Concept
Alden and State Courts
Has the state waived immunity or has Congress validly abrogated it?
Alden and State Courts
A plaintiff turned away from federal court under Seminole Tribe has an obvious next move: refile the same federal claim in state court. The Eleventh Amendment seems to invite it, because the Amendment is written about the federal courts. It says that the judicial power of the United States “shall not be construed to extend” to a suit against a state by citizens of another state or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state, and those words say nothing about what a state’s own judges may hear.1 Seminole Tribe and the cases before it concluded that neither the Supremacy Clause nor Congress’s enumerated powers can abrogate state immunity in federal court.2 Those decisions arose in federal court, so a plaintiff could argue that they leave the state forum untouched.
Alden v. Maine closes that exit. The Court held that Article I does not give Congress the power to subject a nonconsenting state to private suits in the state’s own courts, so the Article I limit travels with the claim into every forum. Without Alden, Seminole Tribe would be a rule about forum alone: a state shielded in federal court could be sued on the same claim a few blocks away, and every plaintiff with an Article I claim would choose the second courthouse. After Alden, a private damages plaintiff needs the state’s consent or a valid Fourteenth Amendment abrogation.
The holding also raises a question that Seminole Tribe did not have to answer. If neither the Amendment’s text nor Article III governs a state court, the immunity there must come from somewhere else. The first subsection below sets out the facts of Alden and the rule it announced. The second takes up the structural reasoning that places the immunity in the design of the Constitution and not in the Amendment’s words.
Alden’s Holding
Alden v. Maine follows the plaintiff from the federal courthouse into the state’s own. Five Justices held, over four dissents, that “the States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.”3 The Framers, the Court said, did not intend to give Congress power under Article I to subject the states to suit in their own courts.4
The case reached the Court by the route Seminole Tribe invited. Maine probation officers sued the State in federal court for overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and after Seminole Tribe that suit could not go forward. They refiled in a Maine court, where they had a statute on their side: the Act’s provisions purported to authorize private actions against states in their own courts.5 The state courts dismissed on sovereign immunity, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The officers’ position could be argued in three easy steps. The Eleventh Amendment by its terms limits only the judicial power of the United States; Congress may force state courts to hear federal claims under Testa v. Katt; and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority left no doubt that the Act applies to state employers as it does to private ones.6 The same five Justices who had formed the Seminole Tribe majority were unmoved by that logic.7
The Court answered by denying that the Amendment is the source of the immunity. “Eleventh Amendment immunity” is a convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, because the states’ immunity neither derives from nor is limited by the Amendment’s terms. It is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty the states enjoyed before ratification and retain today, except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional amendments.8 The immunity therefore rests on a structural principle that inheres in federalism and is not directly tied to the scope of Article III’s judicial power.9 That principle sets the test for Article I: Congress may subject states to private suit in their own courts only if there is “compelling evidence” that the states were required to surrender this power under the constitutional design.10 The next subsection shows why the Court found none.
The officers’ other main argument, that federal law is supreme, fared no better. The earlier cases had concluded that neither the Supremacy Clause nor the enumerated powers confer authority to abrogate state immunity in federal court, and the logic of those decisions does not turn on the forum in which the suit is prosecuted. It extends to state-court suits as well.11
Consent is the first limit on any immunity, so the Court also asked whether Maine had waived it, and it concluded that Maine had not consented to suit. The officers argued that Maine discriminated against federal rights by asserting immunity here. The Court found no evidence that the State had manipulated its immunity systematically against federal causes of action, and it described a state that consents to some classes of suits while keeping its immunity from others as exercising a privilege of sovereignty concomitant to its constitutional immunity.12
The holding limits who may enforce federal law against a state and leaves the state’s duty to obey that law intact. Sovereign immunity “does not bar all judicial review of state compliance with the Constitution and valid federal law,” because certain limits are implicit in the principle itself.13 The officers lost only their private damages action. Five limits mark the edges of the immunity, and each corresponds to ground this chapter has already covered:
- Consent lifts the bar, since sovereign immunity applies only in the absence of consent, and many states have enacted statutes consenting to a wide variety of suits.14
- In ratifying the Constitution, the states consented to suits brought by other states or by the Federal Government, so the Act could be enforced against Maine through a suit by the United States even though the officers’ private suit failed.15
- Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting states under its Section 5 enforcement power, because the Fourteenth Amendment required the states to surrender a portion of the sovereignty the original Constitution preserved to them.16
- The rule does not bar certain actions against state officers for injunctive or declaratory relief, and a damages suit may proceed against an officer in his individual capacity for wrongful conduct fairly attributable to him, so long as the relief comes from the officer personally and not from the state treasury.17
- The immunity bars suits against states but not against lesser entities, and it does not extend to a municipal corporation or other governmental entity that is not an arm of the State.18
The two groups of officers sue in the same forum under the same statute, and only the defendant’s status differs. That is why the first step in any problem is to identify the defendant.
A problem that sends a plaintiff from federal court to state court calls for four questions in order. Who is the defendant: the state or an arm of the state, or a county or city? What is the claim: a private damages action resting on an Article I statute? Has the state consented? Is there another route, such as a Section 5 statute, a suit by the United States, or an officer suit? Only a private damages claim against the state itself, under an Article I statute and without consent, meets Alden’s bar, and the forum does not change that.
Structural Reasoning
The Eleventh Amendment’s words speak only of “the Judicial power of the United States,” so taken alone they say nothing about what a state’s own judges may hear.20 Alden therefore treats the Amendment as confirming a principle that already existed. The Amendment confirmed, and did not establish, sovereign immunity, so the immunity’s scope is marked out by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design and not by the Amendment’s text alone. The settled understanding, shared by the leading advocates of ratification, is that the immunity derives from the structure of the original Constitution itself.21 The Court then asked whether history and structure supply the “compelling evidence” of surrender that abrogation in state court would require.22 It found that history points the other way and that structure explains why.
The ratification debates show what the founding generation feared and what it was promised. Many states were heavily indebted after the Revolutionary War, and they were vitally interested in whether a new federal sovereign with courts of its own would automatically subject them, like lower English lords, to suit in the courts of the “higher” sovereign.23 The Constitution’s defenders answered that it would not. As Madison put it at the Virginia convention, “It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court.”24
The arguments of the Constitution’s opponents point the same way. They reasoned by analogy to the English rule that no lord could be sued by a vassal in his own court, though each petty lord could be sued in the court of a higher lord, and the point of their argument was that federal jurisdiction under Article III would circumvent the states’ immunity in their own courts.25 That argument would have made little sense if the states were understood to have relinquished the immunity in all events.
The Eleventh Amendment’s history fits the same pattern. Its language was directed at the only provisions of the constitutional text believed to call the states’ immunity into question, namely Article III’s grants of jurisdiction over suits between states and individuals. Nothing in Article III or elsewhere suggested that states could not assert immunity in their own courts or that Congress could abrogate it there.26 The Congress that endorsed the Amendment also rejected language confining it to cases in which a state had made a remedy available in its own courts. That choice implies that the states kept both their immunity and the authority to decide whether to allow private suits against themselves in those courts.27 To read this history as stripping state-court immunity would, in the Court’s words, “turn on its head the concern of the founding generation—that Article III might be used to circumvent state-court immunity,” and it is “difficult to conceive that the Constitution would have been adopted” on that understanding.28
Early congressional practice supplies a second strand. Early Congresses did not enact statutes purporting to authorize private suits against nonconsenting states in state courts, and such statutes in any forum are all but absent from American history. The first the Court confronted that even arguably did so was the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, in Parden.29 The recent statutes do not show a different understanding. They create causes of action enforceable in federal as well as state court, so they reflect not a belief that the states surrendered immunity in their own courts but the erroneous view, perhaps inspired by Parden and Union Gas, that Congress may subject nonconsenting states to private suit in any forum.30
Precedent had treated the immunity the same way. Ex parte Young rests in part on the premise that sovereign immunity bars relief against states and their officers in both state and federal courts. That premise is why certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers must be allowed if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land, and General Oil Co. v. Crain, decided the same day, extended the rule to state-court suits.31
History shows what the founding generation assumed. Structure shows why the assumption fits the system, and four of the Court’s structural points bear on a private damages suit against a state: the sovereign’s control over its own courts, the state treasury, the state’s accountability to its own citizens, and the relation between congressional power in state and federal courts.
The immunity of one sovereign in another’s courts has often depended on comity or agreement, but the immunity of a sovereign in its own courts has always been understood to be within the sovereign’s sole control. A power to press a state’s own courts into federal service to coerce the state’s other branches is the power first to turn the state against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of the state against its will.32 The Federal Government, moreover, keeps its own immunity from suit in state tribunals and in its own courts, and the Court was reluctant to conclude that the states are denied a reciprocal privilege.33
The treasury point concerns money. Suits against nonconsenting states, especially for money damages, may threaten the states’ financial integrity, and at the founding many states could have been forced into insolvency but for their immunity from such suits.34 The danger has a modern form. An unlimited congressional power to authorize suits in state court that levy on state treasuries for compensatory damages, attorney’s fees, and even punitive damages could create staggering burdens and give Congress a leverage over the states that the constitutional design does not contemplate.35
The accountability point concerns who governs. The Constitution contemplates that a state’s government will represent and remain accountable to its own citizens, and when the Federal Government asserts authority over a state’s most fundamental political processes, it strikes at the heart of that accountability.36 A state is entitled to order the processes of its own governance, assigning to its political branches and not to its courts the responsibility for directing the payment of debts. If Congress could displace that allocation, the state’s judiciary would have to assume a role foreign to its experience and beyond its competence.37
The anomaly point compares the two court systems. Congress cannot abrogate state immunity in federal court, so a rule allowing abrogation in state court would give the National Government greater power in the state courts than in its own judicial instrumentalities.38 Congress may declare federal law binding and enforceable in state courts, but it would be an unprecedented step to infer from that power that Congress’s authority to pursue federal objectives through the state judiciaries exceeds both its power to press the state’s other branches into service and its control over the federal courts themselves. That inference would imply that Congress may in some cases act only through instrumentalities of the states.39
The same reasoning answers the dissent’s picture of the federal design. The Framers did not share the dissenters’ belief that Congress may circumvent the federal design by regulating the states directly when it pleases, including by a proxy in which individual citizens are authorized to levy on state treasuries without the states’ consent to jurisdiction.40 On the majority’s view, the immunity is a feature of the constitutional design that only a constitutional source of power, such as consent or Section 5, can lift. The plaintiff’s arguments from the Amendment’s text, from Testa v. Katt, and from the statute’s coverage of state employers never reach that question.
A strong answer to the question why immunity reaches state court when the Amendment mentions only the federal judicial power has two layers. The historical layer covers the ratification-era assurances, the Amendment’s drafting history, and the absence of early statutes authorizing such suits. The structural layer covers the state’s control over its own courts, the integrity of its treasury, its accountability to its own citizens, and the anomaly of greater congressional power in state court than in federal court.