Concept
Constitutional Versus Prudential Limits
Case or Controversy and Advisory Opinions
Constitutional Versus Prudential Limits
Justiciability doctrine mixes two kinds of limit, and the Court has said so itself: in Flast v. Cohen it called the doctrine "a blend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations."1 A constitutional limit marks the edge of the judicial power, so a court has no authority to decide beyond it. A prudential limit is a rule of self-restraint that the Court adopted for its own governance; it asks whether a court that has power should use it in a particular case. The ban on advisory opinions and the requirement of a real, adverse, and conclusive controversy belong to the first group. Brandeis's avoidance rules belong mostly to the second.
Flast illustrated the blend with the seven rules Justice Brandeis listed in his concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority. Those rules operate in "cases confessedly within [the Court's] jurisdiction," so they find their source in policy rather than purely in the Constitution.2
Limits Rooted in Article III
The ban on advisory opinions comes from Article III, and not from history alone. The Court has said that the implicit policies embodied in Article III impose the rule, and that when the judicial power is invoked to pass on actions of the Legislative and Executive Branches, the rule implements the separation of powers and confines federal courts to the role Article III assigns them.3 Flast cited Muskrat v. United States as its example.4 In Muskrat, Congress authorized a test suit against the United States and provided for review in the Supreme Court, yet the Court refused to decide the case, because Congress cannot make the United States a defendant unless the United States truly has an interest adverse to the plaintiff.5
Because these limits come from Article III, they bind Congress and the litigants as well as the courts. The case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on federal judicial power,6 and the constitutionally grounded aspects of justiciability cannot be legislated away.7 Congress is one of the branches whose reach into the judicial department the requirement exists to restrain, and a limit that Congress could redefine at will would last only as long as Congress chose to honor it. The litigants pose a different risk. If their joint wish for a ruling sufficed, genuine adversity would vanish whenever both sides preferred it to, which is the collusive-suit problem taught above.
The constitutional core reaches beyond advisory opinions to standing. The Court has required that a party seeking relief allege a personal stake in the outcome sufficient to assure the concrete adverseness that sharpens the presentation of issues, and it has identified three constitutionally required elements: injury in fact, a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct, and likely redress by a favorable decision.8 Each element is a condition on the existence of a case. A plaintiff who lacks one has no case, however a statute describes the suit. Later readings take up the elements one by one.
Ashwander's Avoidance Rules
Brandeis described his rules as ones the Court "developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction," and he said they let it avoid passing upon a large part of the constitutional questions pressed upon it.10 Three of them show the pattern. The Court will not pass on the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary proceeding; it will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it"; and it will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."11 A fourth rule governs a case that could be decided on either of two grounds, one constitutional and the other a question of statutory construction or general law: the Court decides only the latter.12
All of these rules serve one policy, the Court's insistence on strict necessity before it passes on the Constitution. The policy traces to the way Marbury justified judicial review: as a reluctant power, exercised only because the Court must decide the cases brought before it in conformity with the Constitution.13 The power is also costly. Judicial review is inconsistent with majority rule, and the conflict between the judiciary and the democratic system may provoke popular disapproval, so strict necessity helps assure that review does not take place gratuitously.14
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles added a list of further reasons: the delicacy of the judicial function in constitutional cases, the comparative finality of constitutional rulings, the need for consideration by other repositories of constitutional power, the need to preserve the constitutional allocation of powers, and the inherent limitations of the judicial process.15
Justice Frankfurter stressed the effect on the other branches in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. Clashes between different branches of government, he wrote, should be avoided if "a legal ground of less explosive potentialities" is properly available, because constitutional adjudications tend to exacerbate differences by exposing them.16
Restraint has a price. By postponing or forgoing its distinctive competence, the Court may leave an unconstitutional law operating while a case matures, and the harm done in the meantime may never be fully undone by a later decision.17 The avoidance rules answer by making necessity the test: when the case cannot be resolved without the constitutional question, the court decides it.
If the statute had plainly authorized the regulation, the statutory ground would have disposed of nothing, and necessity would then have required the court to reach the due process claim. The rule defers a constitutional ruling only while another ground can carry the judgment. Because the rule is prudential, it also bends when important factors counsel the need for decision.18
Why the Distinction Matters
The classification of a barrier decides what a statute can accomplish, because Congress can lift only prudential barriers. A limitation that originates in Article III's definition of the judicial power is beyond legislative override; Congress can, by legislation, allow the federal courts to hear suits that they might otherwise refuse to adjudicate on policy or prudential grounds.20 The asymmetry has a reason. Article III binds Congress as part of the Constitution, while a rule the Court adopted for its own governance rests on the Court's judgment about timing and prudence, and Congress, acting within its own powers, may reach a different judgment. The Court can also relax a prudential barrier by its own choice when important factors counsel the need for decision.21
Standing supplies a matched pair. Injury in fact is a constitutional element, as noted above. The general bar on asserting the rights of third parties rests on prudential concerns: the Court's desire to avoid constitutional questions and to hear from the most effective and concerned advocate.22 Even that bar has exceptions, which the Court recognizes after weighing the importance of the relationship between the litigant and the third party, the third party's ability to vindicate its own rights, and the risk that those rights will be diluted if third-party standing is denied.23
Sorting a barrier into one category is not always easy, because the Court does not always say which kind it is applying.24 Flast observed that the "many subtle pressures" which cause policy considerations to blend into Article III make justiciability a doctrine of "uncertain and shifting contours," and it noted that several cases Brandeis cited to illustrate his self-governing rules had rested on purely constitutional grounds.25 Two examples show the overlap. Brandeis's first rule, against deciding constitutionality in a friendly, nonadversary proceeding, sits on his list of self-governing rules, yet genuine adversity is also an Article III requirement, as the earlier discussion of collusive suits showed.26 Brandeis also applied his fourth rule to appeals from state courts that rest on an independent state ground, and the plain-statement rule of Michigan v. Long is described as prudential, although the earlier discussion noted uncertainty about whether the doctrine is merely prudential or required by the ban on advisory opinions.27 The uncertainty has a practical cost, because it leaves unclear which components of the doctrine legislation can override.28
When the Court has not said which kind of barrier it is applying, an answer should say so and then reason from the doctrine's purpose. A barrier that protects the existence of a real, adverse, conclusive dispute points toward Article III; one that protects the Court's discretion about timing and necessity points toward policy.
Advisory Used Loosely
The formal ban on advisory opinions is the refusal, traced to 1793, to answer requests for advice that another branch puts to the Court outside a dispute. Opinions also use "advisory" as a term of criticism, and the two uses should not be confused. Some members of the Court have called an alternative ground for a decision an improper advisory opinion, others have faulted dicta as unnecessarily advisory, and the Court has sometimes said that a dispute in which a party lacks standing or the dispute lacks ripeness would call for a prohibited advisory opinion.30 On the broadest version of that rhetoric, much of what Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury might itself be called advisory.31 Yet the formal request for advice rejected in 1793 differs from the rhetorical use of the term to describe parts of an opinion that some members of the Court regard as unnecessary.32
The difference lies in where each practice occurs. A court that states an alternative holding does so in a case already before it, between adverse parties, with a judgment that binds them. What the Court chooses to say in such a case differs from what it might be compelled to say if the other branches could request advice,33 and the Court retains control over how it treats unnecessary portions of earlier opinions.34 An alternative constitutional holding may still offend the policy of deciding on one ground when that ground suffices, which is a prudential concern. It does not show that the court lacked Article III power.
A President who asks the Court whether a draft executive order is lawful presents the formal problem at its starkest: there are no adverse parties and no binding judgment. The usual exam error is to treat a judge's complaint that a passage is advisory as proof that the case lacked a controversy.