Concept
Independent State Grounds
The “adequate and independent state ground”
Independent State Grounds
An adequate state ground bars Supreme Court review only if it is also independent. Adequacy asks whether the state ground can sustain the judgment without the federal ground. Independence asks where the state court found its state-law answer: the ground is independent only if that answer does not rest on the court's understanding of federal law.1
Michigan v. Long gathered the Court's earlier formulations. The Court will not treat a normally adequate state ground as independent when the state court "felt compelled by what it understood to be federal constitutional considerations" to read its own law as it did. Its jurisdiction is also plain when the nonfederal ground is "so interwoven" with the federal ground that it is not an independent matter, or when it is not broad enough to sustain the judgment without a decision on the federal ground.2 The compelled and interwoven formulations share one test: would the state-law answer survive if the state court's view of federal law were mistaken?
The requirement follows from the limit on what the Court can accomplish. If a state ground fully sustains the judgment, a Supreme Court ruling on the federal ground changes nothing, because the state court has the last word on its own law.3 A ground that depends on federal law is different. A state court that reads its constitution to mean what a federal provision means has made its state-law answer a function of its federal-law answer. If the Supreme Court then finds that the state court misread federal law, the state ground falls with the federal one, since the two were inextricably linked, and the Court can reverse.4
Three decisions show how a state-law answer can trace back to federal law. In Foster v. Chatman the Court found the ground not independent because applying the state rule depended on federal constitutional precedent. In Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs it reached the same conclusion where the state court had described its own decision as dictated by federal law. In Ohio v. Reiner it took jurisdiction because the state court's reading of state law had been influenced by its reading of the Fifth Amendment.5 Dependence can therefore show up in how the state rule operates, in what the state court says drove its result, or in how a federal provision shaped its reading of a state one.
The failing pole appears in Delaware v. Prouse. The Delaware Supreme Court had said that any violation of the Fourth Amendment necessarily violates the state constitution's cognate provision, and had described that provision as substantially similar to the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court concluded that the Delaware court did not intend to rest independently on its own constitution and took jurisdiction.6 Long itself arose the same way. The Michigan Supreme Court had rested its decision on both the Fourth Amendment and a similar provision of the Michigan constitution, and it had relied on federal law to define the scope of the state guarantee. Its view of state law might change if the Supreme Court cut back the Fourth Amendment, so there was reason to doubt both the independence of the state ground and its power to bar review.7
The passing pole appears in a case where the Court granted certiorari and then dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. The Indiana Supreme Court had found that the ordinance effectively took property, because Indiana law treated usable air space above private land as part of the property and no compensation was paid. Its opinion did not discuss the Indiana constitutional issue separately from the Fourteenth Amendment issue, but it explicitly relied on Indiana law. A Supreme Court holding that the ordinance did not offend the federal Constitution would not have changed the result, since the ordinance would still have been invalid under the state constitution. Deciding the federal question would have produced an advisory opinion.8
The death-penalty hypothetical from the discussion of substantive adequacy now returns, because it shows how much turns on why a state court cites what it cites. The state ground there looked adequate: it fully supported the judgment and conflicted with no federal law. The open question is whether it was independent.
The same opinion can be read the other way. If the state court cited the federal decisions only because it found them reinforcing its separate reading of the state clause, it would have reached the same conclusion under state law even if it had misjudged the Eighth Amendment. The state ground would then be independent and, being adequate, would bar review.10 Nothing on the face of such an opinion settles which reading is right, because a holding that the sentence violates both constitutions does not reveal which premise carried the result. That gap is the doubtful case, and the presumption Long adopted, taken up later in this chapter, was designed to fill it.11
A state court can also say outright that a clause worded like a federal one gives broader protection to the individual. When it does, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review, because the ruling depends on no federal premise.12 A state is free to give people more rights under its own law than they hold under federal law, and the Supreme Court cannot review the correctness of the state court's reading of its own constitution.13 Identical wording therefore does not defeat independence by itself, while a decision to follow the federal provision's meaning does.
The decisions yield a working list of signals that a state-law answer depends on federal law. The signals are evidence of dependence and do not replace the controlling question, which is whether a mistake about federal law would change the state-law result. The common signals are these:
- The state court describes its decision as dictated or required by federal law.14
- The state court calls its constitutional provision substantially similar to the federal one, or says that every federal violation necessarily violates it.15
- The opinion rests mainly on Supreme Court decisions interpreting the federal provision, or uses them to define the scope of the state guarantee, and cites few state authorities.16
- Applying the state rule depends on a ruling about a federal constitutional question.17
A state court answers these signals with their opposites. An opinion that grounds its result in the text of the state constitution and in state precedent, that treats federal cases as persuasive support rather than controlling authority, and that makes clear the state ground would stand on its own presents a state-law answer that no federal ruling can unsettle.18 What matters is whether the answer in fact depended on federal law, not the label the court attaches.
Independence matters for procedural grounds as well. A state court's reliance on a procedural default is not independent if its resolution of the state procedural question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, or if its decision actually rested on such a ruling.19