Concept
NFIB and the Activity Requirement
Commerce Clause
NFIB and the Activity Requirement
Almost every commerce case in this chapter involved a statute that regulated people who were already doing something: growing wheat, running a motel, cultivating marijuana. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, decided in 2012, asked a different question. Can the commerce power reach people who have refrained from, or not yet begun, an economic activity?1
The statute was the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. Its individual mandate required people who do not receive health insurance through an employer or a government program to buy it from a private company. Beginning in 2014, most Americans had to maintain minimum essential coverage or make a shared responsibility payment, calculated as a percentage of household income.2
Congress's reason for the mandate was economic. The mandate prevents cost shifting by people who would otherwise go without insurance, and it forces more healthy people into the insurance risk pool. Their premiums on average will exceed their health care expenses, which lets insurers subsidize the cost of covering the unhealthy people the reforms require them to accept.3 The Government defended the mandate under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause together.4
The Court split five to four twice. One majority upheld the mandate under the taxing power. A different majority rejected the Government's alternative argument that the Commerce Clause, including in tandem with the Necessary and Proper Clause, supported it.5 Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor would have sustained the mandate under both powers. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, in a joint dissent, would have struck it down under both. Chief Justice Roberts found the taxing power sufficient but supplied the decisive vote against the commerce theory.6 He wrote only for himself on that issue, yet he and the joint dissenters agreed that a congressional mandate of economic activity, as distinct from a prohibition or restriction of it, lies beyond the commerce power.7 That shared conclusion is the subject of this unit. The taxing-power holding is a separate ground and is not treated here.
The case also shows the three Lopez categories at work. Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce, may regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things in it, and may regulate “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.”8 The Government defended the mandate as an effects measure, which places it in the third category.9 The categories overlap in practice. Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Heart of Atlanta Motel, which upheld the federal prohibition on racial discrimination by motels and hotels, as a channels case, although the Court there reasoned in terms of the effects of the discrimination on interstate commerce.10 Because the labels bend, the useful question in NFIB comes before any label: is there commercial activity for Congress to regulate, or is Congress trying to create it?
Two questions follow. First, why does the power to regulate commerce presuppose activity? Second, can the Necessary and Proper Clause supply what the commerce power cannot?
Commerce Power Presupposes Activity
The Chief Justice held that the power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated.11 The individual mandate does not regulate existing commercial activity. It compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce.12 Compelling people to become active in this way creates commerce and does not regulate it.13 The joint dissenters agreed: “one does not regulate commerce that does not exist by compelling its existence.”14 Four arguments support the result: history, text, precedent, and the missing limit in the Government's theory.
History comes first. Congress has used the commerce power in a wide variety of ways, but it has never relied on that power to compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product.15 Novelty is not necessarily fatal, because there is a first time for everything. Yet the lack of historical precedent can be the most telling indication of a severe constitutional problem, and a Court confronted with a new conception of federal power should pause to consider the implications of the Government's arguments.16
The text points the same way. The Constitution's language reflects the natural understanding that the power to regulate assumes there is already something to be regulated, consistent with Gibbons's instruction that the framers be understood to have used words in their natural sense.17 If the power to “regulate” something included the power to create it, many provisions of the Constitution would be superfluous. Congress receives the power to “coin Money” in addition to the power to “regulate the Value thereof.”18 The military powers follow the same pattern: Congress may raise and support armies and provide and maintain a navy, and it separately holds the power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.19 The Constitution treats creating and regulating as different grants, and the Commerce Clause contains only the second.
Wickard shows what separates aggregation from compulsion. The farmer there grew wheat beyond his quota under a program designed to support the price of wheat by limiting supply. The Court rejected his argument that growing wheat for home consumption was beyond the commerce power. His decision to grow his own let him avoid buying wheat in the market, and that decision, considered in the aggregate with the similar decisions of others, would have had a substantial effect on the interstate market for wheat.20 Aggregation, in other words, added up the effects of something people were doing. The Government's theory would extend the idea to people who are doing nothing: individuals could be regulated under the Commerce Clause whenever enough of them are not doing something the Government would have them do. The Chief Justice treated that result as an override of the limit that the commerce power rests on activity.21
The Government's theory also has no stopping point. Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain of congressional authority, because every day individuals do not do an infinite number of things.22 The logic would justify a mandatory purchase to solve almost any problem. The court of appeals in Seven-Sky noted that the Government could not identify any purchase mandate that its theory would make unconstitutional, and the Chief Justice offered a second health care illustration: many Americans do not eat a balanced diet.23 Congress already enjoys vast power to regulate much of what we do. Accepting the Government's theory would give it the same license to regulate what we do not do, fundamentally changing the relation between the citizen and the Federal Government.24 The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it, and for over 200 years both the Court's decisions and Congress's actions have reflected that understanding.25
The Government tried to escape the problem by describing the uninsured as already active in the market. The Court held that the label cannot carry the weight. Precedent recognizes Congress's power to regulate “class[es] of activities,” as in Raich, and not classes of individuals apart from any activity in which they are engaged. In Perez, for example, the petitioner was a member of the class that engages in extortionate credit transactions.26 An individual who bought a car two years ago and may buy another in the future is not “active in the car market” in any pertinent sense. Most of those regulated by the mandate are likewise not currently engaged in any commercial activity involving health care, and that fact is fatal to the Government's effort to “regulate the uninsured as a class.”27 For the same reason, the observation that everyone will eventually need health care does not help. Congress may not dictate an individual's conduct today because of prophesied future activity.28
The four Justices who would have upheld the mandate under the commerce power made the opposing case.29 Those without insurance, they argued, consume a large amount of health care each year, and their inability to pay for a significant portion of it drives up market prices, foists costs on other consumers, and reduces market efficiency and stability. Given those far-reaching effects, the decision to forgo insurance is hardly equivalent to “doing nothing.” It is an economic decision Congress has the authority to address under the Commerce Clause.30 The two sides disagree about what the object of regulation is. The dissenters looked at the effects of an omission. The majority asked whether the people regulated were doing anything at all, and it refused to let effects, however large, supply the missing activity.31
The limit has a narrow trigger. It applies to a mandate of economic activity, which differs from a permissible prohibition of or restriction on economic activity.32 A statute that restricts what people are already doing remains subject to the substantial-effects analysis and the other limits from earlier in this chapter. The activity requirement asks only whether the people regulated are doing something in the first place.
Step three does the work on most problems, because the challenger and the government will usually disagree about whether the regulated group is already in the market. Students most often go wrong by arguing that abstention has large economic effects. Those effects do not answer the prior question: are the people regulated engaged in any commerce at all?
Necessary and Proper Clause Limit
The Government's fallback was the Necessary and Proper Clause, which authorizes Congress “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”34 Its argument was that the mandate is an “integral part of a comprehensive scheme of economic regulation,” namely the guaranteed-issue and community-rating insurance reforms.35 On that view a court need not consider what effect inactivity has on interstate commerce. It is enough that Congress regulate commercial activity in a way that requires regulation of inactivity to be effective.36 The Chief Justice rejected the argument. Even if the mandate is “necessary” to the Act's insurance reforms, it is not a “proper” means of making those reforms effective.37 The Chief Justice and the four joint dissenters thus formed a five-Justice majority against the Government's commerce theory, even when the Commerce Clause was read together with the Necessary and Proper Clause.38
The clause supplies means, not new powers. It gives Congress authority to “legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution,” but it does not license the exercise of any “great substantive and independent power[]” beyond those specifically enumerated. It is “merely a declaration, for the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into execution those [powers] otherwise granted are included in the grant.”39 The same limit appears in McCulloch: even when the end is constitutional and legitimate, the means must be “appropriate” and “plainly adapted” to that end, may not be otherwise “prohibited,” and must be “consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution.” Those phrases are not merely hortatory.40 A means that could itself be a new power would let Congress reach any unlisted subject by calling it helpful to a listed one, and the enumeration of powers would limit nothing.
The two operative words test different things, and the opinion depends on keeping them apart. “Necessary” asks about fit. Under the expansive view of the clause in McCulloch, the mandate might well qualify, because it was “convenient” or “useful” in rendering workable the constitutionally unassailable nondiscrimination and baseline-coverage provisions of the Act.41 The Chief Justice effectively conceded this stage. “Proper” asks a different question: whether the means is incidental to an enumerated power or is instead an exercise of a great substantive and independent power. McCulloch distinguished laws that are merely incidental to an enumerated power from laws that embody “the exercise of [a] ‘great substantive and independent power.’”42 A means can clear the first stage and fail the second, because usefulness measures necessity and says nothing about whether the power being asserted is incidental.
The mandate failed the second stage because of whom it would reach. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate those who, by some pre-existing activity, bring themselves within the sphere of federal regulation.43 A power to compel purchases would be different in kind. Congress could reach beyond the natural limit of its authority and draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would be outside of it.44 Such a power is in no way “narrow in scope” or “incidental” to the exercise of the commerce power. It would work a substantial expansion of federal authority.45 The Chief Justice also warned that it would give Congress “the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate” to the exercise of an enumerated power, and so would undermine the structure of government the Constitution established.46 A test that stopped at usefulness would have no limit. Any scheme whose success depends on participation could justify compelling participation, and the word “proper” blocks that sequence.
Raich is the natural comparison, and the Chief Justice distinguished it. Raich did not involve the exercise of any “great substantive and independent power.” It concerned only the constitutionality of “individual applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme.”47 The distinction is between applying a valid scheme to particular persons and using a clause to enlarge the class of persons Congress may regulate at all. The Chief Justice concluded that, just as the mandate cannot be sustained as a law regulating the substantial effects of the failure to purchase insurance, neither can it be upheld as a “necessary and proper” component of the insurance reforms. The commerce power therefore does not authorize it, and the joint dissent agreed.48
The four Justices who would have sustained the mandate saw the question differently. The minimum coverage provision, they argued, bears a “reasonable connection” to Congress's goal of protecting the health-care market from the disruption caused by people who fail to obtain insurance. By requiring those who do not carry insurance to pay a toll, it gives individuals a strong incentive to insure, which Congress had good reason to believe would reduce the number of uninsured and mitigate their adverse impact on the national market.49 That argument addresses the fit between means and end, the stage the Chief Justice had already conceded, so the real disagreement lies at propriety. Commentators have also questioned how firmly the propriety line can be drawn. One account observes that it is not clear why the mandate is a great power and that the Chief Justice offered little guidance for distinguishing great powers from incidental ones. The Court has treated creating a national bank, deporting people, enacting criminal laws, drafting soldiers, and imprisoning or executing people as incidental, so a great deal will turn on how the Court uses this recently operationalized distinction.50 Until later cases settle the question, the majority's reasoning is the rule to apply.
Step three decided NFIB. The usual error is to stop at step two and treat usefulness to the scheme as the end of the inquiry, or to cite Raich without asking whether the challenged provision merely applies a valid scheme or enlarges the group of people Congress may regulate.