Concept
Suits in Another State's Courts
Does state sovereign immunity bar the suit?
Suits in Another State's Courts
A private plaintiff who cannot sue a State in federal court or in the State's own courts has one forum left to try: the courts of a different State. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt (2019) closed that forum. The Court held that a State keeps its sovereign immunity from private suits in the courts of other States, and it overruled Nevada v. Hall (1979), which had let a forum State's courts deny that immunity to a sister State.1
The Eleventh Amendment's words cannot carry that holding. The Amendment says only that “the Judicial power of the United States” shall not be construed to extend to suits against a State by citizens of another State or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state, and it says nothing about what a State's own courts may hear.2 The Court has never confined the immunity to the Amendment's wording, however. In Hans, the Court faced the argument that the statute granting federal jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law makes no exception for the character of the parties and therefore reaches States.3 It answered that a State cannot be sued by a citizen of another State or of a foreign state on the mere ground that the case arises under the Constitution or federal law. The decisions on which Hans relied plainly arose under the Constitution, and the Amendment barred them anyway.4 In the Court's later words, the immunity “neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”5 Hyatt carries that principle into a forum the Amendment never mentions.
Hall rested on a distinction between a sovereign's immunity in its own courts and its immunity in another sovereign's courts. The reasoning that “no sovereign may be sued in its own courts without its consent,” Hall said, “affords no support for a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts.” Such a claim “necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second sovereign,” so its source must be an agreement, express or implied, between the two sovereigns, or the second sovereign's voluntary decision to respect the first's dignity as a matter of comity.6 Hall then reasoned that the ratification debates and the Eleventh Amendment had addressed only federal-court jurisdiction, and so did not decide whether the Constitution limits a State's power to open its courts to suits against another State.7 Finding no express grant of immunity to the States, and relying on the Tenth Amendment, Hall concluded that the States kept the power in their own courts to deny immunity to other States. It reached that result even while acknowledging “that ours is not a union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns.”8
Comity is a courtesy, and the host controls it. Chief Justice Marshall had explained that whether a host nation respects a visiting sovereign's immunity is for the host to decide, because a nation's jurisdiction within its own territory “is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.” Justice Story added that the host's consent “may be withdrawn upon notice at any time, without just offence.”9 If a State's immunity in a sister State's courts rests on that kind of courtesy, the forum State may withdraw it. Alden had noted the contrast: the immunity of one sovereign in another's courts “has often depended in part on comity or agreement,” while the immunity of a sovereign in its own courts has always been within the sovereign's sole control.10
The comity rule also produced an anomaly that commentators noticed. Federal laws cannot pierce state sovereign immunity unless Congress enacts them under its power to enforce the Reconstruction amendments, and private parties cannot use them to hold a State liable for money damages in state or federal court. Yet Hall suggested that a coequal sister State could do what the hierarchically superior federal sovereign could not.11 The same commentary observed that if full faith and credit has special force anywhere, it would be in sovereign immunity, where a State seeks respect for its sovereignty, its “dignity.” Commentary on the Full Faith and Credit Clause makes a related point: a state court's unwarranted disregard for a sister State's legal prerogatives threatens national unity and harms that State's interests and dignity.12
Hyatt answered by returning to the founding generation. A ratification-era defense of the Constitution called a State's immunity a “pre-existing right of the state governments.” Contracts between a nation and individuals bind only the sovereign's conscience and confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will, and a suit to recover a State's debts could be enforced only by “waging war against the contracting State.”13 Practice under the Confederation matched that theory. In 1781 a creditor named Simon Nathan tried to collect a debt Virginia allegedly owed him by attaching some of Virginia's property in Philadelphia, and James Madison and the other Virginia delegates to the Confederation Congress asked Pennsylvania's executive branch to have the action dismissed.14 During ratification, Federalists and Antifederalists agreed that States could not be sued in other States' courts. One Federalist who argued that Article III would waive the States' immunity in federal court conceded that the waiver was desirable because of the “impossibility of calling a sovereign state before the jurisdiction of another sovereign state.”15
History alone does not defeat the comity theory, because a fully independent nation can withdraw an immunity it once extended. The Court's answer was that ratification changed how the States stand toward one another. The Constitution limits the sovereignty each State exercises toward its sisters, and one such limit is that a State cannot haul another State into its courts without the latter's consent. The Constitution, the Court said, “does not merely allow States to afford each other immunity as a matter of comity; it embeds interstate sovereign immunity within the constitutional design.”16 The Court compared the problem to a dispute over borders or water rights. A State that asserts compulsory judicial process over another State creates a direct conflict between sovereigns, and the Constitution implicitly strips the States of any power they once had to refuse each other immunity, just as it denies them the power to resolve border disputes by political means. Interstate immunity is therefore “implied as an essential component of federalism.” Hyatt had argued that no constitutional provision explicitly grants the immunity, but the Court called that the “ahistorical literalism” it has rejected in interpreting the scope of state sovereign immunity since the discredited decision in Chisholm.17
The Eleventh Amendment's own logic points the same way. A dissent in Hall observed that the States that ratified the Amendment thought they were ending the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions, because otherwise they would have perversely closed the neutral federal forums only to be left to defend suits in each other's courts. “The Eleventh Amendment is thus built on the postulate that States are not, absent their consent, amenable to suit in the courts of sister States.”18 The Court has also described the Amendment as an act in which “Congress acted not to change but to restore the original constitutional design.”19
The dissent in Hyatt defended Hall. It found nothing in the “plan of the Convention” or elsewhere to suggest that the Constitution had converted the customary practice of extending immunity by consent into “an absolute federal requirement that no State could withdraw.”20 It also counted, from the Board's and its amici's submissions, only fourteen cases in forty years in which one State had entertained a private citizen's suit against another, and it saw nothing in those years to show that the Hall dissenters' fear of Hall's “practical implications” had been well founded.21
The majority answered with stare decisis. That doctrine is “not an inexorable command,” and it is “at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment.” The Court weighed the quality of Hall's reasoning, its consistency with related decisions, legal developments since the decision, and reliance.22 On reliance, it acknowledged that plaintiffs such as Hyatt, who sued the Franchise Tax Board, had relied on Hall by suing a sovereign State, and that Hyatt would lose two decades of litigation expenses and a final judgment against the Board for its egregious conduct. But those costs follow in virtually every case that overrules a controlling precedent, and they are not “among the reliance interests that would persuade us to adhere to an incorrect resolution of an important constitutional question.”23
The two decisions disagree about one thing: where a State's immunity in a sister State's courts comes from. Hall found its source in agreement or comity, which the forum State could withhold. Hyatt finds it in the constitutional structure, which no forum State can override.24
Hyatt completes the picture of where a private plaintiff may not sue a nonconsenting State. The three forums line up as follows:
- In federal court, the Eleventh Amendment withdraws federal judicial power over suits by citizens of other States and by foreign citizens or subjects, and the principle behind it reaches further, to actions such as private parties' proceedings before federal administrative agencies.25
- In the State's own courts, the Constitution reserves to the States an immunity from private suits that federal legislation cannot override unless Congress enacts it under its power to enforce the Reconstruction amendments.26
- In a sister State's courts, the Constitution bars private suits against a nonconsenting State.27
None of this bars a suit that falls within the consent the States gave in the constitutional plan. By ratifying the Constitution, the States consented to suits by the United States in federal courts. Because “all jurisdiction implies superiority of power,” the only forums in which they have consented to suits by one another and by the Federal Government are Article III courts.28 The Court has put the principle this way: the waiver inherent in accepting the constitutional plan runs to the other States and to the United States, but not to a foreign State, which lies outside the structure of the Union.29
The plaintiff's identity and the forum together decide the outcome. A private plaintiff in a sister State's court meets the immunity Hyatt recognized, while a sister State in the Supreme Court does not, because that plaintiff falls within the consent the States gave one another.
An exam fact pattern that sets a private plaintiff against a State in a sister State's court invites three wrong answers. The first reasons that the Eleventh Amendment names only the federal judicial power and so does not apply, which forgets that the immunity does not stop at the Amendment's words.30 The second reasons from comity that the forum State may deny immunity if it chooses, which restates the rule Hall announced and Hyatt overruled. The third reasons that because the immunity is constitutional it bars every plaintiff, which overlooks the consent inherent in the constitutional plan.31 The correct analysis identifies the plaintiff and the forum, treats a private plaintiff in a sister State's court as barred, and asks only whether the defendant State has consented.