Concept
Walking Through Lacey
Default judgment by the clerk and relief demanded
Walking Through Lacey
The Lacey default judgment puts every limit from this part to work on a single set of facts, which makes it a good place to watch the checks operate together. The plaintiffs owned the copyrights in eight sound recordings and alleged that Lacey, through an online media distribution system, had downloaded or distributed those recordings without their permission.1 Their complaint demanded three kinds of relief: statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), attorney's fees and costs under § 505, and an injunction under §§ 502 and 503 that would bar further infringement and require Lacey to destroy copies of recordings made in violation of their rights.2
Lacey was served in accordance with Rule 4(e), and nearly three months later she had never filed an answer or otherwise appeared. On the plaintiffs' motion, the clerk entered her default on December 13, 2006, for failure to plead or otherwise defend, and mailed a copy of the entry to the address where she had been served. Thirty more days passed with no further activity, and the plaintiffs then moved for default judgment.3
Lacey's claim never reached the clerk. The clerk's route opens only for a sum certain, or a sum that computation can make certain, against a defendant defaulted for not appearing who is neither a minor nor an incompetent person.4 Lacey satisfied the non-appearance condition, but each condition must hold, and her claim failed the first. The plaintiffs elected statutory damages, which the statute sets within a range of $750 to $30,000 per work "as the court considers just,"5 so the amount was left for the court to determine rather than fixed in advance, and they sought an injunction as well.6 Their request for only the $750 minimum on each of the eight works, $6,000 in all, shortened the court's task but did not change who had to perform it, because the injunction required findings about whether Lacey's infringement would continue.7
Lacey's silence also answered the notice question. She never appeared, and the seven days' written notice of the application that Rule 55(b)(2) requires goes only to a party who has appeared, so the plaintiffs owed her none for their motion for default judgment. The court did notice a lapse at the earlier stage. The plaintiffs' motion for entry of default carried no certificate of service, and nothing in Rule 55 excuses service of a request for entry of default, which is distinct from a motion for default judgment. The clerk's mailing of the entry of default to the address where Lacey had been served negated any harm from that lapse, because it left her on notice that default proceedings were moving forward, and she still chose not to defend.8
Default conceded the facts and nothing more. By defaulting, Lacey admitted the facts alleged in the complaint, but whether those facts establish liability is a question of law for the court, which may not enter a default judgment unless the complaint states a claim for relief. The effect is as if the defaulting party had filed a phantom motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) that the court must decide first.9 The court took up that task mindful of the Eleventh Circuit's disfavor of defaults and its insistence on strict compliance with the legal prerequisites to the power to render a default judgment.10 The complaint passed the screen. It listed each of the eight recordings by copyright owner, album title, and SR number,11 and the court concluded that the plaintiffs had established Lacey's liability for infringing their copyrights in those recordings.12 Default left the amount and character of the relief undecided, however, and the court stressed that entering default judgment in no way obviates the need to determine them.13
The relief the plaintiffs sought tracked their demand. The complaint asked for statutory damages, fees and costs, and an injunction, and at judgment the plaintiffs sought $6,000 in statutory damages and a permanent injunction.14 Both items appeared in the demand, and the damages sat at the statutory floor, so nothing they asked for differed in kind from, or exceeded in amount, what the pleading demanded.15 The limit is practical in purpose: a defendant who stays silent has only the complaint from which to weigh what silence may cost, and the demand tells her. A demanded remedy must still be earned, because judgment may be granted only for such relief as may lawfully be granted upon the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint.16 The court found the injunction justified only after concluding that Lacey was continuing her infringing conduct, had made no effort to defend despite service and notice of the default proceedings, and posed a strong likelihood of continuing infringement unless enjoined.17
The last question, whether a hearing was needed, is one Rule 55(b)(2) leaves to the court. The rule lets the court conduct hearings or order references when it must take an account, determine the amount of damages, establish the truth of an averment by evidence, or investigate another matter, but no hearing is required in every default judgment proceeding. None is needed where the sum sought is certain, or where affidavits and documentary evidence already make an adequate record of statutory damages.18 The plaintiffs' election of the $750 minimum for each of eight works left little for a hearing to resolve on damages, because the figure followed from the statute and a count of the recordings.19
One point sits beneath all five checks. A default judgment demands strict compliance with the legal prerequisites to the court's power to render it, and the court's account in Lacey begins with service made in accordance with Rule 4(e).20 Power over the defendant is a second prerequisite, and for a defendant domiciled in the forum state, domicile alone supplies it, as Milliken v. Meyer holds.
An exam question built on these facts usually moves exactly one check, and the skill lies in seeing which one.
The first variation changes who must be told about the application, and the second changes how much the judgment may award. In both, the sufficiency of the complaint and the need for a hearing stay open.