Concept
Prospective Versus Retroactive Relief
Does Ex parte Young permit the officer suit and the relief sought?
Prospective Versus Retroactive Relief
Ex parte Young lets a private plaintiff sue a state officer in federal court. The Court held there that a suit against a state's Attorney General, to restrain him from enforcing a statute alleged to violate the Constitution, is not a suit against the State within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.1 Yet the Amendment's text bars any suit against a state “in law or equity,”2 so naming an officer settles only that the case may proceed. The remedy must still stay on the right side of a line.
Edelman v. Jordan drew that line. A federal court may order state officials to comply with federal law from now on, even when compliance costs the state money. It may not award retroactive monetary relief that must be paid from the state treasury for past violations.3 The Court has since reduced the inquiry to two questions: does the complaint allege an ongoing violation of federal law, and does it seek relief properly characterized as prospective?4
The line follows the Amendment's purpose, which is to keep federal courts from issuing judgments that must be paid out of the state treasury.5 It also honors a competing commitment: the Amendment was never meant to let states avoid the Supremacy Clause by claiming immunity from orders to comply with federal law. Edelman shows both commitments at work. In a single suit, the Court struck an order to pay past-due welfare benefits and upheld an order requiring the official, from then on, to disburse state payments in conformity with federal law.6
Three questions organize what follows. What makes relief retroactive, and therefore barred? Which costs to the state does the bar permit? And when may a plaintiff reach an officer's own pocket instead of the treasury?
Edelman and the Treasury Bar
Edelman v. Jordan sorted the remedies in a single suit. A class of applicants for public aid sued Illinois officials, claiming that the officials were failing to process applications within the time limits set by federal regulations. The district court ordered two things: that the officials stop missing the deadlines, and that they pay retroactive benefits to applicants whose claims had been processed on the slower schedule.7 The Court of Appeals described the payment as “equitable restitution.”8 The Supreme Court upheld the first order and reversed the second.9
The officials conceded that Ex parte Young permits the prospective injunction. They argued only that Young does not reach a suit seeking an accrued monetary liability that must be met from a state's general revenues, absent the state's consent or waiver.10 The Court agreed, and its reasoning runs in three steps.
First, the state would pay the award. Its funds must inevitably come from the general revenues of Illinois, so it resembles a money award against the state itself far more than it resembles the prospective injunction in Young.11 To a virtual certainty, the money would come from state funds and not from the pockets of the officials named as defendants.12 When an action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and may invoke its immunity even though individual officials are the nominal defendants.13 The caption therefore cannot save the claim.
Second, the award measured a past wrong. It was computed from a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty by the officials, which made it in practical effect indistinguishable in many respects from damages against the state.14 The Court drew the contrast in words it quoted from the Second Circuit's decision in Rothstein v. Wyman: “It is one thing to tell the Commissioner of Social Services that he must comply with the federal standards for the future if the state is to have the benefit of federal funds in the programs he administers. It is quite another thing to order the Commissioner to use state funds to make reparation for the past.”15
Third, an equitable label does not change the result. The Court refused to read Young as permitting any relief against a state officer, however closely it resembles a money judgment payable from the state treasury, so long as the relief may be called equitable.16 Young's own citations show as much. Hagood v. Southern and In re Ayers were actions against state officers for specific performance of a contract to which the state was a party, and they demonstrate that equitable relief may be barred.17
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury confirms the point. A taxpayer who had paid Indiana taxes under protest sued the state officials charged with collecting them, claimed that the tax violated the Constitution, and sought a refund. “Equitable restitution” fit that claim even better than it fit the Edelman award, because the taxpayer had once held the money; yet the Court had no hesitation in holding that the suit was against the state and barred.18 The reason is structural. If a label controlled, any plaintiff could recast damages for a past wrong as restitution, and immunity would turn on drafting instead of on who pays.
The word “retroactive” describes what a payment repairs, not when the officer must pay it. All relief for a past wrong operates after the order issues; the officer in Edelman was ordered to pay past-due installments in the future.19 The date of payment therefore answers nothing. The question is whether the money is measured by a past wrong or flows from compliance with a decree.
Illinois's participation in a program through which the federal government assists its public aid system supplied no consent to suit. Participation of that kind is not enough to establish a state's consent to be sued in federal court.20 Consent remains one of the routes around immunity, but the record in Edelman showed none. The state's defense also survived a late start. The Eleventh Amendment partakes enough of a jurisdictional bar that the Court will consider it even when it is urged for the first time in the Supreme Court. In Ford Motor, Indiana's Attorney General had defended on the merits below and raised the objection first in the Supreme Court, and the objection was in time.21
The line has critics, and one wrote in Edelman itself. Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that the impact on the state treasury is “precisely the same” whether a decree is prospective only or also requires payment for the weeks or months wrongfully skipped.22 The majority disagreed. When a state has a definable allocation for public aid, retroactive payments to correct past delays will invariably leave less money for the system's continuing obligations, and the majority would not treat the financial impact as the same when a court applies Young to grant prospective relief.23
Commentators press the criticism further. One notes that the order the Court affirmed, which required officials to meet the federal processing deadlines in the future, undoubtedly cost the state more than payment for three years of past violations would have.24 The decisions lack consistency, but they may reflect an attempt to balance respect for state dignity, protection of the state treasury, and enforcement of federal law.25 One doctrinal thread supports the bar itself: if violating the Constitution strips an officer of his identity as the state, he cannot breach the state's contract, and on the same reasoning he cannot answer for the state's welfare obligations in Edelman.26
For exam purposes, the critique matters less than the application. Sort each requested order into one of two groups: an order that makes officials comply from now on, or an order that pays for a past wrong. The equitable label, the officer's name in the caption, and the state's participation in a federal program change nothing.
Ancillary Costs of Compliance
Prospective relief against a state officer often costs the state money, and the Eleventh Amendment tolerates the cost. Edelman itself pointed to earlier welfare decrees that had fiscal consequences for state treasuries. In Graham v. Richardson, Arizona and Pennsylvania officials were prohibited from denying welfare benefits to otherwise qualified recipients who were aliens. In Goldberg v. Kelly, New York City officials were enjoined from following state procedures that authorized terminating benefits without a prior hearing.28
The Court explained that the fiscal consequences in those cases “were the necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature.” Officials who must shape their conduct to a decree will often have to spend more from the state treasury than if they had been free to pursue their previous course.29 The Court called that effect ancillary and described it as “a permissible and often an inevitable consequence” of the principle announced in Young.30
The reason follows from what Young is for. Stopping an unlawful practice usually means putting a lawful one in its place, and the lawful practice takes staff, procedures, or benefits that cost money. If every such cost counted as a suit against the treasury, the officer suit would be empty. The Eleventh Amendment was also never meant to let states escape judicial orders to comply with federal law.31 Money spent to comply is the price of a duty the state already owed; it repays no injury.
The retroactive award in Edelman fell on the other side because of what the money was for. It required payment of state funds “not as a necessary consequence of compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question determination, but as a form of compensation” to applicants whose claims had been processed on the slower schedule when the officials were under no court-imposed duty to meet a different standard.32 The question to put to any money remedy against a state officer is therefore whether the payment compensates for a past wrong or flows from compliance with a forward-looking order. Money from the treasury can follow either kind of order, so neither its size nor its source separates them.33
Fees and sanctions that enforce an injunction follow the same logic. In Hutto v. Finney, the Court held that an award of attorneys' fees against state prison officials for their bad-faith unconstitutional actions did not violate the Eleventh Amendment, even though the state would pay the money.34 Part of that award rested on Congress's abrogation of immunity in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 under Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, and the Court sustained an additional award not covered by the statute as ancillary to a prospective injunction and therefore permissible under Edelman.35 A court may likewise award fees or costs in a suit for injunctive relief, or fine a state official for contempt in violating a federal injunction.36 And if officials do not comply in good faith with an order of prospective relief, federal courts may impose monetary penalties on the officers or on the state itself.37 Those payments look forward. They respond to resistance to a decree and enforce it, and they repay no injury that preceded it.
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II) carries the idea to programs the state must build. The Court upheld an order requiring state money for “compensatory or remedial educational programs for schoolchildren who have been subjected to past acts of de jure segregation.” It said the order fit “squarely within the prospective-compliance exception Edelman reaffirmed” because the state had to set up the programs prospectively.38 Judicially imposed expenditures to implement desegregation orders are now treated as ancillary and not barred.39 One commentator finds little to recommend the explanation. All relief for past wrongs is prospective in that sense, and Milliken added that the money would not go to the wronged pupils themselves without saying why that mattered; perhaps the Court saw that circumstance as separating the order from an award of damages.40 Another observes that the Court has struggled to justify and administer the distinction, since structural injunctions that cost the state large sums still fall on the permissible side.41
Notice relief completes the set, and it arose from Edelman's own remand. The district court ordered the state to mail class members a notice that they had been deprived of benefits in violation of applicable law, together with notice of the state process through which they could seek a remedy. The Seventh Circuit reversed because the form of notice purported to decide that the recipients were entitled to the lost benefits, but it ruled that a notice advising class members only that they might have a claim and that state process was available would be permissible prospective relief.42 In Quern v. Jordan, the Supreme Court recognized the lower court's power to order notice relief of that kind, which informs class members of their right to pursue state remedies for past-due benefits.43 The mailing costs the state money but pays no one for the past, and any recovery of past-due benefits would run through the state's own process.
An exam stem will often make the expense the first thing a student notices: a large sum, a state treasury, a federal judge. Ask what the money is for. If it is measured by what the plaintiffs lost before the decree, the bar applies. If it is the price of conforming conduct, of enforcing the decree, or of informing class members about state remedies, it is ancillary and permitted. An equitable label on the request and the officer's name in the caption change nothing in either direction.
Personal Liability of Officers
The treasury bar looks to the source of payment, so it does not end every claim for money against a state officer. A plaintiff who seeks damages from an official's own pocket has not asked for a judgment that must be paid out of the state treasury, which is the judgment the Amendment exists to prevent.45
Hafer v. Melo applies the point. A suit against a state official to recover damages from the individual personally, and not from the state, falls outside the Eleventh Amendment immunity, although the official may enjoy some level of common law immunity.46 State officers may be sued in their personal capacity for damages in federal court because the Amendment grants them no immunity from federal action, even where they acted in their official capacity. If the suit actually asks that an officer be ordered to pay funds from the state treasury for wrongful acts of the state, or to return property in the state's possession, the state is the real party in interest and the suit is barred.47
What decides the question is whose money the plaintiff asks the court to reach, and the caption does not. A request that the head of a state welfare department personally pay damages is permissible. A request that the same official pay past-due amounts from the state treasury is barred.48 The official is the same and the past wrong is the same, but the pocket is different.
The stripping fiction fits that result. Under it, a state official who acts contrary to federal law is stripped of any state garb and transformed into an ordinary private individual.49 An individual answers from his own resources. A judgment payable from the treasury belongs to the state, and no fiction can change whose money it is.50 Retroactivity is not the problem with such a judgment, since a personal judgment for past conduct is allowed. The treasury is the problem.
A court that finds no Eleventh Amendment bar has decided only that the personal claim may be heard. The official may still invoke common law immunity, which Hafer leaves open.51 That is why personal liability offers plaintiffs less than it first appears to. The Amendment question and the official-immunity question are separate steps. On an exam, ask first whom the plaintiff asks to pay, the treasury or the official personally. If the answer is the treasury, ask whether the relief is prospective or retroactive. If the answer is the official, flag the common law immunity the facts may raise.
The next section tests the officer suit against a federal statute. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act allows an Indian tribe to engage in Class III gaming, meaning games that are neither merely social nor traditional forms of Indian gaming, only under a compact between the tribe and the state in which the gaming would take place.53