Concept
Standing on Appeal
Standing
Standing on Appeal
Standing is not a gate that a litigant passes once. It must exist at every stage of a case, and a party that asks an appellate court to act must satisfy it in its own right. Hollingsworth v. Perry is the leading illustration. The Supreme Court held that the private proponents of California’s Proposition 8 could not appeal a judgment invalidating the measure, because the judgment injured them in no personal and concrete way and they asserted only a generalized interest in the enforceability of state law.
The three elements you have already studied do not retire when a complaint survives. After a trial court rules, the party seeking review stands where the plaintiff stood at filing, and it must show that the judgment injures it. Hollingsworth tests that rule on a hard case: the officials who would ordinarily appeal chose not to, and the only parties left were private citizens deeply committed to the result. The first subsection states the persistence rule and applies it. The second asks whether a State can solve the problem by authorizing someone else to defend its law.
Standing at Every Stage
Article III confines the federal judicial power to actual “Cases” or “Controversies,” and a person who invokes that power must show a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.1 Most standing cases ask whether the plaintiff met that requirement at filing. Article III, however, demands that an actual controversy persist through all stages of litigation, so standing “must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.”2
On appeal, redressability takes a specific form. The appellant must show that a ruling in its favor would redress whatever injury the adverse lower-court ruling caused it, and a favorable ruling that corrected no cognizable injury would be purely advisory.3 Two procedural points follow. The rules that decide who is a proper party to an appeal rest on common-law principles, not on Article III.4 But Article III operates alongside them: standing must exist at all times, the court of appeals may evaluate it on its own motion, and any party may raise it at any time, even on appeal.5 The Supreme Court used that authority in Hollingsworth when it directed the parties to brief whether the petitioners had standing under Article III at all.6
Hollingsworth shows one case passing the test at one stage and failing it at the next. After the district court declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional and enjoined the state officials named as defendants from enforcing it, “the inquiry under Article III changed.” The plaintiffs had won, so they had no injury left to redress, and the officials chose not to appeal.7 The only people who sought review were the initiative’s proponents, who had intervened in the district court, and that court had not ordered them to do or refrain from doing anything.8 The judgment bound officials who would not appeal, favored plaintiffs who needed nothing more, and commanded nothing of the one party that wanted review.
The proponents therefore faced the test every litigant faces: a litigant must seek relief for an injury that affects it in a “personal and individual way.”9 Their only reason for wanting the order reversed was to vindicate the validity of a generally applicable state law, an interest every citizen who favors the law shares. That is the generalized grievance described earlier in this chapter, and the Court held that however deeply committed the proponents were to upholding Proposition 8, their commitment was not a particularized interest sufficient to create a case or controversy.10 Commitment does not distinguish a party from the many who share it, and letting such a party carry a case upward would invite the Court to review the choices of other branches at the request of anyone who disagrees. The Court spoke to that danger directly. Out of an “overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its proper constitutional sphere,” it said, courts must put aside “the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of [an] important dispute and to ‘settle’ it for the sake of convenience and efficiency.”11
A government that has been ordered to act has a stake of its own. In United States v. Windsor, the Executive welcomed a ruling that a federal statute was unconstitutional, yet the district court’s judgment ordered the United States to pay Windsor the refund she sought. The Supreme Court held that the United States kept a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction on appeal. An order directing the Treasury to pay money is “a real and immediate economic injury,” and the fact that the Executive may welcome the order, when it comes with the constitutional ruling the Executive wants, does not eliminate the injury to the national Treasury.12
Set the two cases side by side. The difference is not who agreed with whom; it is whom the judgment commanded. In Windsor the judgment ordered the Treasury to pay, and the appellant was the party under the order. In Hollingsworth the injunction ran against officials who declined to appeal, and the proponents were under no order at all. An appellant needs an injury from the judgment itself, and agreement or disagreement with the legal ruling supplies none.
The injury an appellant claims must also be real rather than conjectural. In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Court held 5–4, in an opinion by Justice Alito, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Section 1881(a). They argued that there was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their communications with foreign contacts would be intercepted under the statute at some future time, and the Court rejected that theory.13 The claimed injury was not fairly traceable to the statute, because it was speculative whether the Government would target them on an imminent basis.14 An appellant who says only that a judgment may someday harm it fares no better.
Defending State Laws
When state officials will not defend a law, can private proponents defend it in federal court because the State’s own courts say they may? In Hollingsworth the Supreme Court said no. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a 5–4 majority, and the reasoning moves in four steps: the proponents’ own interest, the State’s interest they tried to borrow, the state-law authorization they relied on, and the agency theory they offered last.
The proponents’ own interest was the generalized grievance described above. California law gave them a special role in the initiative process, but that role lay in enacting the measure. Once the voters approved it, the proponents had no part in enforcing it, so their stake matched that of every Californian who favored it. The Court had said as much before, observing in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona that it had never “identified initiative proponents as Article-III-qualified defenders of the measures they advocated.”15
Lacking a cognizable interest of their own, the proponents tried to invoke the State’s. But without an injury in fact of their own, they would ordinarily have no standing to assert the State’s interests.16 The third-party doctrine in the next section starts from the same premise. Diamond v. Charles had reached a similar result: an individual who intervened to defend an Illinois abortion statute could not continue the defense after the State declined to appeal. The State’s own interest is another matter. A State that sues in its own name can receive special solicitude in the standing analysis, as Massachusetts did when it sued in its parens patriae capacity in Massachusetts v. EPA.17 That solicitude belongs to the State, and Hollingsworth refuses to let private parties borrow it.
The proponents’ strongest argument was that the California Supreme Court had determined, as a matter of state law, that they could appear and assert the State’s interest in the measure’s validity. State authorization matters in some settings. In Karcher v. May, two New Jersey legislative leaders were allowed to intervene to defend a state law after the attorney general declined to do so. Because the New Jersey Legislature had authority under state law to represent the State’s interests, the Speaker and the President, in their official capacities, could vindicate that interest in federal court on the legislature’s behalf.18
The majority held that authorization could not rescue the proponents. Standing in federal court is a question of federal law, not state law, and the fact that a State thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance “cannot override our settled law to the contrary”; a State cannot hand private parties who otherwise lack standing “a ticket to the federal courthouse.”19 The reason is structural. If a State’s say-so could create standing, state law would draw the boundary of the federal judicial power.
The New Jersey leaders differed because they held public office and acted in their official capacities for the legislature. The proponents hold no office. As the dissent summarized the majority’s view, initiative proponents “are not elected” and “decide for themselves, with no review, what arguments to make and how to make them.”20 An officeholder answers to the public for how the State’s interest is defended, and a proponent answers to no one. That was the difference that mattered.
The same pattern appears in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha. The executive branch declined to defend a legislative veto, which created what looked like a friendly suit between the government and the alien. Congress intervened, and the Court held that Congress was a proper party to defend a statute when the agency charged with enforcing it agrees with the plaintiffs that it is inapplicable or unconstitutional. Congress as an institution thus had standing to defend its claimed prerogative.21 Membership in state government is not enough on its own, however. In Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, the Court later held that one chamber of a state legislature could not appeal an order invalidating a redistricting plan after the State declined to appeal.
Nor could agency fill the gap. The California Supreme Court had described the question of who bears responsibility for any attorney-fee award as entirely distinct from the question of the proponents’ authority. But a principal ordinarily has a duty to indemnify an agent for the cost of defending suits when the agent acted with actual authority. If fee responsibility is entirely distinct from authority, authority cannot rest on agency. Neither the California Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit ever described the proponents as agents of the State, and the majority concluded that they plainly do not qualify.22
Justice Kennedy’s dissent supplies the counterargument and explains why the vote was close. He agreed that a proponent’s standing to defend an initiative in federal court is a question of federal law, but he argued that resolving it first requires a threshold determination of state law.23 In his view, Article III does not require California to follow the Restatement of Agency, or the Court’s view of how a State should structure its government, when it decides who may defend an initiative on its behalf. The initiative system exists to control and bypass public officials, he argued, and those are the same officials who would not defend the measure, an injury the Court leaves unremedied.24 He added that courts already let a party assert another’s interests without an agency relationship in settings such as special prosecutors, qui tam actions, and next-friend suits, and that the ruling leaves the district court’s judgment and its statewide injunction effectively immune from appellate review.25 The majority’s answer, as the dissent reports it, was that qui tam actions and next-friend litigation have a longer historical pedigree than the initiative process. The dissent called that no basis for finding Article III satisfied there but not here.26
Because the proponents had not carried their burden to show standing to appeal, the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction. The Court vacated its judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal.27 The holding concerns the federal courthouse only: California remains free to decide who may defend its initiatives in its own courts, where Article III does not apply.
Steps two and three do the sorting. A proponent who is sincere and well informed has not passed step two, and a state court’s declaration that a proponent may defend has not answered step three, because only an office or institution answerable to the public can stand in for the State.