Concept
Source of the Spending Power
Spending power
The Spending Power
Source of the Spending Power
Congress may pay actors who wish to study Shakespeare, but it may not require adults to read Shakespeare.1 The gap between those two powers traces to the first clause of Article I, Section 8, which authorizes Congress “To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”2
That language confers a power to tax and spend, so any exercise of it must take the form of a tax or an expenditure. The clause also names the ends the power serves: the nation’s debts, its common defense, and its general welfare.3 The first two ends are easy to picture. The third has divided readers since the founding, because it could mean either of two things: a power of Congress’s own, or only a description of the purposes for which Congress may spend when it exercises its other powers.
James Madison and James Monroe, among the early presidents, thought the power to “provide for the general welfare” reached only spending in the exercise of other enumerated powers, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce.4 On that reading, the clause gives Congress no spending authority beyond what its other powers already carry.5 Alexander Hamilton read the clause the other way. For him it confers a power separate and distinct from the later enumerated powers and restricted in meaning by none of them, so that Congress holds a substantive power to tax and appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it exercise that power to provide for the general welfare of the United States.6 Americans over time came to favor Hamilton’s view, which lets Congress spend on matters it cannot directly regulate.7
In 1936, United States v. Butler resolved the dispute in Hamilton’s favor.8 The power to tax is not unlimited, the Court said, but its confines are set in the clause that confers it, not in the other clauses of Section 8 that bestow and define Congress’s legislative powers. It follows that Congress’s power to authorize the expenditure of public money for public purposes “is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”9 South Dakota v. Dole later drew the practical conclusion: objectives outside Article I’s “enumerated legislative fields” may still be reached through spending and the conditional grant of federal funds.10
Congress can therefore fund what it cannot require. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Court put the point simply: Congress may tax and spend, and that grant gives the federal government considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate.11 A federal program that pays communities for flood and hurricane losses shows the effect. The harms are local, and Congress might lack any power to regulate them, yet the program needs no link to interstate commerce. It needs only a congressional judgment that the expenditure serves the general welfare, and courts have read that phrase so broadly that Congress holds something close to unreviewable discretion over which ends qualify.12
An independent power is not an unlimited one, and students who treat the two as the same lose points on exactly this line. Butler itself draws the line. After taking Hamilton’s side, the Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act in the same opinion. The act, it held, was a plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government and within the rights reserved to the states. The tax, the appropriation, and the direction for disbursing the funds were only parts of that plan and means to an unconstitutional end.13 Choosing the Hamiltonian view thus settled how broad the permitted ends of spending are. It did not settle how far Congress may attach conditions to the money, and the cases that follow take up that question.
The textual limit is simple. The words general welfare sit in a clause that grants a power to tax and spend, so they supply purposes for taxing and spending and create no power to regulate.14 Congress may spend or tax for the general welfare, but it may not regulate for it. Reading the phrase as a regulatory grant would erase the limit Butler enforced when it struck down a scheme to regulate production in the name of taxing and spending.15