Concept
Declaratory Judgments
Case or Controversy and Advisory Opinions
Declaratory Judgments
A declaratory judgment settles the legal relationship between the parties without awarding damages or issuing an injunction. The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, lets a party obtain an “authoritative judicial statement of legal relationships.”1 A party can use it to learn its rights under a contract or the coverage of a statute before any breach or violation occurs.2 The resulting judgment binds the parties to the dispute.3 Because a declaration commands no one, it can look at first like a recital of the court's views, and a recital of views is what the ban on advisory opinions forbids. This unit traces how the Court overcame that doubt, shows why a declaration issued in a real controversy is a judgment and not advice, and marks the limits that keep the remedy from sliding back into advice.
Early Doubt and the 1934 Act
The early doubt rested on a view of what makes a judgment judicial. A series of Supreme Court decisions had treated the execution of judgments, through the sale of property or imprisonment for contempt, as an essential feature of judicial power, and a declaration specifies rights without executing anything.4 In 1928, in Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, a lessee wanted to tear down an unprofitable auditorium and put up an office building, and the lessor had indicated informally that doing so would violate the lease. The lessee wanted the question answered before demolishing anything, which is the situation declaratory relief exists to serve. The Court held that the suit was not a proper bill to remove a cloud on title and added, in dictum (a remark not needed to decide the case), that what the lessee sought was simply a declaratory judgment, relief beyond the power of the federal judiciary.5 Muskrat v. United States fed the same doubt. The Court found no case or controversy there, relying partly on the debatable assertion that the United States, the named defendant, had no interest adverse to the plaintiffs, and partly on the notion that a judgment which could not be executed amounted to no more than an expression of opinion on the validity of the statutes.6
The Court resolved the doubt in 1933. In Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Wallace, a company sought a declaration that a tax was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, and because the same matter would have been justiciable as a request for an injunction, the declaratory form of suit could be adjudicated.7 The Court was reviewing an action brought under a state declaratory-judgment statute, and it said that the judiciary clause of the Constitution “did not crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789 as the only possible means for presenting a case or controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts.”8 Substance decides and form does not: the case is justiciable “so long as the case retains the essentials of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical, controversy.”9 Congress enacted the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act the next year, and the Court upheld it in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth even though the Act comes into play before the parties have incurred a loss.10
The old objection mistook one familiar way of ending a dispute, execution, for the essence of judicial power. Article III protects the adversary setting and the reality of the dispute, and it does not protect any particular remedy. Once the Court asked whether adverse parties had a real controversy, a declaration that settled their rights qualified without any coercive order attached. Coercive relief is therefore no longer an essential element of the case-or-controversy requirement, and where an actual controversy exists, a court may issue only declaratory relief.11 The later cases drop Muskrat's premise that an unexecutable judgment is mere opinion, and they leave intact the requirement that a real controversy exist.
Why Declarations Are Not Advisory
Haworth itself shows why the remedy raises no advisory-opinion problem. An insurance company in a coverage dispute with a policyholder claimed that the policies had lapsed for nonpayment of premiums and sought a declaration to that effect. The Court agreed that this was an actual controversy between disputing parties, because it required the federal courts to adjudicate a present legal right on established facts and did not call for an opinion on a hypothetical record.13 The insurer and the policyholder were adverse over their own legal relations, and a declaration could resolve their dispute with conclusive effect, which is what Article III asks of a federal court.14
The conclusive effect comes from the character of the judgment. Once the district court declares the parties' rights, the declaration becomes a final judgment subject to appellate review, with the same preclusive effect as any other federal judgment.15 If the court declares that the policies lapsed, Haworth cannot later sue on them and reopen the question. Preclusion is the practical proof of finality, since a decision the loser cannot reopen has settled the dispute. It also supplies the adversary incentive that the ban on advisory opinions protects, because parties who know the declaration will control the outcome press their claims vigorously and give the court a real clash of argument. And because § 2202 permits “necessary or proper relief” based on the declaration after notice and hearing to the adverse party, a loser who ignores the declaration can be made to obey it.16
A request for judicial advice from the political branches lacks each of these features. In a typical request, the executive and legislative branches do not formally join opposing parties as in an adversary proceeding, and interested persons have no right to take part in the proceeding that leads to the opinion, so they cannot fairly be bound by the result. A court may later follow an advisory opinion as precedent, but with no adverse parties it cannot treat the opinion as a bar to future litigation.17 The two postures differ in who is bound, and an opinion that binds nobody settles nothing.
Two everyday settings show why parties want the remedy. A dispute over liability insurance coverage involves the insured, the insurer, and the injured victim, all of whom need to know whether the policy covers the claim, and when the insurer insists it does not while the others insist it does, a declaratory judgment resolves the matter.18 A grocer who wants to sell groceries on Sunday in the face of a law forbidding it can test the law by violating it and objecting to its constitutionality in a criminal prosecution, but only by risking criminal penalties. If the grocer is really ready to open the doors and the prosecutor is really threatening to prosecute, the case is a real controversy, and a declaration is most appropriate, although enjoining enforcement of the statute can sometimes accomplish the same thing.19 The remedy lets the grocer learn the legal position before incurring the violation, and the dispute is already concrete because the threat of enforcement exists now.20
The same logic reaches the government. Earlier in this chapter the President could not ask the Justices whether a planned executive order was lawful. If a state later refuses to comply with the order on the ground that it violates applicable statutes, the appropriate federal officer may sue the state seeking only a declaration about the order's legality. An actual controversy then exists between the executive branch and the state, and the declaration will bind the parties and be enforceable if necessary.21
Jurisdiction and Discretion
The Act authorizes declaratory relief but gives a federal court no power over a case it could not otherwise hear. It expands the remedial authority of the courts without creating new rights, so a plaintiff who wants a declaration must establish subject matter jurisdiction through an independent basis, as with any other federal suit.23 Two citizens of the same state who disagree about a contract governed by state law, for example, cannot use the Act to reach a federal court, because they need a federal question or diversity of citizenship. A remedial statute answers what the court may award, while the jurisdictional statutes answer whether the court may hear the case at all, and the Act speaks only to the first question.
Even when jurisdiction exists, the plaintiff has no right to a declaration. In Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111 (1962), the Court held that the Act is an authorization and not a command, so courts decide whether to declare rights using the public interest as their guide, though they may not decline as a matter of whim or personal disinclination.24 Two questions organize that discretion: whether a declaration will serve a useful purpose, and whether it will terminate the controversy.25 A criminal action that begins shortly after a declaratory action is filed usually leads a court to abstain, and the existence of another effective remedy does not bar declaratory relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57, although it may in an appropriate case be a reason to decline.26 Timing matters for the same reason. The remedy's chief advantage is that it fixes legal rights before a breach or violation, so a court may decline once that moment has passed, and it will likely refuse a declaration about a penal statute's scope after criminal proceedings have begun, since the claimant can raise the coverage question as a defense in the criminal trial.27 The reluctance of courts to pass on constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary has produced rigorous justiciability rules, and the declaratory remedy operates within them.28
Abstract and Hypothetical Requests
The constitutional limit travels with the remedy. The Act incorporates the case-or-controversy requirement, so a party cannot obtain a declaration on speculative concerns and must show a substantial and immediate controversy between parties with adverse legal interests.30 No bright line separates an abstract question from a sufficient controversy, so courts weigh whether the dispute involves genuinely conflicting claims or only a hypothetical concern.31 Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co. shows one way a request can be too broad. A company sought a declaration and an injunction establishing that its activities fell outside the state commission's authority, which required deciding whether those activities were interstate commerce. Because that ruling would reach “far beyond the particular case,” the Court said courts must use “a maximum of caution,” and it found the broad inquiry not ripe for declaratory relief.32
What must a challenge to a criminal statute show before a court will declare anything? The answer turns on whether enforcement is a real threat. In Poe v. Ullman, two married couples and a physician challenged Connecticut's statute against contraception. The statute had been on the books for about eighty years with a single reported prosecution, and nothing showed a clear threat of prosecution, so the Court declined to reach the declaratory challenge. The grocer who wants to open on Sunday stands on the other side of the line, because a grocer genuinely ready to open the doors and facing a prosecutor genuinely threatening to prosecute has a real controversy.33 Both plaintiffs attack a criminal statute, and what differs is whether enforcement is a present threat. A grocer who can say only that opening some Sunday is possible, or that the law is old and disliked, looks like the Poe plaintiffs. Poe also bears on ripeness, which a later section takes up in its own right.
The label on the complaint cannot rescue a request like the first version. The inquiry looks to substance and not form, so asking for a declaration about hypothetical facts produces an advisory opinion just as surely as any other request for advice.34