Concept
Article I Cannot Abrogate
Has the state waived immunity or has Congress validly abrogated it?
Article I Cannot Abrogate
Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court under any power granted by Article I, with one narrow exception for bankruptcy. Seminole Tribe so held for the Indian Commerce Clause: notwithstanding Congress’s clear intent to abrogate, the Clause “does not grant Congress that power, and the suit against Florida must be dismissed.”1 To reach that result, the Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., which had allowed abrogation under the Interstate Commerce Clause.2
The working rule of thumb follows from the holding. Congress may not abrogate when it exercises powers granted by the original Constitution, and it may abrogate when it exercises powers granted by constitutional amendments; bankruptcy is the exception.3
The rule changes how the abrogation framework works in practice. An Article I statute can say in unmistakable terms that Congress means to subject states to private suits and still lose, because clarity answers only what Congress intended. The question that decides the case is whether Congress acted under a power that can carry abrogation, and no Article I power can.4 Alden carries the same limit into a state’s own courts, a point developed below: Maine could not be sued there on a federal overtime claim without its consent.5
Three questions organize what follows: what Union Gas decided and why the Court overruled it, why the structure of the Constitution puts Article I on the losing side, and why bankruptcy escapes the rule.
Union Gas Overruled
The Eleventh Amendment provides that the judicial power of the United States “shall not be construed to extend” to a suit against a state by citizens of another state or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state.6 Because the Amendment removes those cases from the judicial power that Article III defines, the question whether Congress may abrogate becomes a question whether a statute passed under Article I can enlarge what Article III courts may hear.7 The Court once suggested that it could. In the line of cases that includes Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, it indicated that Congress might use powers found in the body of the Constitution to limit the later-enacted Eleventh Amendment, and it has since rejected that position.8
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. (1989) carried that suggestion furthest. The question was whether Congress had abrogated state immunity in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, and the Justices answered in a fractured set of opinions.9 A plurality held that the Interstate Commerce Clause gave Congress the power, reasoning that the power to regulate interstate commerce would be “incomplete without the authority to render States liable in damages.”10 Justice White supplied the fifth vote for the result but wrote separately because he did “not agree with much of [the plurality’s] reasoning,” and four Justices dissented and rejected the plurality’s rationale.11 The arithmetic explains the decision’s weakness. Five Justices agreed on the outcome, but Justice White and the four dissenters, a majority, rejected the plurality’s theory, so no rationale for Article I abrogation ever had majority support.12
Overruling a precedent requires reasons, because stare decisis keeps the law stable. Seminole Tribe concluded that none of the policies underlying stare decisis required the Court to keep Union Gas, and it gave three reasons.13
First, no rationale spoke for a majority. A precedent governs later cases through its reasoning, and Union Gas gave lower courts none that a majority shared. The decision had been of questionable precedential value since it issued, “largely because a majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality.”14 Lower courts struggled with it: one said Justice White’s concurrence “must be taken on its face to disavow” the plurality’s theory, and another called his “vague concurrence” a reason to doubt the decision’s continuing validity.15 The Court treated that confusion as a reason to reexamine the case: “the degree of confusion following a splintered decision . . . is itself a reason for reexamining that decision.”16
Second, the plurality’s theory contradicted the settled understanding of Article III. It was well established in 1989 that the Eleventh Amendment stood for the principle that state sovereign immunity limits the federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III.17 It had also “seemed fundamental” that Congress could not expand federal jurisdiction beyond the bounds of Article III, a proposition the Court traced to Marbury v. Madison, and the Court thought the plurality had misread precedent in reaching the opposite conclusion.18 The plurality’s rationale “deviated sharply” from established federalism jurisprudence and “essentially eviscerated” Hans v. Louisiana.19 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer offered no help, because it rested on a rationale “wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause”: the Fourteenth Amendment came well after the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, and it altered the balance of state and federal power that Article III and the Eleventh Amendment had struck.20
Third, only the Court or the people could correct the error. Because the case interpreted the Constitution, it could be altered only by constitutional amendment or by revision in the Court itself, so Congress had no way to repair a mistaken reading of Article III by statute.21 The Court judged the reading mistaken: Union Gas, in result and in rationale, departed from the established understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermined the accepted function of Article III, so it “was wrongly decided and . . . should be, and now is, overruled.”22
With the precedent gone, Seminole Tribe stated the rule for Article I as a whole: the Eleventh Amendment “restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”23 The statute before the Court rested on the Indian Commerce Clause, while Union Gas had involved the Interstate Commerce Clause, but the reasoning does not depend on which commerce clause Congress invokes.24
Suppose the same text had been enacted to enforce a Fourteenth Amendment guarantee. The second inquiry would then be satisfied, because Section 5 can carry abrogation.25 The source of the power decides the outcome; the clarity of the statement does not.
Why Article I Fails
The rule against Article I abrogation rests on two propositions, and the second builds on the first.
The first is that sovereign immunity limits the judicial power of the United States itself. The Eleventh Amendment removes certain cases from the federal judicial power defined by Article III, § 2, so it operates in part as a limit on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.27 The Court has described the principle in those terms. State sovereign immunity is “a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III,” and, like the requirement of a justiciable controversy, “a constitutionally grounded limit on federal jurisdiction.”28
The second is that Congress cannot expand federal jurisdiction beyond Article III. The Court has long held as much, and it treats the point as fundamental.29 Article III, in the words of the Union Gas dissent that the Court later adopted, sets out the “exclusive catalog of permissible federal-court jurisdiction.”30 A statute passed under Article I would therefore have to enlarge the federal courts’ jurisdiction to reach a suit that Article III, read with the Eleventh Amendment, withholds, and Congress cannot do that.
Together the two propositions yield the rule without regard to which Article I power Congress invoked. The Court framed its inquiry accordingly: was the Act “passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate”?31 That question looks to the source of the power. Neither the importance of the regulated subject nor the care of Congress’s findings can change the answer.
The Fourteenth Amendment is the contrast case, because it also grants Congress a legislative power and yet can carry abrogation. Section 1 contains prohibitions expressly directed at the states, Section 5 expressly gives Congress power to enforce them, and through the Amendment federal power extended to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment.32 The difference lies in timing as well as text. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted well after the Eleventh and altered the balance that Article III and the Eleventh Amendment had struck, whereas the Commerce Clause arrived together with Article III.33 That reasoning reconciles Fitzpatrick with the second proposition. A later amendment enlarged federal power over the states, but no amendment stands behind an Article I statute to enlarge anything.
Two arguments that might seem to set an Article I statute apart from the ordinary run fail under the same reasoning.
The remedy does not matter. The Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely to prevent federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a state’s treasury; it also serves to avoid “the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.” The type of relief sought is therefore irrelevant to whether Congress has power to abrogate, and a statute that authorizes only an injunction stands where one that authorizes damages stands.34
A trade does not matter either. The immunity “may not be lifted by Congress unilaterally deciding that it will be replaced by grant of some other authority.” The Court drew a parallel to its holding that the mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a state has consented to suit in federal court.35 A state’s consent cannot be inferred from a bargain that Congress describes.
The Seminole Tribe dissent offered the rival theory. Its premise was that the common law of England, where the states adopted it, was open to change by the legislature, which suggests an immunity that is only a default that Congress may displace.36 The majority gave three answers. First, it called the premise “wholly unexceptionable and largely beside the point,” because the common law provided substantive rules of law rather than jurisdiction. Second, it likened state immunity to the requirement of a justiciable controversy, a constitutionally grounded limit on federal jurisdiction. Third, it noted that state sovereign immunity stands apart from other common-law principles because only it prompted a specific constitutional amendment.37
The presumption theory also has a structural cost. If immunity meant only that federal-question suits for damages against states cannot be brought in federal court unless Congress clearly says so, Hans “means nothing at all,” as Justice Scalia put it in the Union Gas dissent.38 The clear statement would become the whole doctrine, and the power inquiry would disappear. The majority’s view keeps both inquiries, which is why an unmistakably clear Article I statute still fails.
Preemption raises a different question from abrogation. Federal patent protection coexists with state remedies for inventors, and a state doctrine gives way under the Supremacy Clause only to the extent that it interferes with federal regulation.39 Preemption decides which law governs. The abrogation limit decides whether a federal court may hear a private suit against a nonconsenting state, and the answer to the second question does not follow from the answer to the first.
The Bankruptcy Exception
One Article I power escapes the rule. Ten years after Seminole Tribe, the Court held in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz that Congress may use its power to legislate in bankruptcy to let federal courts proceed against nonconsenting states as defendants in bankruptcy cases.41 Katz thus allowed an Article I-based abrogation of state immunity.
Read quickly, Katz looks like a crack in Seminole Tribe, and the exam trap is to treat it as a general permission. The Court gave two rationales, and each is tied to bankruptcy.42
The first is that bankruptcy jurisdiction is principally in rem. A court exercising in rem jurisdiction acts on a thing, here the debtor’s estate, and not on the persons who hold claims against it, so its exercise “does not, in the usual case, interfere with state sovereignty.”43
The second rationale covers the cases the first leaves open. Insofar as orders ancillary to the in rem jurisdiction implicate a state’s immunity, “the States agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert that immunity.”44 That rationale fits more comfortably in the implied-consent camp, and it tends to soften the Article I-based rationale, since the ground is the states’ own earlier agreement.45
Katz should not be over read. It is hard to imagine another Article I power that would squarely fall within its reach, although a future expansion could find another Article I power similarly unique.46 The rule of thumb records the same limit: Congress may abrogate under the constitutional amendments and under the bankruptcy power, and it may not abrogate under other powers granted by the original Constitution.47
Allen v. Cooper shows how narrowly the Court reads the exception. There the Court rejected an effort to extend Katz, characterizing it as a “good-for-one-clause-only” holding and suggesting, at least for the moment, that the bankruptcy power is the only Article I authority not subject to the Seminole Tribe rule.48 The Court did not fully foreclose the possibility that sovereign immunity law might not apply in lockstep across every Article I power. One scholarly question shows how open the point remains: the naturalization power sits in the very same clause as the bankruptcy power, so does that architecture signal a naturalization-based power to abrogate as well?49 As current law, however, bankruptcy is the only recognized exception.
Neither Katz rationale travels easily to a claim like copyright infringement. An infringement suit has no debtor’s estate on which in rem jurisdiction can rest, and the agreement in the plan of the Convention, as Katz described it, concerned orders ancillary to bankruptcy jurisdiction. A copyright plaintiff suing a state therefore meets the immunity question before any merits doctrine matters, the transformative-use test for fair use among them.50 Outside bankruptcy, a plaintiff who needs abrogation must find it in a constitutional amendment, which is why the rule of thumb sorts powers by their source.
The power comes first in this sequence because the exception, like the Fourteenth Amendment route, belongs to particular sources of power, and no degree of statutory clarity can substitute for one.