Concept
The Eleventh Amendment's Text
Does state sovereign immunity bar the suit?
State Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment's Text
The Eleventh Amendment is one sentence: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”1 The sentence is narrow, and the doctrine later built on it is far broader, so the words make sense only against the case they were written to undo.
That case was Chisholm v. Georgia. Alexander Chisholm, executor of the estate of a South Carolina decedent named Robert Farquar, sued Georgia in the Supreme Court. During the Revolution, Farquar had delivered supplies to Georgia under a contract that was still unpaid when he died. Georgia never contested the debt; it refused to appear, on the ground that the federal court had no jurisdiction over such a suit.2
The Court's opinions went against Georgia on a common theme: the case fell within the literal text of Article III, which extended federal jurisdiction to controversies “between a State and Citizens of another State” and “between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.” The argument that “between” reached only suits in which the State was plaintiff was dismissed as inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the word and with the grant over “Controversies between two or more States,” which necessarily contemplates States as defendants. Two Justices added that sovereign immunity was inconsistent with the principle of popular sovereignty the Constitution established.3 One opinion took the opposite view: Congress had supplied no new law and had referred the courts to the old law, nothing in the old law authorized a suit like this, and the suit therefore could not be maintained.4
The decision startled the country. By the Court's later account, it “created such a shock of surprise throughout the country” that the first Congress to meet afterward almost unanimously proposed the Eleventh Amendment, and the state legislatures adopted it.5 The surprise had a ready explanation. While the Constitution was on trial before the American people, its great defenders had expressly disclaimed, and even resented, any suggestion that the federal judiciary could entertain suits by individuals against the States.6
The idea of sovereign immunity was itself familiar from English law, where the sovereign, as the authority that created the courts, could not be compelled by them, and the crown enjoyed full immunity in the English courts. Two exceptions were well known when the Amendment was ratified. The crown could be sued if the plaintiff first obtained its consent through a petition of right, and, absent consent, writs of mandamus and prohibition ran against the King's officials who were engaged in wrongdoing, on the theory that the suit was against an individual and not against the crown.7 Consent and suits against officers return later in this chapter.
Congress acted quickly. Each House spent a single day on the Amendment, and the votes were close to unanimous: 23 to 2 in the Senate, 81 to 9 in the House. Every attempt to weaken it failed. Congress rejected proposals to limit it to suits whose cause of action arose before ratification, to limit it to cases where the State had not provided a remedy in its own courts, and to except cases arising under treaties.8
The Amendment reversed Chisholm outright, and it reached suits already underway. The question came to the Court in Hollingsworth v. Virginia: did the Amendment supersede pending suits as well as prevent new ones? Counsel argued that jurisdiction over suits begun before adoption was unimpaired. The next day the Court unanimously disagreed, holding that the Amendment having been constitutionally adopted, no jurisdiction could be exercised in any case, past or future, in which a State was sued by citizens of another State or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state.9 Because the Amendment withdraws the federal judicial power itself, no court authority remains to finish a suit filed before ratification.
The Amendment's terms are narrow. They address only the specific constitutional provisions that had raised concerns in the ratification debates and formed the basis of Chisholm. The Court nonetheless finds a “natural inference” in the Amendment's speedy adoption: the Constitution was understood, in light of its history and structure, to preserve the States' traditional immunity from private suits.10 That inference is the bridge from this text to the immunity doctrine in the sections that follow.
Read closely, the text names two kinds of plaintiff: citizens of another State, and citizens or subjects of a foreign state. It can be read as simply repealing the Citizen-State and Alien-State Diversity Clauses of Article III, § 2, closing two of the seven doors through which a suit against a State might enter federal court. The other five, including the door for suits arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, stay open on that reading. Citizens of other States or countries could then no longer bring common law actions against a State in federal court but, like anyone else, could arguably still sue to redress violations of federal law.11
That narrow reading is the diversity account, under which the Amendment curtails only two sources of jurisdiction: suits by diverse citizens and by foreign nationals. Its rival is the profound-shock thesis, which takes its name from the Court's articulation of it in Hans.12 Hans shows why the narrow reading was thought inadequate. The Court conceded that the Amendment “does so read”: taken literally, it would leave a State open to suit in federal court by its own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, even though citizens of other States or of a foreign state could not sue on the same cause, and even though the State does not allow itself to be sued in its own courts. The Court called that result “no less startling and unexpected” than Chisholm itself.13 It held instead that the States, in the absence of consent, are immune from suits brought by their own citizens or by federal corporations, although such suits fall outside the Amendment's explicit prohibitions.14
Testing the words against facts shows how little they say on their own.
Change one fact at a time and the words stop answering the question by themselves.
- If the plaintiff is a citizen of the defendant State, no named category fits, yet the Court holds the State immune absent consent, because the immunity does not depend on the explicit prohibition.15
- If the plaintiff is the United States, no named category fits, and on the words alone the suit lies outside the Amendment's bar. The section on suits by the United States or States returns to the question.
- If the foreign merchant sues in the State's own courts, the plaintiff category fits but the forum does not, because the Amendment limits only the “Judicial power of the United States.” The sections on suits in a State's own courts and in another State's courts take up what else restricts those suits.