Concept
Courts Outside Article III
Case or Controversy and Advisory Opinions
Courts Outside Article III
The ban on advisory opinions binds courts created under Article III, and it binds them because of what Article III provides. The case-or-controversy requirement is the constitutional condition that a federal court may hear a matter only if it involves an actual dispute.1 Federal courts are therefore forbidden to issue advisory opinions, although other courts, such as the International Court of Justice, render them routinely.2 The preceding sections applied that condition to Article III courts. This section asks where the condition stops. Two kinds of tribunal fall outside it: the legislative courts that Congress creates under Article I, and the courts of the states.
The boundary tracks the judicial guarantees of Article III. Section 1 would seem to say that the judicial power of the United States can be conferred only on courts whose judges hold office during good behavior and whose compensation cannot be diminished while they serve. The Framers and every later generation have thought those protections vital to judicial independence.3 A tribunal whose judges lack the protections stands outside the structure of which the ban is a part, so the ban has no automatic hold on it. Each of the two settings below puts that idea to work, and each carries qualifications.
Article I Tribunals
Congress is not confined to Article III when it creates federal courts. Within limits, it may also establish legislative courts, usually called Article I tribunals, which are inferior to the Supreme Court but neither limited nor protected by Article III.4 Their judges have no constitutionally guaranteed lifetime tenure and no protection against a cut in salary, and the tribunals are really akin to administrative agencies.5 The case-or-controversy limitation does not govern them, so they may render advisory opinions.6 The category now includes territorial courts, certain courts in the District of Columbia, courts-martial, and the legislative courts and agencies that adjudicate “public rights.” Administrative law judges are Article I judges.7 Some of this business, such as that of territorial courts, is business that Congress could have sent to an Article III court and chose not to.8
Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, a unanimous decision of 1929 by Justice Van Devanter, shows how a tribunal is classified and what follows from the classification.9 Congress had created the Court of Customs Appeals in 1909 to hear appeals from the Board of General Appraisers in customs-duty cases. In 1922 it added a further task, reviewing Tariff Commission findings on matters the President must ultimately decide, which are not cases or controversies in the Article III sense.10 When such a matter reached the court, a party asked the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. The party argued that a constitutional court could not give what amounted to an advisory opinion. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Customs Appeals was not a constitutional court, so it could hear the matter whether or not the matter fell within the judicial power of the United States.11
Van Devanter’s test looks to the tribunal’s source of power and its work. He found a legislative court because its jurisdiction included “nothing which inherently or necessarily requires judicial determination, but only matters the determination of which may be, and at times has been, committed exclusively to executive officers.”12 The statute apparently gave the judges life tenure, yet he refused to treat that as important. The argument, he said, “mistakenly assumes that whether a court is of one class or the other depends on the intention of Congress, whereas the true test lies in the power under which the court was created and in the jurisdiction conferred.”13 A label or a grant of tenure is something Congress can write into a statute. The power Congress invoked and the work it assigned are facts about what the tribunal actually does, and a tribunal whose docket consists of matters that executive officers could decide is doing the kind of work that officers do.
The Court of Claims was an Article I court when Muskrat arose, which explains a loose end in that case. The Supreme Court never said why it did not sustain the part of the jurisdictional statute that gave the Court of Claims, in effect, the power to render an advisory opinion. It must have thought the statute was not severable, because Congress wanted the Supreme Court’s final judgment and not merely a Court of Claims opinion on constitutionality.14 The status did not last. In 1962 the Court held in Glidden Company v. Zdanok that the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are constitutional courts, although the Justices in the majority reached that result on varying grounds.15 A tribunal’s classification can therefore change, and a court classified under Article III can no longer exercise advisory jurisdiction.
Hayburn’s Case supplies the other pole, because there judges sitting as Article III courts refused work of a similar kind. Under the pension statute the circuit courts were to certify disabled veterans to the Secretary of War, who was to put the applicant on the pension list unless he had cause to suspect imposition or mistake. The circuit courts, on which five of the Supreme Court Justices sat, uniformly refused to entertain the petitions. They reasoned that the business was not properly judicial in nature and that the Secretary’s power to suspend the decision deprived the proceeding of the finality a court’s judgment requires.16 The pension duty and the tariff duty of Bakelite were alike in leaving the last word with an executive officer. The difference lay in the tribunal that received the duty. Congress placed the pension duty on Article III courts, whose judges decline such work, and it placed the tariff duty on a legislative court, which may accept it.
Congress’s freedom to use Article I tribunals has a limit. Congress must have an appropriate reason to create one, and it may not simply give any and all Article III business to an Article I court. Otherwise the very concept of a court protected and limited by Article III would have no meaning.17 The tenure and salary guarantees attach only to Article III judges. If Congress could move ordinary lawsuits to tribunals whose judges serve on terms Congress sets, it could strip any category of disputes of that protection simply by changing the forum. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. is the decision commonly cited for the point that Congress may not take cases of the kind traditionally heard by Article III courts and assign them to Article I courts.18
An Article III answer at the first step brings the full case-or-controversy requirement and the ban on advisory opinions with it. An Article I answer lifts the ban, but the third step can still defeat the statute when Congress has relocated the kind of dispute that Article III courts have traditionally decided.
State Courts
State constitutions may authorize what Article III forbids. The Massachusetts Constitution lets each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor and council, require the opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court on important questions of law and upon solemn occasions. The Michigan Constitution lets either house of the legislature or the governor request the supreme court’s opinion on important questions of law, upon solemn occasions, about the constitutionality of legislation that has been enacted but has not yet taken effect.21 The provisions see real use, since state supreme courts issued 143 responses to requests for advisory opinions between 1990 and 2004. One commentator argues that judicious use of such opinions improves efficiency and accountability.22
A state may do this because the federal ban comes from Article III. Justiciability doctrine derives from Article III, so it does not directly bind state courts, which look to their own constitutions for questions of judicial authority. Many state-court systems therefore have very different justiciability regimes from the federal courts.23 A state that wants its high court to test a statute’s validity before the statute takes effect can say so in its own constitution. About ten state high courts do give advisory opinions, as does the Canadian Supreme Court, and advisory opinions remain an integral part of the legal tradition in continental Europe and in several international tribunals.24
The two requests are the same, and the only difference is the court asked. The federal limit attaches to the Article III court, which is why a state court may answer a question the Supreme Court may not.
The limit on the U.S. Supreme Court’s own jurisdiction does follow a state case to Washington. In Doremus v. Board of Education a taxpayer challenged a state statute requiring Bible reading in public schools, lost in the state’s highest court, and appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because the taxpayer lacked the requisite financial interest in the outcome.25 The Court said it did not undertake to decide whether a state court may render an opinion on a federal constitutional question even when the opinion can be regarded only as advisory. But because its own jurisdiction is cast in terms of “case or controversy,” it could not accept as the basis for review any procedure that does not constitute one.26 The reasoning has two links. A state court may decide whatever its own constitution lets it decide, and the Supreme Court takes no objection to that. Reviewing the state decision, however, would be an exercise of Article III judicial power, which requires a live dispute in which the petitioner has a personal stake, and the taxpayer’s stake did not grow because a state judge reached the merits.
A dissent in Orr v. Orr relied on Doremus to state the principle compactly: a state court cannot transform an abstract or hypothetical question into a case or controversy merely by ruling on its merits.27 The dissent added that a statute giving litigants a right of appeal to the Court does not change the analysis, because Congress cannot confer jurisdiction that Article III withholds, which is the lesson of Marbury.28 A state advisory opinion therefore answers the question for the state and opens no federal door. Two errors tempt the unwary: carrying the federal ban into state court, and assuming that a state court’s ruling on the merits cures a missing federal stake.
Who petitions, and what the state judgment did to them, decides the outcome. A plaintiff with no federal-court stake who loses in state court has nothing for the Supreme Court to review, as Doremus shows. A comparable plaintiff who wins in state court presents a different case, because the state judgment itself may inflict a direct, specific, and concrete injury on the defendants. When they petition for review, the requirements of a case or controversy can be met even though the plaintiffs would have lacked standing had they sued in federal court.29 Mootness shows a second difference. A federal case that becomes moot on appeal ends with the appellate judgment vacated and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss, which leaves the case with no binding effect on the parties. A case that began in state court and becomes moot on appeal is treated differently, because Article III and federal rules of self-restraint do not bind state courts and the Supreme Court has no supervisory power over them. The Court normally dismisses the appeal but does not require the state court to vacate its judgment or dismiss the complaint.30