Concept
Wickard and Aggregation
Commerce Clause
Wickard and Aggregation
Wickard v. Filburn holds that Congress may reach purely local activity that, taken in the aggregate, exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. The case arose under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which sought to control the volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign commerce so as to avoid surpluses, shortages, and the abnormally low or high prices that follow them. Each year the Secretary of Agriculture proclaimed a national acreage allotment, which was apportioned to the States and their counties and finally broken into allotments for individual farms.1 Roscoe Filburn ran a small farm in Ohio, and in the year at issue he raised 23 acres of wheat.2
The statute's reach made the case hard. Darby had sustained federal power to regulate the production of goods for commerce, and that decision alone would have left the commerce question with little to consider. The difficulty was that the Act extended federal regulation to production not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm.3 The Act defined “market” to include feeding wheat to poultry or livestock whose products are sold, so the marketing quotas covered what could be sold without penalty and also what could be consumed on the premises.4 Filburn's usual practice was to sell part of his crop, feed part to poultry and livestock, mill some into flour for the household, and keep the rest for seed; the record did not say expressly what he intended for the crop in question.5 The Court therefore assumed the crop was never marketed and asked whether the commerce power reached it anyway.6
The Court answered in economic terms, in three steps. The first is that the power to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in, along with practices affecting those prices.7 One primary purpose of the Act was to raise the market price of wheat by limiting the volume that could affect the market. The question therefore became whether home-consumed wheat influences price, and the Court said it “can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions.”8
Home-consumed wheat reaches price through one channel on each side of the market. On the supply side, wheat in marketable condition overhangs the market, and when rising prices induce its owner to sell, it flows in and checks the increase. On the demand side, wheat a farmer grows for himself supplies a need that would otherwise be met by purchases in the open market, so growing it removes a buyer. In the Court’s words, “Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce.”9 The figures made the effect concrete. Consumption on the farm where the wheat was grown appeared to vary by more than 20 percent of average production, while the amount consumed as food varied relatively little and use as seed was relatively constant, so home-consumed wheat was the most variable factor in the disappearance of the wheat crop.10
The third step is the aggregation principle itself. Filburn’s own contribution to the demand for wheat might be trivial by itself, the Court conceded, but that was “not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”11 The effect that carried the case therefore belonged to the class of growers who raised wheat for their own needs, whose combined behavior moved supply and demand in the interstate market, and not to Filburn alone.
The idea came from Darby, which Wickard cited for the point.12 There Congress was held to have recognized that competition by a small part may affect the whole, that the aggregate effect of many small producers may be great, and that “[t]he legislation aimed at a whole embraces all its parts.”13 The logic is practical. If every regulated grower could escape by showing that his own share is small, a scheme aimed at the whole would reach none of its parts. The cost of the principle is its breadth, since almost any activity can be summed into a large number, and that is why later cases ask what kind of activity is being summed.14
The principle has a corollary about carving out. Because the effect is measured for the class, a court does not remove individual members of a regulated class on the ground that each is small. Gonzales v. Raich states the class-wide rule: when Congress decides that the “total incidence” of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class, and the Court has never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude.15
The principle also raises a question: aggregated with whom? If very few farmers grew wheat for home use, unlimited production by those growers, even in the aggregate, might well not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Wickard met that frame-of-reference problem by looking only at home-use wheat growers. It then found that their combined activity did have the requisite substantial effect, because many growers produced home-use wheat and that activity, in the aggregate, influenced prices in interstate markets by affecting both supply and demand.16 So the definition of the class can matter as much as the size of any single member.
Later opinions read Wickard through two different facts, and both readings matter in the sections ahead. Lopez called it perhaps the most far-reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, yet insisted that it involved economic activity in a way that possessing a gun in a school zone does not.17 For Lopez, then, Wickard marks how far aggregation goes when what is being added up is economic. Raich looked instead at the farmer and the market. Although Filburn was a commercial farmer, the Court had not treated his cultivation of wheat for home consumption as part of his commercial farming operation, and the Wickard record itself established the causal connection between production for local use and the national market; in Raich, Congress had made findings to the same effect.18
Aggregation does not rescue a statute aimed at conduct that is not economic. Lopez held that the school-zone gun provision was a criminal statute that by its terms had nothing to do with commerce or any economic enterprise, and that it was not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity whose scheme would be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It therefore fell outside the cases upholding regulation of activities connected with commercial transactions that, viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce.19 Filburn’s wheat was added to a market in wheat, where grain that overhangs a price or displaces a purchase changes supply and demand. Gun possession near a school had no comparable market to be added to. Where the Court draws the line when an activity looks noneconomic is the subject of the Lopez and Morrison sections that follow.