Concept
Article III Protections
Organization and relationship of state and federal courts in a federal system
Article III Protections
The second sentence of Article III, Section 1 gives every federal judge, on the Supreme Court or on any inferior court, two guarantees: the judge holds office “during good Behaviour,” and receives at stated times a compensation that “shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”1 The provisions were designed to insulate federal judges from political pressure and reprisal, and they were modeled on tenure protections that Parliament extended to the judges of the superior courts at Westminster in 1701.2 Hamilton spoke for much of the founding generation when he called an “independent spirit in the judges” essential to the faithful performance of their duty.3
The two clauses block different exits. Tenure during good behavior blocks removal, because a judge who could be dismissed after an unwelcome ruling would learn quickly which rulings the dismissing authority preferred. The Compensation Clause blocks the quieter alternative of leaving the judge in office and shrinking the paycheck. Either guarantee alone would leave the other exit open, so the Constitution supplies both, and together they secure the Judiciary’s independence from the Executive and Legislative Branches.4 A judge who rules against the government of the day then risks neither a position nor a livelihood. Because the text names the judges “both of the supreme and inferior Courts,” the guarantees travel with every lower court that Congress ordains and establishes.5
The sections on legislative courts that follow measure each tribunal against these two guarantees, and the question they ask is whether a tribunal’s judges hold both by constitutional command or, at most, by statute. Limiting the federal courts’ jurisdiction is another and more common way for the political branches to regulate the exercise of judicial power, and the course on Federal Courts covers it in depth.6
Life Tenure
Article III provides that federal judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour.”7 The plurality in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. read that clause to guarantee life tenure, subject only to removal by impeachment.8 “Good behavior” sounds conditional, but the phrase has been understood to mean tenure for life, subject to removal for misconduct.9 The House may impeach a judge for malconduct and the Senate may try the judge; a convicted judge may be dismissed and disqualified from holding any other office, and that procedure is the only one consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character.10 Congress has rarely used it. As Hamilton predicted, the standard has given judges “permanency in office.”11
History explains why the guarantee sits in the Constitution’s own text. The Declaration of Independence charged the King with having “made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.”12 A judge whose seat depends on another branch has a personal reason to rule as that branch would prefer, and a litigant opposing the government could never be sure of an impartial hearing. Life tenure removes the incentive by making the judge’s position independent of how any ruling is received. Two values justify the arrangement: impartial adjudication, and a judiciary strong enough to stand as an equal in a government of separated powers and checks and balances.13
The source of a judge’s tenure matters as much as its length. The opinion in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok observed that, apart from Article III, neither the tenure nor the salary of federal officers is constitutionally protected from impairment by Congress.14 A statutory declaration that judges serve during good behavior with undiminished salary therefore cannot bind a later Congress unless those judges were invested at appointment with the protections of Article III.15 A statute is ordinary legislation, which Congress can change by the process that enacted it, so a judge whose tenure rests on a statute depends on the legislature’s continuing goodwill, the very dependence the good-behavior clause was written to end. The Glidden dissent drew the contrast sharply: an Article I judge’s tenure is “statutory and statutory only,” and Article I contains no guarantee of life appointments.16
Glidden supplies a concrete pair of judges. Judge Madden of the Court of Claims and Judge Jackson of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals each enjoyed a statutory assurance of tenure and compensation.17 The petitioners pointed to the Bakelite and Williams cases as establishing that no constitutional protection had in fact been conferred.18 The opinion answered that the constitutional quality of the tenure and compensation extended to the two judges at their confirmation depended on the constitutional status of the courts to which they were primarily appointed.19 Statutory words could not settle the question, because the protection follows the court’s constitutional status. Later sections of this chapter take up that status.
The bankruptcy judges in Northern Pipeline show the same point from the other side. They served fourteen-year terms, and the judicial council of their circuit could remove them for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability.20 It was undisputed that they did not enjoy the protections constitutionally afforded to Article III judges, because they did not serve for life subject to their continued good behavior.21 Fourteen years is a long time, and removal for misconduct sounds like a good-behavior standard. Even so, the term expires on a schedule, and removal rests with a judicial council and not with the House and Senate through impeachment. A long term or a protective statute does not make a judge an Article III judge.
An exam stem that quotes a statute promising good-behavior tenure therefore does not show that the court is an Article III court. Decide the court’s constitutional status first, because the statute’s promise binds a later Congress only if the court has that status.
Protected Compensation
The sentence that guarantees good-behavior tenure also supplies the Compensation Clause: federal judges “shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”23 The first phrase requires payment of salaries at stated times, and the second prohibits any reduction in judicial salary.24 The plurality in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. described the clause as guaranteeing Article III judges a fixed and irreducible compensation, and it paired the clause with good-behavior tenure as the two devices that keep the Judiciary independent of the Executive and Legislative Branches.25
A salary can serve as a weapon without a single judge being removed. Hamilton saw the danger plainly: “a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.”26 He added that the judicial power can never be completely separated from the legislative power in any system that leaves judges dependent for their pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the legislature.27 The Revolutionary generation had felt the abuse, since the Declaration of Independence charged the King with making judges dependent on his will for “the amount and payment of their salaries.”28
The Constitution forbids reducing a judge’s pay but fixes no dollar amount, because the proper figure changes with circumstances. Hamilton explained that the legislature had to keep discretion to vary its provisions in conformity to the variations in circumstances, under a restriction that puts it out of the legislature’s power to change the condition of the individual judge for the worse.29 Congress may therefore alter judicial salaries as occasion requires, yet never lessen the allowance with which a particular judge comes into office, in respect to that judge.30 The protection runs judge by judge. A sitting judge knows that the ground will not shift and “can never be deterred from his duty by the apprehension of being placed in a less eligible situation.”31 A judge appointed after a reduction takes office at the lower figure.
The Glidden dissent drew the same line for judges outside Article III: an Article I judge’s tenure is statutory only, and Article I does not provide that the salaries of such judges may not be reduced during their term of office.32 The bankruptcy judges in Northern Pipeline illustrate the point. Congress could adjust their salaries,33 and the plurality treated it as undisputed that those salaries were not immune from diminution by Congress.34 Pay that Congress may lower gives the legislature the leverage over livelihood that Hamilton described, and it is not the protected compensation Article III gives its judges. Article III judges’ salaries are also fixed by statute and Congress may raise them, so the line between the two groups falls where the Constitution forbids Congress to reduce a sitting judge’s pay.
A statute that raises judicial salaries therefore presents no Compensation Clause problem. An across-the-board cut is invalid as applied to sitting Article III judges. The same cut applied to the judges of a court outside Article III meets no protection in the Constitution itself, because the clause shelters only judges who hold Article III status. Whether Congress may vest the bankruptcy judges’ authority in judges without these protections is the question the later sections on Northern Pipeline address.