Concept
NFIB and the Individual Mandate
Taxing power
NFIB and the Individual Mandate
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius applies the doctrine of the preceding sections to one statute. The Affordable Care Act required most individuals to maintain minimum health insurance coverage and charged a “shared responsibility payment” to those who went without it. Congress called that payment a penalty. The Court sustained it as a tax anyway, because the payment operated like one: the IRS collected it with income tax returns, its amount turned on household income and filing status, and it was expected to raise substantial revenue.1
The grant at issue is the first clause of Article I, section 8, which gives Congress the power “To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”2 The case runs the screens from the earlier sections in order. The label does not control, the measure must raise revenue, and a revenue-raising exaction must not operate as a penalty.
The order of the holdings fixes the case's place in this chapter. The Court first concluded that the commerce power could not support a requirement to buy insurance, a ruling covered in the commerce material and not reargued here. The tax ruling came second, and it rested on a simple asymmetry: the federal government cannot order people to buy health insurance, but it can tax those who go without it.3 A requirement that failed under one grant therefore survived under another, which is what it means to call the taxing power independent. The word Congress chose for the payment, penalty, did not decide which power the exaction fell under.
The subsections that follow track the opinion's reasoning. The first explains how the Court came to ask whether the mandate was a tax at all. Three more apply the practical characteristics that separate a tax from a penalty: how heavy the exaction is, whether it reaches only knowing wrongdoers, and who collects it and by what means. The Child Labor Tax Case supplied those characteristics, and NFIB shows the same inquiry resolved in the government's favor. The last subsection presents the joint dissent, which refused to treat a command with a penalty label as a tax, and the drafting lessons that separate majority from dissent. Keep the statute's design in view throughout: a requirement to hold insurance, with a payment to the IRS owed by those who do not. Each characteristic bears on one question, whether that payment is the price of a lawful choice or punishment for breaking the law.
Reaching the Taxing Question
The Court reached the taxing question only after the commerce argument failed, and it got there by a rule of interpretation. That route explains how a payment Congress called a penalty could be read as a tax. It has four steps: what the statute required, why the commerce argument closed, what the saving rule permits, and why that rule differs from the tax-versus-penalty features applied in the later subsections.
The mandate is easy to state. Every “applicable individual” must be covered under minimum essential coverage, and one who is not owes a payment that the Act calls a “penalty.”4 The payment goes to the IRS with the individual's taxes, and the IRS must assess and collect it in the same manner as taxes, though it may not use the means most suggestive of a punitive sanction, such as criminal prosecution.5{{cite:246d01c2-8da7-4ce4-b2ca-265def75e54d-placeholder}} The later subsections develop those details. One fact matters here, because the saving reading depends on it: an individual who goes without insurance owes an additional payment to the IRS at tax time, and nothing more.6
The Government defended the mandate on two theories, and the order in which the Court took them up shapes the analysis. Congress thought it could enact the requirement under the Commerce Clause, and the Government defended the law primarily on that basis, but the Court held that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress that power.7 That ruling reflects a structural premise: the Constitution withholds from Congress a plenary police power that would authorize every type of legislation.8 A statute needs the support of only one granted power, however, so the failure of the commerce argument left the second argument open.9
The second argument was that the mandate fell within the power to tax, and making it required a different description of the same text. In defending the mandate as commerce regulation, the Government had described it as a regulation requiring individuals to purchase insurance. It did not claim that the taxing power allows Congress to issue such a command. It asked instead that the Court read the mandate not as ordering individuals to buy insurance but as imposing a tax on those who do not.10
The saving construction rule made that description available. When a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not.11 The opinion's own example is a law reading “no vehicles in the park,” which might or might not ban bicycles; a court that can read the words either way takes the reading that keeps the law valid.12 Holding that Congress exceeded its powers is the most serious step judicial review takes, so courts accept a reasonable reading that avoids it.
The rule has two parts, and each has its own logic. The trigger is that a court turns to the alternative reading only when the natural reading is unconstitutional, which is why the Court took up the tax reading only after the commerce argument failed. The threshold is that the alternative need not be the most natural interpretation of the mandate, only a “fairly possible” one, because “every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”13 A requirement that the saving reading also be the better reading would leave the rule nothing to do, since the rule matters only where text and constitutional limit pull apart. The word “reasonable” supplies the ceiling: a court may choose among readings the words can bear, and it may not adopt one they cannot.
Applied to the mandate, the rule begins with an admission. The most natural reading is a command, because the statute says individuals “shall” be covered.14 The Chief Justice said as much: the provision reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax.15 The tax reading rests on how the statute operates. If an individual does not maintain insurance, the only consequence is an additional payment to the IRS when he pays his taxes, so the mandate can be regarded as setting a condition, not owning insurance, that triggers a tax, the required payment to the IRS.16 Giving the Act the full measure of deference owed to federal statutes, that reading is fairly possible.17
The contrast between a command and a tax explains why the consequence carries so much weight. Under the commerce power Congress may simply command individuals, and one who disobeys may face criminal sanctions along with all the attendant consequences of being branded a criminal. The taxing power lets Congress require only a payment into the Treasury, and once a tax is properly paid the Government has no power to compel or punish.18 A statute whose only consequence for noncompliance is a payment can be read as the second kind of law. A statute that imprisons cannot.
Adopting the saving reading did not mean that the Chief Justice found the tax reading the better one. He wrote that the statute reads more naturally as a command and that he would uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it.19 In his account, reaching the taxing question was necessary because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command, and the statute could be interpreted as a tax only because courts have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible. Without deciding the Commerce Clause question, he would have found no basis for the saving construction.20 That reply answered Justice Ginsburg, who had questioned the need to reject the commerce argument given that the statute could be upheld under the taxing power.21 It also shows why the order of decision mattered: the saving rule applies only when the natural reading is unconstitutional, so the commerce question had to be settled first.
The saving rule is a tool about meaning, and it stands apart from the tax-versus-penalty inquiry that follows. The rule tells a court to adopt a constitutional reading if the text can fairly bear one. It does not say what makes a payment fairly characterizable as a tax rather than a punishment, and that content comes from the features the next subsections take up: how heavy the payment is, whether it reaches only knowing wrongdoers, and who collects it and how. The opinion itself runs in that order, because after stating the saving rule it turned to the exaction's characteristics and observed that the payment looks like a tax in many respects.22 A student who runs only the saving rule has shown that a tax reading would rescue the statute without showing that the reading is reasonable. A student who runs only the tax features has skipped the reason the tax characterization was on the table at all.
The third step is where an exam answer is most often incomplete, because naming the saving rule without pointing to the consequence that makes the alternative reading reasonable leaves the argument unbuilt. The fifth step is where the next three subsections pick up.
Burden Compared to Insurance Cost
The first practical characteristic is the burden of the exaction: how heavy it is when measured against the choice it regulates. The Court took all three characteristics from Drexel Furniture, its short name for the Child Labor Tax Case, and applied them to the mandate to decide whether the payment could be treated as a tax.24 A power to lay and collect taxes is a power to bring money into the Treasury, so an exaction that works as punishment needs a different justification.25 Burden is the first place that difference shows. This subsection isolates it, and the next two take up the other characteristics.
Drexel Furniture began with weight. The charge took 10 percent of a company's net income, and it did so “no matter how small their infraction.”26 Weight matters because a tax leaves the person a lawful choice. Someone facing a tax may do the taxed thing and pay, or skip it and owe nothing, and the amount decides whether paying is a sensible option. When the amount is modest next to what the activity is worth, the charge works as a price: people pay it, the Treasury collects, and the choice stays real. When the amount is so large that no rational actor would pay it, the charge stops working as a price and operates as a prohibition backed by a sanction, because the only people who ever pay are those who slipped. That is why the Court set the “prohibitory” financial punishment in Drexel Furniture against a payment that might be a reasonable financial decision.27 The Drexel charge also did not shrink as the infraction did, so it looked like a fine fixed by the violation and not a price for any quantity of activity.
The mandate payment fared differently on the same measure. For most Americans, the Court observed, the amount due will be far less than the price of insurance, and by statute it can never be more.28 Those are two separate points. The first describes the typical case, and the second is a ceiling written into the statute, so that going without coverage could never cost more than buying it. The Court illustrated the first with projections for 2016: an individual making $35,000 a year would owe about $60 for any month without insurance, someone making $100,000 would likely owe about $200, and a qualifying policy was projected to cost around $400 per month.29 Against that price, the lower payment is about 15 percent of the premium and the higher is half of it. From those comparisons the Court concluded that it may often be a reasonable financial decision to make the payment rather than purchase insurance.30
The variable is relative, because the question is whether paying is a plausible alternative to complying. The same $200 would be heavy if compliance cost $20 a month and is light when compliance costs $400, so a dollar figure means something only next to the price of the regulated choice. The figures were projections, which means they illustrate the comparison without fixing it, and the statutory ceiling is what keeps the comparison favorable whatever the later numbers prove to be. The ceiling also preserves a lawful choice. Those subject to the mandate could lawfully forgo insurance and pay higher taxes, or buy insurance and pay lower taxes, and the only course the law did not allow was to go without coverage and not pay.31
A light burden shows that paying can be a price, and that is only one of three characteristics. The Court did not suggest that every exaction collected by the IRS without a scienter requirement falls within the taxing power. Congress could not, for example, expand its authority to impose criminal fines by creating strict liability offenses and assigning their enforcement to the IRS.32 The next two subsections take up the scienter requirement and the collecting agency, and the burden comparison joins them in the final judgment about whether the payment is a tax. An exam stem that supplies dollar figures is asking for this comparison: set the exaction beside the price of the choice it regulates, and ask whether a rational person could pay it instead of complying.
No Scienter Requirement
The second characteristic asks whether the exaction reaches only people who act knowingly. Scienter is the legal term for the mental element, knowledge or intent, that must be shown before liability attaches. In Drexel Furniture the exaction fell only on employers who knowingly employed underage laborers, and the Court observed that scienter requirements are typical of punitive statutes because Congress often wishes to punish only those who intentionally break the law.34
A knowledge element points toward punishment because of what each kind of exaction is built to do. A tax attaches to a circumstance, such as owning a house, earning income, or selling a product. Everyone in that circumstance owes it whatever they were thinking at the time, because the charge measures the activity and the collector needs to establish only that the activity occurred. A state-of-mind element has no work to do in raising revenue. It does work when a legislature wants to separate the culpable from the innocent, since punishing a person who did not know of any wrong neither deters that person nor fits the ordinary idea of blame. A legislature that writes “knowingly” into the trigger is sorting wrongdoers, and sorting wrongdoers is the business of a sanction. Scienter therefore operates as evidence of purpose: a punitive statute needs it, and a revenue statute does not.
The shared responsibility payment lacked that mark. The individual mandate contains no scienter requirement, so the payment applies to every taxpayer who goes without coverage, including one who never learned that the mandate existed.35 The statute asks only whether coverage was held, a fact the IRS can read from a return, and it asks nothing about what the taxpayer knew or intended. A statute built that way resembles an ordinary levy on a circumstance. It differs from the child labor charge, which an employer owed only by knowingly breaking separate federal standards. The Court counted the absence of scienter as the second of three characteristics, alongside the modest burden and IRS-only collection, that supported reading the payment as a tax.36
The scienter factor connects to the question that divides a tax from a penalty: whether the exaction punishes unlawful conduct. The mandate payment did not, on the majority's reading. Although the mandate plainly aims to induce the purchase of insurance, neither the Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not buying insurance beyond a payment to the IRS, and the Government agreed that a person who pays rather than obtains insurance has fully complied with the law.37 A payment that satisfies the law cannot be punishment for violating it, since no violation has occurred. The liquor dealer in Constantine, discussed earlier in this chapter, shows the opposite arrangement: the dealer who paid the extra $1,000 was still operating in violation of state law, so the charge sat on top of an ongoing offense.
Congress's own expectations supply a further inference. About four million people each year were expected to pay the IRS rather than buy insurance.38 Legislators who regarded going uninsured as unlawful would be troubled by a projection of millions of violators, so a Congress that accepted the figure as tolerable was not creating “four million outlaws.”39 The better reading is that the payment imposes a charge citizens may lawfully choose to pay in lieu of buying insurance.40 The same reasoning answers the plaintiffs' reliance on the statute's use of “shall” and “penalty.” They argued that those words required reading the provision as punishing unlawful conduct, and the Court noted that it had rejected a similar argument before and looked instead at how the payment operated.41
The absence of scienter is evidence, and it carries limited weight standing alone. The previous subsection recorded the Court's caution that lacking a knowledge element and using the IRS for collection do not by themselves make an exaction a tax.42 The structure of the factor explains the caution. A legislature can create a strict-liability offense, which punishes without any knowledge element, and can route the resulting fine through the revenue agency. That fine would lack the mark of punishment discussed above and would still be a sanction for an unlawful act. A missing scienter requirement therefore removes one reason to call an exaction a penalty without supplying an affirmative reason to call it a tax, which is why the decision weighs the three characteristics together.
An exam stem therefore calls for two checks on this factor. If the trigger reaches only those who knowingly break the law, as the child labor charge did, treat the knowledge element as a mark of punishment and compare it with the size of the exaction and the agency that collects it. If everyone in the taxed circumstance pays and the statute says nothing about intent, as with the mandate, the factor favors a tax, and the case strengthens further where the Government concedes that paying satisfies the law.
Collection Through the IRS
The third characteristic asks who collects the exaction and with what tools. The clause that grants the taxing power speaks of laying and collecting, and the machinery a government chooses for collection shows what the exaction is meant to accomplish.44 The shared responsibility payment was collected solely by the IRS through the normal means of taxation, except that the Service was not allowed to use the means most suggestive of a punitive sanction, such as criminal prosecution.45 The first two characteristics, the burden of the exaction and the absence of a scienter requirement, were taken up above.
The collecting agency matters because an agency's job determines what it looks for. A revenue agency reads returns, applies a formula, and bills the amount the formula produces, and it needs no finding about anyone's state of mind or wrongdoing. An agency charged with punishing violations must first discover that a violation occurred, so an exaction it enforces attaches to misconduct. In Drexel Furniture the child labor charge was enforced in part by the Department of Labor, an agency responsible for punishing violations of labor laws and not for collecting revenue.46 The Court drew the contrast directly in a footnote: an exaction paid like a tax to the agency that collects taxes looks like a tax, while one exacted by Labor Department inspectors who ferret out willful malfeasance looks like a penalty.47
The mandate payment sat on the revenue side of that contrast, and the statute's own text shows how. The Court found four features that belong to the ordinary tax process:48
- Taxpayers pay the amount into the Treasury when they file their tax returns.
- The payment does not apply to anyone whose household income falls below the income tax filing threshold.
- The amount is determined by familiar factors such as taxable income, number of dependents, and joint filing status.
- The requirement appears in the Internal Revenue Code, and the IRS must assess and collect it in the same manner as taxes.
Each feature does its own work. The filing threshold ties liability to the existing income tax system, so the payment reaches only people already inside the machinery of revenue collection. The tax-return inputs mean the IRS needs nothing beyond what a return already reports, and it conducts no inquiry into whether anyone did wrong. Together they yield the essential feature of any tax, which is that the exaction produces at least some revenue, and the payment was expected to raise about $4 billion per year by 2017.49 A compact way to hold these points is that the payment brought revenue to the Treasury, was calculated on individual returns, was enforced by the IRS, and was sized by income and other tax-code determinants.50
The statute also withheld tools. The IRS may not use the means most suggestive of a punitive sanction, such as criminal prosecution.51{{cite:246d01c2-8da7-4ce4-b2ca-265def75e54d-placeholder}} Criminal prosecution is how a legal system answers disobedience of a command, and removing it leaves the payment as the only consequence of going uninsured. An ordinary tax debtor may face prosecution for failing to pay, but a person who declined to make this payment could not, and that fact reinforced the view that the payment was a price citizens could lawfully choose to pay.52
Collection by the IRS is evidence, and it does not settle the question by itself. The Court expressly disclaimed the suggestion that any exaction lacking a scienter requirement and enforced by the IRS falls within the taxing power, and it gave an example: Congress could not expand its authority to impose criminal fines by creating strict-liability offenses enforced by the IRS and not by the FBI.53 The agency's identity is a clue about purpose, and a statute can borrow the clue without having the substance.
The same restraint applies when the enforcement role moves in the other direction. In United States v. Cox, the Tenth Circuit considered the National Firearms Act levy that the Court had upheld in Sonzinsky. Congress had since reassigned compliance responsibility from the IRS to the Department of Justice, and the challengers argued that the shift made the Act resemble the scheme struck down in the Child Labor Tax Case. The court refused to invalidate the levy. It emphasized that the Child Labor Tax Case turned on the joint operation of several considerations and that the change in enforcement had not so altered the law's operation as to unmoor it from the statute upheld in Sonzinsky.54 The enforcing agency is one factor weighed with the amount, the trigger, and the revenue yield, and neither IRS enforcement nor its absence decides a case alone.
The Dissent and Drafting Lessons
The Justices in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius disagreed about whether Congress had used the taxing power for the individual mandate, and none disputed that Congress holds it.56 Four of them, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, wrote a joint dissent.57 They would have stopped at the commerce question, and once the majority reached the taxing question they concluded that the shared responsibility payment was a penalty attached to a command and that Congress had not enacted it as a tax.58 Their reasoning has three links, and each answers a different part of the majority's analysis.
The first link is the definition of the line between a tax and a penalty. The dissent accepted that a court must, if “fairly possible,” read a provision as a tax in preference to a mandate with a penalty, but it insisted that a court “cannot rewrite the statute to be what it is not.”59 It then stated the line in the terms of earlier decisions: a tax is an enforced contribution to support the government, while a penalty is an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act, so the question is whether the exaction is imposed for violation of the law.60 On the dissent's reading of the text, it plainly is. Section 5000A commands that every applicable individual shall ensure that the individual is covered, and the very next provision imposes a penalty on an individual who fails to meet that requirement.61 The payment is therefore triggered by disobeying a command. That is the structure of the extra $1,000 charge in Constantine, which fell on liquor dealers only because they were operating in violation of state law, and Constantine is one of the cases in which the Court invalidated an exaction because it was itself an instrument of regulation by virtue of its coercive effect.62
The second link is the label. Congress called the exaction a penalty eighteen times in section 5000A and elsewhere in the Act, and the dissent treated that vocabulary as Congress's own answer to the question of lawfulness: a legislature that inflicts a penalty for an act is understood to have made the act unlawful, because lawmakers do not ordinarily penalize lawful conduct.63 From that premise the dissent drew a categorical conclusion, that the Court had never treated as a tax an exaction that “faces up to the critical difference between a tax and a penalty, and explicitly denominates the exaction a ‘penalty.’”64
The third link concerns which branch should write a tax. Judicial tax-writing, the dissent said, is particularly troubling, because the Constitution requires tax increases to originate in the House of Representatives, the body most accountable to the people, where legislators must weigh the need for a tax against the price they may pay at the next election, never more than two years off.65 The dissent had no doubt that Congress knew precisely what it was doing, and it concluded that saying the Individual Mandate merely imposes a tax rewrites the statute instead of interpreting it. The same worry can be put from the legislator's side. If Congress may collect a tax while disclaiming the word, federal lawmakers can avoid the negative public response that an openly labeled tax increase draws.66 A voter cannot hold a representative responsible for a tax that the representative described as something else.
The majority's answer begins with the dissent's own framing. It described the challengers as contending that the law must fall because Congress used the wrong labels, even if the Constitution permits Congress to do exactly what the Court read the statute to do, and it replied that labels should not control.67 The deeper reply is the substance-over-form principle developed earlier in this chapter. The principle that produced the tax-penalty distinction in the first place must also guide how courts apply it, so how the payment operates in the real world counts for more than the word Congress chose.68 On operation, the majority found that the payment's non-prohibitory character, its lack of a scienter requirement, and its collection solely by the IRS meant that it may for constitutional purposes be considered a tax, not a penalty.69
Both sides therefore ask the same underlying question, whether the exaction punishes unlawful conduct, and they part over what shows the answer. For the dissent the command, the label, and the penalty vocabulary show that going without insurance is a violation. For the majority the evidence is how the payment works: an estimated four million people a year were expected to pay the IRS rather than buy insurance, which suggests that Congress regarded paying as a lawful choice.70 The majority also conceded that the provision reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance, and that concession gives the dissent's textual argument its force. It adopted the tax reading only because a court has a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible.71
The first three steps track the practical characteristics the majority relied on, and the fourth supplies the revenue that every tax must produce. The second step also answers the dissent: a provision drafted as a charge on a condition, instead of a command followed by a penalty, leaves the dissent's textual argument with no “shall” to use. The fifth step involves a trade. A drafter who avoids the word tax gains political distance from the measure and accepts reliance on the Court's functional characterization, which is the very arrangement the dissent thought inverted the constitutional scheme.
An exam stem built on this case will often set two drafts of one requirement side by side and ask which can be defended as a tax.
The holding is narrower than its reputation. The majority stressed that the taxing power does not give Congress the same degree of control over behavior as the commerce power. Under the commerce power Congress may command and punish disobedience with criminal sanctions, whereas a tax leaves a person free to pay and does not make the underlying choice a crime.73 Upholding the mandate as a tax, the Court added, recognizes no new federal power and determines only that Congress used an existing one.74 The revenue requirement also remains part of the holding. The Court noted that the payment was expected to raise about $4 billion a year, and revenue is the essential feature of any tax.75
Yet the case reaches well beyond its own facts through drafting. It tells a legislature that a payment priced below the cost of compliance, owed without regard to knowledge, collected by the revenue agency, and enforced without criminal sanction can pursue a behavioral goal that the commerce power could not support. A drafter can adopt that recipe, and a challenger can use the same list to look for signs of punishment. The dissent's accountability objection remains as the counterweight: a drafter who follows the recipe without ever using the word tax relies on the Court's functional test, and the dissent's complaint is that voters then cannot tell when a tax has been imposed.