Concept
Dual Court Systems
Organization and relationship of state and federal courts in a federal system
Article III and Legislative Courts
Dual Court Systems
The United States has interlocking state and federal judicial systems, and Article III supplies only the frame for the federal one. It vests the judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.1 That sentence guarantees a single federal court and leaves every other one to the legislature. The delegates reached the arrangement by compromise. A motion to strike the provision for inferior tribunals prevailed, five states to four, with two divided. Wilson and Madison then moved that the national legislature be empowered to institute such tribunals, and their motion carried, eight states to two, with one divided. That compromise supplied the language later used in the Constitution.2 Congress took up the invitation in the Judiciary Act of 1789. It chose to create a system of lower federal courts instead of relying on the state courts to hear federal claims, and it tied the two systems together by providing for Supreme Court review of state-court decisions that rejected a right set up under federal law.3
The two systems differ in kind. State courts are presumed able to hear all manner of state and federal claims, and they are therefore called courts of general subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts exist because Congress created them and vested them with power to hear specified claims, so a federal complaint must begin by naming the statute that confers subject matter jurisdiction.4 The numbers show the imbalance: just under 3% of the nation's judges serve in federal court, and over 97% serve in state courts.5 Every case therefore begins with a sorting question, which system may hear it. The three subsections below follow that question through the structure of the federal courts, the division of business between the two systems, and the Supreme Court's review of state-court judgments.
One further point runs through the remaining parts of this chapter. Congress need not use Article III courts to decide federal claims, because it may constitute a legislative court or an administrative agency instead. Such non-Article III tribunals date from the early days of the Republic, and they belie, in practice if not in theory, any claim that every court of Congress's own creation must meet the standards of Article III.6 The question for later is how far that option extends.
Structure of Federal Courts
Article III, Section 1 gives federal judges two protections and gives Congress one choice. The judges of both the supreme and inferior courts hold their offices during good behavior and receive compensation that may not be diminished during their continuance in office. The choice is whether to create any court other than the Supreme Court.7 Three consequences follow. The Constitution guarantees only one court, a court is an Article III court only if its judges hold those protections, and a lower federal court hears only the cases Congress gives it.
The Madisonian Compromise explains the first consequence. It grew out of a debate between delegates like Madison and Wilson, who thought inferior federal courts essential to an effective judicial department, and delegates like Roger Sherman and Luther Martin, who thought state courts could act as courts of first instance, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.8 The permissive text empowers Congress to create lower courts without requiring it to. It also treats state courts as proper tribunals for the first-instance determination of many federal claims, while assuming some degree of federal judicial oversight.9 Most observers conclude that Congress has broad control over the existence and jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, while the Supreme Court is constitutionally established and impervious to congressional destruction. The Judiciary Act of 1789 fits that view, because it established district courts but assumed the Supreme Court's existence and provided for six justices. A vocal minority argues that the Constitution requires lower federal courts for some matters, usually federal criminal cases and admiralty and maritime cases.10
Because inferior courts might never exist, the Constitution could not assume them. Article III, Section 2 therefore describes kinds of cases without vesting jurisdiction in any inferior court, and the jurisdiction of every Article III court other than the Supreme Court must rest on a statute consistent with Article III. It is never enough to assert that a district court has jurisdiction “under Article III”; a statute must confer it.11 Congress's discretion runs in both directions. In 1802 the Jeffersonian Congress repealed a controversial judiciary law that had created freestanding circuit courts with a general grant of federal-question jurisdiction. In the process it turned sitting judges out of office and returned many federal-question cases to the state courts. Judges today would presumably keep their jobs and paychecks, but the episode underscores the scope of congressional control.12 The accepted limit is Article III itself. Congress may not extend any federal court's jurisdiction beyond the categories Article III provides, but it may give inferior courts less than Article III permits, and it may grant or withhold any aspect of that jurisdiction it deems appropriate.13
Justice Story and others argued that the jurisdiction of inferior tribunals is, to some extent and in various fashions, mandatory, but the widely accepted view is the one just stated.14 Beginning with Story's opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, some have read the seemingly mandatory declaration that the judicial power “shall extend” to the listed matters as an obligation on Congress to extend it. They point out that the Constitution often uses “shall” as a term of obligation.15 Story's own reasoning in Martin about state-court review, taken up in the last subsection, also began from the premise that there might be no lower federal courts at all.16
Because the Constitution creates only one court, “Article III court” needs a definition that fits the Supreme Court and whatever lower courts Congress adds. Article I, Section 8, clause 9 empowers Congress to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, and Article III refers to the inferior courts Congress ordains and establishes. The Supreme Court and the lower courts so created are therefore both Article III courts, and Article III's limits and protections apply to both.17 Three features mark such a court.
The district courts display all three features. Congress created them under its power to constitute inferior tribunals, they exercise jurisdiction over specified Article III subject matters such as federal-question and diversity cases, and their judges have life tenure and salary protection. Their decisions are reviewable by the Supreme Court, usually through the courts of appeals.18 The requirement of inferiority adds a structural guard. It prevents Congress, and by implication the President, from establishing a new set of tribunals, vesting them with part of the judicial power, and directing them to adjudicate free from the oversight of the Article III judiciary. It thereby forestalls the creation of more politically pliable tribunals to determine federal rights finally.19
Congress has built on this base a three-tier hierarchy. The district courts try cases, the regional courts of appeals review them, and the Supreme Court sits at the top. In 1982 Congress added a thirteenth circuit, the Federal Circuit, with specialized jurisdiction to hear appeals from across the country on patents, trademarks, international trade, and government contracts.21 The Supreme Court decides most of its cases by certiorari, because a 1988 statute converted almost all of its mandatory appellate jurisdiction into discretionary review.22 The hierarchy does real work. Under the common-law principle of stare decisis, like cases should be decided alike, and a hierarchy gives that principle force. Lower courts must obey the decisions of their judicial superiors or invite reversal, and litigants can secure their federal rights at lower levels without litigating all the way to the Supreme Court.23
Congress has also created more specialized courts. A special railroad court, composed of already sitting federal judges designated to sit part-time, is an example of a specialized Article III court.24 The Court of Federal Claims hears federal contract disputes and most other claims for money damages against the United States. The Court of International Trade hears customs and international trade cases, and its decisions are appealed to the Federal Circuit.25 Whether such a court is an Article III court depends on the three features, not on the fact that Congress created it. Later parts of this chapter apply that test to courts whose judges lack tenure and salary protection.
Article III, Section 2 sets the outer limit on what any of these courts may decide. It extends the judicial power to nine categories: cases arising under the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties; cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; controversies to which the United States is a party; controversies between two or more states; controversies between a state and citizens of another state; controversies between citizens of different states; controversies between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states; and controversies between a state or its citizens and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.26 The text calls the first three categories “Cases” and the remaining six “Controversies,” and the labels track what defines each group. Cases are defined by subject matter, as when a case arising under federal law calls for interpreting or applying that law. Controversies are defined by the identity of the parties, and a controversy need not depend on the meaning of federal law, although it often does.27
The list sets a ceiling and leaves the floor to Congress. In Kline v. Burke Construction Co. the Court explained that the Constitution “simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity to take jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of Congress to confer it.” Only the Supreme Court's jurisdiction comes directly from the Constitution. Every other federal court derives its jurisdiction wholly from Congress, which may give, withhold, or restrict it at its discretion, provided it does not extend beyond the constitutional boundaries.28 For many observers the greater power to deny the lower courts all jurisdiction includes the lesser power to confer only part of it.29
The two steps fail in different ways. A dispute between citizens of the same state under state law fits no Article III category, so no statute could confer federal jurisdiction over it.30 A $35,000 contract claim between an Oregon citizen and an Idaho citizen does fit the diversity category, so Congress could confer jurisdiction over it. But the diversity statute demands more than $75,000, so the district court may not hear it.31 Congress has never granted the lower federal courts the full range Article III permits. The 1789 Act gave neither district nor circuit courts a general grant over cases arising under federal law.32 Congress did not grant general federal-question jurisdiction until 1875, and until 1980 that jurisdiction carried an amount-in-controversy requirement.33
State Courts and Federal Limits
Article III gives the federal courts a list, and the list gives state courts a contrast. Federal courts can hear cases only because of the nature of the question or the nature of the parties, and Congress cannot expand federal jurisdiction beyond Article III's contours.35 State courts, by contrast, are presumed able to hear all manner of state and federal claims.36 That breadth fits the states' lawmaking authority. The states prescribe the substantive rules that govern people's ordinary lives. That authority is subject to limits in the Federal Constitution and to the possibly superseding effect of federal law, but it remains very wide.37
Two consequences follow. Many cases belong only in state court. A plaintiff who sues a fellow citizen of the same state over injuries in a traffic accident presents neither a federal question nor diverse parties, so the plaintiff must sue in state court. Other cases fit both systems. Among the relatively few cases the federal courts can hear, most can also be heard in state courts, and the two systems then have concurrent jurisdiction. If the defendant is a citizen of another state, the same plaintiff may choose between a state court of general jurisdiction and a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction.38
Concurrency is the presumption. The Supremacy Clause presumes that state courts will entertain claims arising under the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States as well as state-law claims.39 Congress can rebut the presumption in three ways: by express statutory language, by an unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.40
Concurrency also gives defendants a countermove. Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has provided for the removal of certain matters from state to federal trial courts, which lets defendants transfer certain state proceedings into a federal forum.41 The choice of forum matters. In recent years plaintiffs won 52% of nonprisoner federal-question cases filed originally in federal court but only 25% of those removed there. In diversity cases they won 71% of original actions and 34% of removed ones. The groups contain different cases, so caution is in order, but the result survives controls for as many variables as possible. Removal therefore seems seriously to affect outcomes, as its purpose of protecting defendants would predict.42
Congress can also close the state forum. Some federal statutes, such as those on bankruptcy, copyright, and pension regulation, confer exclusive subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts.43 Exclusivity is the exception, and Congress must establish it by one of the three routes described above.
Suits by the United States are concurrent too. Section 1345 of Title 28 covers civil actions, suits, or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress. The courts read it to grant the full scope of the constitutional authority, and, absent a few exceptions listed in other statutes, the Court holds that jurisdiction concurrently with the state courts.44 A suit by the United States against a private party therefore resembles the diversity suit more than the copyright suit, because the United States may file in either system.
The federal limits do not follow litigation into state court. A federal court may hear only the cases and controversies that Article III lists,46 while state courts, presumed able to hear all manner of claims, are not confined to that list.47 Standing shows the gap. In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, taxpayers sued in state court on a federal constitutional claim, and the defendants removed the case to federal court. The taxpayers lacked federal standing, so their suit was not an Article III case or controversy, and a federal court could not decide it. The federal court's only course was to remand or dismiss, but a state court, which is not bound by Article III, might still hear the claim. A ruling that plaintiffs lack federal standing therefore does not show that no court can hear their claim.
One last structural point concerns the law a federal court applies. The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the lower federal courts chiefly to hear diversity cases, because Congress feared that hometown sentiment could sway state judges toward parties to whom they were politically accountable.48 Diversity jurisdiction also explains how a federal court comes to decide state law at all. In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok the Court observed that authority for the federal government to decide questions of state law exists only by virtue of the Diversity Clause in Article III. It concluded that the question whether Judge Madden enjoyed constitutional independence was inescapably presented.49
Glidden's observation points ahead. A tribunal that decides such questions must be able to say whether its judges hold the independence Article III guarantees, and later parts of this chapter take up that question for courts Congress creates outside Article III.
Supreme Court Review of State Courts
Article III does not limit the Supreme Court's work to cases that began in a federal trial court. Section 2 gives the Court original jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors and those in which a state is a party. It gives the Court appellate jurisdiction in all the other listed cases, with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress makes.51 The appellate grant refers back to the cases “before mentioned,” so it sweeps in cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. Congress has supplemented the constitutional grant since Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The current statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, authorizes the Court to review final state-court decisions that present federal questions, along with all cases that originate in the lower federal courts.52 Review of state judgments is thus the link that lets the top of the federal hierarchy supervise how state courts decide questions of federal law.
The power drew a direct challenge in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. After the Supreme Court reversed the Virginia high court under Section 25, that court declared that the Supreme Court's appellate power does not extend to it and that the part of Section 25 extending appellate jurisdiction to state courts is not in pursuance of the Constitution. It added that the writ of error was improvidently allowed and that obedience to the mandate should be declined.53 Martin appealed again, and the Supreme Court for the second time reversed the Virginia court and held Section 25 constitutional.54
Justice Story's opinion for the Court rested on the text of Articles III and VI and on the structure the Framers chose. Article III was a compromise between those who wished to create a complete system of lower federal courts and those who feared that the federal judiciary would undermine the state judicial systems, so the Constitution created a Supreme Court and left lower federal courts to Congress. Since the Framers knew that there might be no lower federal courts, Story reasoned, they must have envisioned that the Court's appellate jurisdiction in cases arising under the Constitution might extend to cases decided by state courts.55 The alternative shows why. If the appellate power reached only cases pending in federal courts, the jurisdiction of those courts over the listed classes would have to be exclusive of state tribunals. Otherwise, cases that state tribunals decided without appeal would leave the appellate power reaching only some cases and not all, contrary to the manifest intent of the Constitution.56
The Supremacy Clause directs state judges to honor the Constitution over conflicting state law, but Story saw two reasons to provide for review anyway. Judges of equal learning and integrity in different states might read the same federal statute, treaty, or constitutional provision differently. Without Supreme Court review to harmonize their judgments, federal law might never have precisely the same construction in any two states. Second, “state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests” might lead state judges to shirk their duty under the Supremacy Clause.57 The first reason is uniformity, and the second is fidelity.
Cohens v. Virginia then applied the same power where the state was itself a party. Chief Justice Marshall rejected Virginia's argument that the Constitution had provided no tribunal for the final construction of federal law and that the courts of every state might exercise that power in the last resort. He added that it did not matter that the state was a party, because Article III, Section 2 gives the Court appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, “whoever may be the parties.”58 The two decisions answer different objections. Martin establishes that a state's highest court cannot put its judgments on federal questions beyond review by declaring the authorizing statute invalid, and Cohens adds that a state's role as a litigant confers no immunity. Both turn on whether the case arises under federal law.
The principle remains current. In James v. Boise the Supreme Court declared that it has the responsibility to decide the meaning of a federal statute, and that “[o]nce the Court has spoken, it is the duty of the other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.” Relying on Martin, it ruled that “the Idaho Supreme Court, like any other state or federal court, is bound by this Court's interpretation of federal law.”59
The power stops where its source stops. Review attaches to cases arising under federal law. The Court has refused to assert appellate jurisdiction over state-law claims, and Congress has refused to make such jurisdiction available. That is so even where the alignment of the parties in the state court would make the case a controversy within Article III, as in a dispute between citizens of different states. The Court does have statutory power to review diversity matters first resolved by the lower federal courts, and it has occasionally used it.60 In general, then, neither the identity of the tribunal nor the citizenship of the parties supplies jurisdiction to review a state judgment, and only a federal question does.