Concept
Dole: Facts and Holding
Spending power
Dole: Facts and Holding
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), is the modern anchor for conditional spending, and its facts are short. South Dakota let persons 19 and older buy 3.2 percent beer. In 1984 Congress enacted 23 U.S.C. § 158, which directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of the federal highway funds otherwise payable to any state that permitted persons under 21 to buy alcoholic beverages.1 South Dakota sued for a declaratory judgment that § 158 violated the constitutional limits on the spending power and the Twenty-first Amendment. The district court rejected both claims, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.2 The question for the Supreme Court was whether Congress may attach a financial penalty to a state's choice of drinking age.
South Dakota invoked the Twenty-first Amendment against the statute. The Secretary answered that the Amendment is simply not implicated: § 2 confirms the states' broad power to restrict the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages, but it gives them no power to permit sales that Congress seeks to prohibit. On that reading, the Amendment would not stop Congress from enacting a national minimum drinking age more restrictive than the various state laws provide, and it follows all the more that an indirect inducement is compatible with the Amendment.3
South Dakota conceded most of the rest. It did not seriously claim that § 158 violated any of the first three restrictions the Court recited on conditions attached to federal funds, and it admitted that it had never contended the congressional action was unrelated to a national concern, apart from the Twenty-first Amendment. The Court added that the condition is directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway funds are spent: safe interstate travel.4 That left the Twenty-first Amendment as the live dispute. The next section takes up the restrictions one by one.
The Court upheld § 158 without deciding whether Congress could set a drinking age directly. It found the legislative effort within constitutional bounds even if Congress may not regulate drinking ages directly,5 and it concluded that, even if Congress might lack the power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly, the encouragement to state action in § 158 is a valid use of the spending power. The Court accordingly affirmed.6 The holding, then, is that Congress may use the spending power to push states toward a higher drinking age by withholding a modest share of highway funds, and the Twenty-first Amendment does not stand in the way.
The Court could assume the worst for the government on direct regulation because the spending power runs on its own track. Butler settled that the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution, so objectives outside Article I's enumerated legislative fields may still be reached through a conditional grant of federal funds.7 Whether Congress could regulate directly is a different question, one about the reach of its commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, which is how the Court framed the issue in the California medical-marijuana case.8 The result is an asymmetry: Congress may use a conditional grant to pursue an end it might be unable to reach by regulation.
Congress pulls the same lever elsewhere. It requires states to meet specified ambient air standards if they wish to receive federal highway funds.9 Commentary on a case about state milk subsidies voices a related intuition about funding: the Court would have upheld direct cash payments or tax subsidies to in-state producers, financed by the state's own taxpayers, because the people who pay weigh the costs and benefits and supply an inner political check. Shifting the costs to out-of-state persons weakens that check and widens the role of judicial review.10
The Court treated § 158 as an inducement the state could refuse. It quoted an earlier opinion's warning that "to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties." It then concluded that Congress had offered relatively mild encouragement to the states to enact higher minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise choose, and that enacting such laws remained the prerogative of the states not merely in theory but in fact.11 South Dakota could keep its law and forgo five percent of its highway funds. How large an inducement may grow before it stops being encouragement is the anti-coercion question, which this chapter takes up after the four limits.
Justice O'Connor dissented on relatedness. She wrote that § 158 is not a condition on spending reasonably related to the expenditure of federal funds and cannot be justified on that ground. It is instead, in her view, an attempt to regulate the sale of liquor, which lies outside Congress's commerce power because it falls within § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.12 Her objection invoked a limit that the majority also applied, and the disagreement turned on whether a drinking-age condition satisfies it.