Concept
From Formalism to Effects
Commerce Clause
From Formalism to Effects
The words of the Commerce Clause did not change between the 1890s and the 1940s: Congress may “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”1 The Court's method of applying them changed completely. Before 1937 the Court policed the boundary between federal and state power with two labels. After 1937 it asked how the regulated activity related to interstate commerce, and the rest of this chapter builds on that question.
The first label sorted activities by kind. When the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Act of 1890 first brought federal regulation under the commerce power before the Court, it carried over from its negative Commerce Clause cases the rule that Congress could not regulate “production,” “manufacturing,” and “mining.”2 United States v. E. C. Knight Co. is the standard example of that approach. Carter v. Carter Coal Co. extended it to labor regulation by holding that federal rules on unfair labor practices in mining regulated “production,” not “commerce.”3 Under this label the outcome depended on which box an activity fit. Manufacturing and mining went in the States' box, whatever they did to the national market.
The second label separated direct effects on interstate commerce from indirect ones, and it ignored size. In 1935 the Court invalidated a pension law for railroad workers because conditions of employment were only indirectly linked to commerce.4 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States shows how much weight the word “indirect” could carry. The argument for the federal poultry code was economic. Almost all the chickens New York slaughterhouses received came from other States, so wages and hours shaped the owners' costs, their demand for out-of-state chickens, and the price of those chickens. States acting one by one might also fail to fix low wages and long hours, because each would fear a race to the bottom.5 The Court nonetheless treated the effect as indirect. Carter Coal then explained why a large effect did not help: the direct-indirect distinction “turns, not upon the magnitude of either the cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the effect has been brought about.”6 A test that disregards how much an activity matters to the national market cannot track the economic reality the Clause governs.
One strand of the older cases already pointed toward a different question. In the Shreveport Rate Cases of 1914, the Court held that where the interstate and intrastate aspects of commerce were so mingled that full regulation of interstate commerce required incidental regulation of intrastate commerce, the Commerce Clause authorized the regulation.7 That decision looked at how an activity related to interstate commerce and not at what kind of activity it was.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. made that strand the test in 1937. The Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act against a Commerce Clause challenge, departed from the distinction between direct and indirect effects, and said that the question “is necessarily one of degree.” Intrastate activities that “have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions” fall within Congress's power.8 The Court also dealt with the production label. A close and intimate effect on commerce may arise from activities in relation to productive industry even though that industry, viewed separately, is local, so the fact that the employees were engaged in production “is not determinative.” What remains is “the effect upon interstate commerce of the labor practice involved.”9
Set Jones & Laughlin beside Carter Coal, decided the year before. In 1936, regulating labor practices in mining was held to regulate production, which lay outside the commerce power. In 1937, the same fact about employees engaged in production no longer decided anything. The difference lies in the question asked. The Court stopped asking what kind of activity Congress had regulated and began asking what the activity did to interstate commerce. The dissent in Morrison offers one explanation for the reversal. On that account, the Carter Coal Court was still trying to build a laissez-faire world out of the twentieth-century economy and used formalistic distinctions as instruments toward that end. Once the Court stopped attempting the impossible, the formalisms had no point, and they sat in a war with Chief Justice Marshall's conception of the commerce power.10
The Court later gave a factual reason and a doctrinal reason for the shift. Enterprises that had once been local or regional had become national in scope, and the doctrinal change reflected a view that the earlier cases had artificially constrained Congress's authority.11 The two reasons reinforce each other. A rule that sorts activities by name settles the case before anyone examines the facts: a mill is manufacturing, whatever its shutdown would do to commerce. A rule that asks about economic effect examines the relation the Clause actually regulates. Wickard v. Filburn put the point this way: once an economic measure of the reach of the commerce power is accepted, “questions of federal power cannot be decided simply by finding the activity in question to be ‘production,’ nor can consideration of its economic effects be foreclosed by calling them ‘indirect.’”12
Darby and Wickard completed the shift. Darby upheld a restriction on the production of goods for commerce, the category the old rule had placed off-limits, and stated the governing principle. The commerce power “extends to those intrastate activities which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power over it as to make regulation of them an appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end,” and “[w]here the effect is substantial, Congress may legislate to regulate or prohibit those intrastate activities.”13 Wickard stated the rule in its broadest terms. An activity may be local and may not be commerce at all, yet Congress may reach it if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, “irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’”14 Wickard also held that Filburn's own contribution to the demand for wheat, though trivial by itself, did not remove him from federal regulation, because his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, was far from trivial.15 The next section takes up that aggregation principle.
A substantial-effects regulation reaches activity that is neither interstate commerce itself nor an instrumentality of it, so the label on the activity cannot settle the question. Whenever Congress regulates such an activity, what is at issue, whether or not the Court says so, is the reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause as it augments the Commerce Clause.16 That clause authorizes Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,” and the commerce power is among them.17 Darby's phrase “an appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end” echoes that language.
The effects test carried its own limit from the start. Jones & Laughlin warned that the commerce power “must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.”18 Darby and Wickard speak in the same terms of a “substantial effect” and a “substantial economic effect.” The Court has since said that these modern precedents confirm outer limits on the power, and Lopez itself emphasized that Congress's authority, even under the modern, expansive reading, is not without effective bounds.19 The later sections show how the Court has tried to mark those bounds. On an exam, the name of the regulated activity (manufacturing, mining, farming) settles nothing. Ask how the activity relates to interstate commerce, and ask whether the effect is substantial or so remote that it would erase the line between national and local.