Concept
The Basic Rule
The “adequate and independent state ground”
When State Grounds Bar Review
The Basic Rule
The Supreme Court will not review a state-court judgment that rests on an adequate and independent state ground, even when the same opinion decides a federal question and decides it wrongly.1 In Michigan v. Long the Court described the principle as based, in part, on “the limitations of our own jurisdiction.”2 The rule matters whenever one state-court opinion gives two reasons for its result, one drawn from state law and the other from federal law.
A short hypothetical shows how it works. A state supreme court dismisses a prosecution for two reasons: the state criminal statute does not reach the defendant’s conduct, and the statute is in any event invalid under the Federal Constitution. The state petitions for certiorari and argues that the constitutional holding is wrong. The first reason is a pure question of state law, and it would likely qualify as an adequate and independent ground for the dismissal. If it does, the Supreme Court may not review the constitutional holding at all.3 Even a Supreme Court victory on the constitutional point would leave the prosecution dismissed.
Two propositions explain that result. The first concerns what the Court may review. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 expressly limited the Court’s review of state judgments to questions of federal law, so that when a state court had also decided questions of state law, the Court could not review the correctness of those rulings. Congress later dropped the express limit, but the Court has adhered to the principle that it will not review state-court rulings on state law.4 Today 28 U.S.C. § 1257 reaches only federal-question cases and omits any reference to cases that involve no federal-law issue.5 The Court established its power to review state courts on federal questions in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, and Murdock v. City of Memphis is the classic statement of where that power stops.
The second proposition concerns who has the last word on state law. A state’s highest court is not a “lower court” on that subject, even in relation to the Supreme Court of the United States. It must follow the Supreme Court on the meaning of the Constitution and federal law, but it may interpret state statutes and its own constitution in any way that does not violate federal law.6 The federal courts, the Supreme Court included, are therefore bound by state-court judgments about the content of the state’s own law.7
Joined, the two propositions produce the doctrine. When a state court rests its judgment on both a federal ground and a state ground, the Court can examine only the federal one. If the state ground alone would yield the same judgment, a ruling on the federal ground changes nothing for the parties, and the Court’s jurisdiction depends entirely on whether its decision of the federal question may affect the result below.8
Two labels describe a state ground that passes this test. A state ground is adequate when it fully sustains the result and does not itself violate the Constitution or federal law.9 It is independent when it does not depend on the state court’s interpretation of federal law. In Michigan v. Long, references to the Michigan Constitution did not make the state court’s ground independent, because the court had rested its decision primarily on federal law.10 A ground must be both adequate and independent, and unless it is both, the Court can review the case.11 A state ground can also fail the adequacy requirement. Suppose a state court upholds a law after concluding that it violates neither the state nor the federal constitution. If the Supreme Court decides that the law does violate the Federal Constitution, the judgment must be reversed, because the state ground is not adequate to sustain it.12
The Court applied the rule in Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Commission. It granted certiorari, then dismissed the writ as improvidently granted after concluding that Indiana law treated usable air space above private property as part of the property and that the ordinance effectively took that property without compensation. The Indiana Supreme Court had not discussed the state constitutional issue separately from the Fourteenth Amendment issue, but it had explicitly relied on Indiana law. That reliance settled the matter. A holding that the ordinance did not offend the federal Constitution would have left it invalid under the state constitution, and deciding the federal question would have produced an advisory opinion.13
The doctrine asks what the state court actually relied on, not what it might have relied on. In Oregon v. Guzek the Court stressed that a “possible adequate and independent state ground” for a decision does not “bar our reaching the federal questions” where a state supreme court “quite clearly rested its decision solely on the Federal Constitution.”14 If a state court passes over an available state-law route and rests on federal law alone, its judgment stands on federal law only. Reversal on the federal question would then change the outcome, and the Court has something to correct. That difference separates such a case from Jankovich, where the state court had relied on state law.
The reason for the rule lies in what the Court may do with a state judgment. In Herb v. Pitcairn the Court put the point this way: “Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions.” If the state court would render the same judgment after the Court corrected its views of federal law, the Court’s review “could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.”15 Article III limits the judicial power of the United States to actual cases and controversies, and a ruling that could have no effect on the rights or duties of the parties would be an unconstitutional advisory opinion.16
The Court has not settled which explanation is basic. In the early years it seemingly treated the doctrine as prudential: when parties could invoke its appellate jurisdiction as of right, the doctrine let the Court control its docket. Later cases, including Herb v. Pitcairn, appear to treat it as compelled by the Article III bar on advisory opinions.17 The advisory-opinion rationale is itself contestable. There is historical evidence that Congress intended review of the whole case; the Court has at times said it need not decide whether the rule is constitutional because a statute supplies an adequate basis; and a federal ruling issued despite an alternative state ground looks more like a moot decision in a concrete controversy than an advisory one.18
Whatever its foundation, the consequence is the same once both requirements are met: the state decision is absolutely shielded from Supreme Court review, however erroneous its handling of federal law.19 The sections that follow therefore ask when a ground is adequate, then when it is independent, and finally how the Court treats the doubtful cases, including the one in Michigan v. Long.