governs cases filed originally in federal court. The proper "venue" for a removed action is the district and division embracing the place where the state action is pending.11 This is consistent with the structure of the general venue statute, which applies "except as otherwise provided by law." Congress has enacted specialized venue statutes for particular kinds of cases, such as § 1402 for tort claims against the federal government.12 For removed cases, § 1441(a) supplies the rule. An answer that runs a § 1391 analysis on a removed case has therefore gone wrong at the first step, whatever it concludes, and the right federal court is the one § 1441(a) prescribes even if an original filing there would have been improper.13
Removal leaves one question untouched. A successful removal establishes subject-matter jurisdiction in the federal court, but it does not speak to personal jurisdiction. A defendant can remove from state to federal court and then challenge personal jurisdiction.16 Students often blur the two, probably because removal does not affect personal jurisdiction yet does affect venue.17 The inquiries are independent. In one analysis of an original federal filing, the parties were diverse, so subject-matter jurisdiction posed no problem, yet the chosen district very likely lacked personal jurisdiction and venue. The defendant's extensive business activity there was unlikely, after Daimler, to support general jurisdiction, which appears limited to the states of incorporation and principal place of business.18
When the defendant presses the objection in federal court, the familiar service question applies. Was service made within the territorial limits of the state where the district court sits, or somewhere else that state's law permits? A third-party defendant or indispensable party may also be reached within the 100-mile bulge of Rule 4(k)(1)(B).19 Some practitioners state the personal jurisdiction challenge in the notice of removal as a belt-and-suspenders precaution, just to be safe.20