Concept
The Effective Relief Test
Mootness
The Effective Relief Test
Mootness comes down to a practical question: can the court still give the plaintiff any meaningful relief? Ripeness polices lawsuits brought too early; mootness polices lawsuits brought too late. Federal courts decide only ongoing disputes between parties with a live personal stake, so when events after filing resolve the dispute, the case must be dismissed as moot, whether at trial, on appeal, or in the Supreme Court itself.1 The working test asks whether it has become impossible for the court to fashion any effective relief. If it has, the case is moot, because Article III does not let a federal court declare principles of law that cannot affect the case before it.2
The test has two halves, and each rests on a reason. The first half asks only whether relief is possible; it does not ask whether the legal question is important, because a ruling that could change nothing for the parties would merely state a principle of law, and Article III withholds that power.3 The second half is generous to plaintiffs: relief need not be complete. If the court can grant some meaningful remedy, the case is not moot even though the court cannot return the parties to the status quo ante.4
The burden of proof runs opposite to standing. The proponent of jurisdiction must demonstrate standing in the first instance, but the party who wishes to defeat jurisdiction “bears the burden to establish that a once-live case has become moot,” and that burden is tall: a case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.5 The questions differ as well. Standing asks at the outset whether the plaintiff has suffered, or will imminently suffer, a personal injury.6 The sponsors of Proposition 8, whom the lower court had not ordered to do or refrain from doing anything, had no direct stake in the outcome of their appeal and so lacked standing to bring it.7 Mootness asks later, after events have intervened, whether a decree could still do something for the claim.
Events other than Molly's can do the same work. When the parties settle, the controversy is no longer alive; when the challenged statute or regulation expires or is repealed, the controversy is over; and any change in circumstances that has the practical effect of ending the dispute moots the case.9 A plaintiff who receives, after suing, all the relief requested has nothing left for a decree to add.10 Each event removes the remedy, and the loss of the remedy is what moots the claim.
The source of the change affects how much weight it carries. A legislature's repeal ordinarily ends the controversy, because restoring the statute would require the whole lawmaking process again. A city council can reinstate its own ordinance with little effort, so courts are more suspicious of a local repeal and less ready to find the case moot. Kremens v. Bartley, where a legislative change ended the case, contrasts with City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., where repeal of a local ordinance did not.
The worry that a defendant who has changed course may change back is the subject of voluntary cessation, one of two exceptions that mootness recognizes and standing does not; the other covers disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review.11 Both are developed later in this chapter. The second exception can keep a case alive after the particular dispute has run its course. In one such case, a contractor's dispute with an agency arose under a two-year government contract, too short to litigate fully, especially since administrative review had consumed part of the two years. The agency disagreed with the Government Accountability Office over a procurement rule and was expected to refuse to apply it again, and the contractor was expected to bid again on the same services. Because the dispute was likely to recur between the same parties in circumstances again too short for full review, the case was not moot.12
Church of Scientology v. United States reaches the opposite result from Molly's on facts that look worse for the plaintiff. The Church resisted an IRS subpoena for tapes of conversations between Church officials and their lawyers. While the appeal was pending, the state court clerk delivered copies of the tapes to the IRS, and the court of appeals held the case moot. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The court could not erase what the IRS might have learned by listening, but it could order the IRS to destroy or return every copy in its possession, and that partial remedy was meaningful relief.13 Once Molly retired, nothing a court could order would help her; an order directed at the copies would still do something for the Church.
Three more decisions show how little the test demands. In Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, the houseboat at the center of an admiralty suit was destroyed, yet the Supreme Court held the case was not moot, because the court could still grant relief. In Chafin v. Chafin, a federal court ordered a child returned to Scotland under the Hague Convention, and the mother left with the child. The court of appeals held the father's appeal moot because it doubted that a reversal could be enforced. The Supreme Court disagreed: the mother remained subject to the district court's jurisdiction, and doubt about whether she would comply, or whether a foreign court would help, did not make relief impossible. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the parties agreed to liquidate damages, but the agreement left each side with a financial stake in the Court's ruling on presidential immunity, so the controversy stayed definite and concrete.14 Church of Scientology involved relief that was partial and Chafin relief that might go unenforced; in neither was relief impossible.
Mootness is decided claim by claim, because each claim carries its own remedy. The end of the wrongful conduct can moot a request for an injunction without mooting a request for damages, since money for a past injury is still something a court can order.15 The same logic governs prisoner suits. A transfer or release from prison does not moot a claim for damages included in the complaint,16 so a prisoner who pleads damages keeps a live claim after being moved, while one who asks only for an injunction may lose the case.
Even nominal damages are enough. In Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, college students challenged a campus speech policy and sought an injunction and nominal damages, and the college abandoned the policy soon after the suit was filed. The students accepted that injunctive relief was no longer available, but the Supreme Court held that an award of nominal damages by itself can redress a past injury, so the case could go forward.
Students often declare the whole case moot the moment the headline remedy disappears. The sound approach asks, for each claim, what a decree could still accomplish.