Concept
Article III’s Jurisdictional Design
Congressional power to define and limit
Congressional Control of Jurisdiction
Article III’s Jurisdictional Design
Article III gives Congress a different degree of control over each of three things: the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, its appellate jurisdiction, and the existence of any federal court beneath it. Section 2 lists nine subject matters to which the judicial power extends. It vests two of them in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, which means the Court hears those cases as the first court to receive them rather than on review. For the other seven, it provides that “the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”1 The two original categories are cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and cases in which a State is a party.2 Section 1 vests the judicial power in “one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”3
Original jurisdiction is therefore fixed by the Constitution’s own words, appellate jurisdiction is open to whatever exceptions and regulations Congress makes, and the lower federal courts exist only if Congress creates them. Article III says little beyond that, and it presumes Congress will fill the gaps: the Constitution, both expressly and impliedly, presumes that Congress “will supply much of the design and most of the detail for the newly created third branch.”4
That presumption makes jurisdictional statutes routine, and it also makes them a weapon. The authority that lets Congress organize the courts lets it restrict them as well. Congress has considered a series of jurisdiction-stripping proposals on gay marriage and the pledge of allegiance, and it has enacted others. The Prison Litigation Reform Act restricted the federal courts’ remedial authority in prison-conditions cases. The AEDPA cut back their authority to entertain habeas petitions. Immigration reform legislation sought to curtail judicial review of deportation orders. The Detainee Treatment Act restricted habeas petitions and other actions to review the confinement of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay.5
Every exercise of this authority runs into the same three limits that apply to any constitutional power. The first is the power’s own definition. The power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction cannot be used to make exceptions to its original jurisdiction, because that use lies beyond the scope of the power granted. The second is structure. Congress cannot use the exceptions power to vacate a decision the Supreme Court has already made, since doing so would usurp a judicial prerogative. The third is external: a statute excepting from the Court’s jurisdiction every case brought by members of one religious denomination would run afoul of the First Amendment’s religion clauses.6
The structural limit appears in two further decisions. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., the Court held that Congress’s power does not extend to reopening and redetermining cases the courts have fully and finally resolved, because that would intrude on the Third Branch and violate the separation of powers.7 In Klein, Congress amended a statute to disallow pardons as proof and purported to deny all courts jurisdiction to return property to someone holding a pardon. The Court held the amended statute unconstitutional because it attempted both to dictate the result in pending cases and to limit the effect of a pardon. Because the statute closed all avenues of relief, unlike the statute in McCardle, it denied substantive rights.8 Those three limits organize the rest of this chapter. This unit first takes up the three pieces of Article III to which the limits apply.
Original Jurisdiction Is Fixed
The Constitution fixes the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction by naming the categories: cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and cases in which a State is a party. In those cases the Court “shall have original Jurisdiction.”9 The next sentence turns to “all the other Cases” and gives the Court appellate jurisdiction “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”10 The qualifier belongs to the appellate sentence alone. The original-jurisdiction sentence invites no congressional role, and everything in this section builds on that difference in drafting.
Marbury v. Madison shows what happens when a statute tries to move a case from one category to the other. Picture the cases listed in Section 2 in two piles: a small pile the Court hears first, and a large one that reaches the Court only on review. Marbury asked the Supreme Court directly for a writ of mandamus, an order commanding an official to perform a duty, and the Justices agreed with him that § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the Court to take the case as an original matter. Marshall also recognized that Marbury’s case fit neither original category, so § 13 was trying to add a third. The Court declared § 13 unconstitutional.11 Under modern practice the constitutional ruling should never have been reached. When a statute raises serious doubt about its constitutionality, the Court first asks whether a fairly possible construction avoids the question.12
Marshall’s argument was structural. If Congress could add to the original jurisdiction by statute, the Constitution’s division of the Court’s authority between original and appellate jurisdiction would be “mere surplusage.” Critics find that reasoning unconvincing. Article III can be read as persuasively as a starting point that Congress may adjust, and the Exceptions Clause seems to authorize Congress to make exceptions to the textual allocation.13 The Court has acknowledged the force of that reading. Were the question new, it observed in Ex parte Yerger, it might deserve inquiry whether Congress could, under the power to make exceptions from appellate jurisdiction, extend the original jurisdiction.14 Even so, Marbury established that Congress cannot add to the original jurisdiction.15 On that settled reading the Exceptions Clause is no escape, because it qualifies only the appellate sentence.
The other half of the rule, that Congress cannot subtract from the original jurisdiction, has a thinner pedigree. The Court has never dispositively established it, but the Court and commentators generally accept it.16 The Court has said repeatedly, in dictum, that its original jurisdiction “is conferred not by Congress but by the Constitution itself” and is self-executing, needing no legislative implementation.17 Congress has always legislated on the subject anyway, and the current statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1251, so the self-executing theory has never been tested.18
The Court approached the question in California v. Arizona. It agreed that Congress could refuse to waive the Nation’s sovereign immunity from suit in any court or in all courts. But it remarked that “once Congress has waived the Nation’s sovereign immunity, it is far from clear that it can withdraw the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court over such suits.” The Court avoided the constitutional question by reading the statute to exclude only state-court jurisdiction and to confine jurisdiction in those cases to the federal courts, so the suit could proceed originally in the Supreme Court.19
Fixed does not mean exclusive, and that distinction is where students most often go wrong. Congress may provide that the district courts share jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over cases within the original grant,21 and it may give state courts concurrent jurisdiction as well.22 A parallel forum adds an option for litigants and takes nothing from the Court. Because district courts may hear these cases, the Court rarely accepts original jurisdiction, and it typically refers the cases it does accept to a special master who receives evidence and prepares a record. The most common original case is a dispute between two states, such as a boundary dispute or a suit over water rights in an interstate river.23 The Court’s habit of declining original jurisdiction when another forum can hear the dispute sits in some tension with the idea that its original jurisdiction is fixed, mandated, and conferred by the Constitution.24
Two more moves remain open to Congress. It may regulate procedure in original cases so long as the rules do not impinge on the Court’s jurisdictional authority.25 It may also give the Court appellate jurisdiction in cases that could have been filed originally.26 Marshall’s contrary statement in Marbury was unnecessary to the decision, and later Congresses and Courts have not followed it.27
The result is an asymmetry that runs through the rest of this chapter. Original jurisdiction is assigned by the Constitution and defines itself, while appellate jurisdiction is assigned subject to exceptions that Congress makes. When a fact pattern describes a statute that moves, adds, or deletes a category of Supreme Court jurisdiction, ask first which pile the case sits in. The Exceptions Clause supplies authority only over the appellate pile.
Appellate Jurisdiction and the Exceptions Clause
Outside the two original categories, the Supreme Court “shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”29 That sentence gives the Court a constitutional source of authority and ties its exercise to Congress in the same breath.
Appellate jurisdiction accordingly has two layers. Article III marks the outer boundary of what the Court may review, and a federal statute must affirmatively confer jurisdiction before the Court may act inside that boundary.30 Chief Justice Ellsworth put the rule this way in Wiscart v. D’Auchy: “If Congress has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction.” On this reading, the Exceptions and Regulations language requires Congress to act affirmatively before the Court exercises jurisdiction. If Congress has passed no law vesting the Court with appellate jurisdiction over appeals from decisions denying Sixth Amendment rights, for example, the Court may not hear those appeals.31
An affirmative grant also works as a limit. A statute that grants specified appellate jurisdiction necessarily implies an exception for all jurisdiction it does not specify. By expressly providing for certain types of appeals, Congress impliedly negates every type it leaves out.32 One statute therefore does the work of a long list of express exclusions. Suppose a statute authorizes Supreme Court review of state-court decisions that reject a federal constitutional claim and says nothing about decisions that uphold such a claim. Article III may well reach both kinds of case, but the statute’s silence operates as an exception for the second kind, and the Court lacks appellate jurisdiction over it.33
How far Congress may go in using this control is the subject of the sections that follow. Read in isolation, the Exceptions Clause may appear to grant Congress virtually unlimited discretion to make exceptions,34 and the orthodox view treats Congress’s power over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction as essentially unrestricted.35 The baseline established here is narrower: the Court’s appellate jurisdiction has a constitutional source and a statutory trigger. Congress can go so far as to repeal an appellate jurisdiction after a case has been briefed and argued but before it has been decided, as in Ex parte McCardle, leaving the Court only to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction.36
The fourth step is where answers go wrong. A response that stops once the case appears on Article III’s list has checked only the constitutional layer, and the case may still be beyond the Court’s reach because no statute sends it there. The second step ties back to the previous section: original jurisdiction comes from Article III itself, so the question whether a statute confers jurisdiction arises only for cases in the appellate pile.
Lower Federal Courts Are Optional
Article III, Section 1 makes two different commitments in a single sentence. It vests the judicial power in “one supreme Court,” and in “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”38 The Constitution guarantees the Supreme Court’s existence, while the lower courts exist only because Congress chooses to create them.39 The one other textual reference to inferior federal courts imposes no duty; it supplies the source of Congress’s power, a grant of authority “To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”40 The judicial power Article III describes is thus vested in the Supreme Court and in those inferior courts Congress creates under that Article I power.41
The permissive wording reflects a fight at the Constitutional Convention. Some of the framers wanted no lower federal courts, others would have allowed only lower courts of admiralty, some insisted that the Constitution require lower federal courts, and still others would have let Congress create them with jurisdiction over all matters of general concern.42 The first draft of the Virginia Plan provided for both supreme and inferior courts. Delegates who preferred state courts successfully pressed to strike the inferior-court provision, and after mandatory lower courts fell, Madison pushed for language that would empower Congress to establish lower courts without requiring it to.43 The text gave each camp something it could accept. Those who preferred state courts avoided a mandate, and those who wanted lower federal courts kept the power to create them.
This Madisonian Compromise means Congress has more than one way to provide for the adjudication of federal rights. It may create full-fledged Article III courts with life-tenured judges, or it may rely on state courts, which have long exercised jurisdiction over federal rights of action. It may also constitute a non-Article III tribunal, such as a legislative court or administrative agency, to hear the federal claim.44
Congress has used its discretion over the lower courts in practice. In 1802 the Jeffersonian Congress repealed a controversial judiciary law that had created freestanding circuit courts with their own judges and a general grant of federal-question jurisdiction. The repeal turned sitting judges out of office and returned many federal-question cases to the state courts.45 Judges today would presumably keep their jobs and their paychecks, because Article III gives judges of the inferior courts tenure during good behavior and a salary that cannot be diminished.46 Even so, the 1802 precedent underscores the scope of congressional control over the existence and jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts.47
Justice Story read the same text as a command. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee he reasoned that Congress cannot vest judicial power except in courts it has ordained and established. If state courts lacked jurisdiction over some enumerated cases, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction could not reach those cases, and the injunction that the judicial power “shall be vested” would be disobeyed. “It would seem, therefore,” he concluded, “Congress is bound to create some inferior courts in which to vest jurisdiction which the Supreme Court cannot take originally.”48 His position, in short, was that Congress has a constitutional obligation to vest the federal courts with full federal-question jurisdiction.49
Story’s view has not prevailed. Orthodoxy holds that Congress has complete control over the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts.50 Any obligation of the kind Story described is not judicially enforceable: if no statute vests a federal court with jurisdiction, the court may not adjudicate the case.51
Congress’s discretion over whether to create lower courts is not discretion over what the courts it creates may decide. Congress cannot vest an Article III court with power to hear a suit between private parties that arises wholly under state law unless the parties are diverse, because Article III does not provide jurisdiction for such cases.52 The constitutional grant is only the ceiling, and within it the exercise of jurisdiction is at least in broad principle at the pleasure of Congress. While it is the Constitution that provides the fuel, it is Congress that must step on the gas.53 The next sections test how far that power extends when Congress uses it to withdraw jurisdiction, beginning with Ex parte McCardle.