Concept
Armed Forces and Defense
War, defense, and foreign affairs powers
Armed Forces and Defense
The preceding sections followed the war power into the civilian economy, where the question was how closely a measure related to the war. Here the Constitution speaks directly about the military itself. Article I, Section 8, clause 12 gives Congress the power to raise and support armies, and clause 13 the power to provide and maintain a navy. Clause 14 adds the power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. Clauses 15 and 16 let Congress provide for calling forth the militia and for organizing, arming, and disciplining it.1
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. marks the contrast. The Court there sustained rent controls that outlasted the fighting, reasoning that the war effort had contributed heavily to a housing deficit and that Congress could act after hostilities ended to control the forces a short supply had created.2 The doubt in such a case is whether the measure connects closely enough to the war. When Congress legislates about the forces themselves (who serves, how units are organized, what discipline governs them), each grant names the armed forces or the militia as its subject, so the connection to defense need not be inferred. The analysis turns instead on which clause carries the authority and what else in the Constitution limits it.
The three settings below fall on the structural side of the line drawn at the start of the chapter: Congress controls the structure, organization, and broad policies of the military, and the President directs what the forces do.3 The first setting is the power to raise and support armies, which reaches businesses and civilians as well as soldiers. The second is the militia, which stands between federal and state authority and so raises a federalism question the economic cases did not. The third is the system of military courts, which rests on Article I and not on Article III.
Raising and Supporting Armies
Clause 12 gives Congress the power “to raise and support Armies,” and clause 13 the power “to provide and maintain a Navy.” Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer read those clauses to lay on Congress “primary responsibility for supplying the armed forces.”4 The verbs divide the work. Raise and provide bring a force into being; support and maintain keep it fed, equipped, and able to fight. The first half lets Congress compel people to serve. The second lets Congress impose duties on businesses and civilians so that the forces are supplied. Because the Constitution gives both halves to Congress, the grant also answers a question about the President, which the end of this subsection takes up.
Raising an army includes the power to compel service. The Court has long recognized that Congress may conscript citizens, compelling millions to risk death or severe injury, under its powers to raise an army and to provide a navy; Arver v. United States (the Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366 (1918), is the usual citation.5 The power would mean little otherwise. If Congress could fill the ranks only by asking, the size and readiness of the forces would depend on how many people chose to volunteer at the moment of danger. Compulsion is also the heaviest burden the government can place on a citizen, and the same grant sustains the lighter burdens on property and business discussed next. The commerce power supplies a useful contrast. In NFIB v. Sebelius the Court held that the commerce power limits Congress’s ability to impose individual mandates, yet it made clear that Congress could impose such mandates under its military powers.6 On a mandate problem, therefore, the first question is which power Congress invoked.
The second verb, support, reaches property as well as people. In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. the Court recognized that Congress may draft men for battle service and may also impose affirmative duties on business organizations to support the fighting men.7 In Lichter v. United States the Court recognized that the power reaches laws requisitioning food and fuel and requiring the takeover of factories, telephone systems, and rail lines, reading the express grant broadly because the clause stresses the supporting of armies as well as the raising of them.8 The reasoning is practical. Once warfare became global, the equipment and supplies a mobilized force uses became as essential to success as the people who use them, so a power that ended at the recruiting office would give Congress armies it could not keep in the field. The same reading of support helps explain McCulloch v. Maryland, where the Court relied in part on the ability of the national bank’s dispersed branches to move the money needed to sustain troops across a large country.9 Because these duties rest on the grant to raise and support armies, the businesses and civilians that Congress regulates need not fall within the commerce power.10
The same text that lets Congress compel and supply also settles who holds the supply function, a point Jackson pressed in Youngstown. The Government there defended the seizure of the steel mills partly on the ground that the President had committed American troops to Korea on the President’s own responsibility. Jackson answered from the clauses: by placing in Congress the powers to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy, the Constitution “certainly lays upon Congress primary responsibility for supplying the armed forces.”11 Congress alone controls the raising and appropriation of revenue, may decide in what manner and by what means money is spent for military and naval procurement, and can take over war supply as a government enterprise.12 The consequence for the Commander in Chief Clause is that the President commands the forces Congress provides. In Jackson’s words: “While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army or navy to command.”13
The allocation matters because of how the alternative would work. If supplying the forces were an incident of command, a President could create the premise of the power by committing troops abroad and then claim whatever those troops need from the domestic economy. Jackson regarded the prospect that a President could enlarge his mastery over the country’s internal affairs by committing the armed forces to a foreign venture as more sinister and alarming than any doctrine the Court could announce, and he found it unnecessary to consider the legal status of the Korean enterprise to reject an argument built on it.14 He found support in the Third Amendment, which permits quartering of soldiers in wartime only “in a manner to be prescribed by law,” so that even in war a commander’s seizure of needed military housing must be authorized by Congress.15 He also read the Constitution as not contemplating that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy makes the President commander in chief of the country, its industries, and its inhabitants.16 The concurrence leaves the command role itself intact. Jackson would indulge the widest latitude in sustaining the President’s exclusive function to command the instruments of national force when they are turned against the outside world, and he reserved his objection for the use of military power inward on a lawful economic struggle between industry and labor.17
The two scenes differ in one fact: which branch supplied the authority. The first follows from the decisions on duties imposed on business to support the fighting forces. The second follows from Jackson’s view that it is not “a military prerogative, without support of law, to seize persons or property because they are important or even essential for the military and naval establishment.”18 The concurrence is one Justice’s reasoning, and the wider question of presidential power without a statute belongs to a later section. The point to carry forward here is who holds the supply function. Congress may compel service and impose supply duties by statute, and a President acting alone on the strength of command must find some other source of authority.
Militia and National Guard
Two clauses of Article I, Section 8 govern the militia, the citizen-soldier force that at the Framing operated under state control. Clause 15 lets Congress “provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions,” and clause 16 lets it “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.”21 The first clause decides when state forces may be summoned into national service and for which three purposes. The second decides how they are organized, equipped, and governed. Clause 16 also reserves to the states the appointment of officers and the training of the militia under the discipline Congress prescribes,22 so the two clauses divide authority over a body that the states historically ran.
Clause 15 places the decision to call forth the militia in Congress, not the President.23 A federal call-up therefore needs authorization by statute, which means both houses must agree before the nation draws on a state’s citizen-soldiers. The federal side of the arrangement has its own logic. A coordinated national defense cannot depend on each governor’s separate willingness to release units, so federal control attaches to the part of the force the nation is actually using.
The leading decision on how far that federal control reaches is Perpich v. Department of Defense. A federal statute authorized the President to order National Guard units into federal service for training outside the United States, and the governor of Minnesota objected to training in Central America. The Court sustained the statute, although training abroad is not among the three purposes listed in clause 15,24 no national emergency existed, and the governor withheld consent. The reasoning rests on the Guard’s dual character. Members enlist both in a state Guard and in the National Guard of the United States, a reserve component of the Army, so a unit ordered to federal duty serves in a federal capacity that Congress’s military powers support. The three purposes in clause 15 therefore do not cap the call-up.
The text of clause 15 supplies the other pole. Because the clause assigns the power to provide for calling forth the militia to Congress, a call-up the President orders alone has no clause 15 source unless a statute authorizes it.25 That is an inference from the allocation of power in the clause, not the holding of a decided case.
The two scenes turn on who made the decision. In Perpich a statute supplied it, so Congress had made the call and delegated its execution. In the hypothetical the President decides alone. The facts that tempt a student, such as the absence of an emergency or a governor’s objection, do not settle the problem. The militia clauses place the decision with Congress, and a statute authorizing the call-up answers both objections.
Military Courts and Tribunals
Military courts draw their authority from Article I, Section 8, clause 14, which lets Congress make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.27 Read with the Necessary and Proper Clause, that grant carries the power to build a complete system of military justice, including courts-martial, the military’s criminal trial courts for members of the armed forces, and the procedures they follow.28 Because the source is Article I, these tribunals are not Article III courts. Their judges do not hold life tenure, and the accused does not receive the civilian jury protections that attach to ordinary federal prosecutions. The Fifth Amendment itself excepts cases arising in the land or naval forces from its grand jury requirement, which shows that the Constitution expected military justice to run on its own track.
The reason for a separate system lies in what military discipline demands. A commander can enforce orders only if consequences follow quickly, and units that move around the world cannot wait for indictments and jury trials in distant civilian courthouses. Many military offenses, such as desertion and disobedience of orders, have no civilian counterpart, so civilian courts have little experience judging them. The same reasoning explains the two limits that run through the rest of this section. The justification for military trial weakens when the accused is no longer part of the forces, and the civilian courts keep a narrow supervisory role to see that the military stays inside its authority.
That supervisory role is narrow. Regular federal courts have no general power to review the merits of court-martial proceedings, and a civilian judge who could reweigh the evidence in every court-martial would restore the delay and divided authority that the separate system exists to avoid. The exception is habeas corpus, the writ that lets a detainee ask a court to test whether the detention is lawful. Through habeas, a civilian court may ask whether the military tribunal had jurisdiction over the person and the offense. The exception follows from the premise of the system: military authority exists only over those within the forces, and whether a tribunal stayed within that authority is a question of power that a court may ask whatever the merits of the verdict.
Jurisdiction over service members turns on status. In Solorio v. United States the Court held that a member of the armed forces may be court-martialed for any offense, whether or not the offense relates to military service, because jurisdiction depends on the accused’s status as a service member. That holding overruled an earlier decision that had required each offense to be service connected. Clause 14 speaks of regulating the forces, which describes people, and its text contains no limit to crimes connected with duty. A rule keyed to the person also lets everyone know in advance which system will try the case. A soldier who commits an off-duty offense away from the base and unrelated to any assignment is therefore still triable by court-martial.
The same reasoning removes jurisdiction when status is missing. In Toth v. Quarles a former airman, honorably discharged, was arrested months later for a murder allegedly committed in Korea while he was in service, and the Court held that Congress cannot subject ex-service members to court-martial for offenses committed during service. Once discharged, the man was a civilian, and clause 14 reaches only those in the forces. The Court pressed the point furthest in Reid v. Covert, where civilian wives of servicemen were tried by court-martial overseas, in England and in Japan, for killing their husbands. A plurality held that the trials violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, because Congress’s powers over the forces, including the Necessary and Proper Clause, do not override the Bill of Rights, and living with the military community abroad does not make a civilian a member of the forces.29 Later decisions carried the reasoning to noncapital offenses and to civilian employees accompanying the forces.
Placed beside Solorio, Reid shows which fact carries the analysis. The service member in Solorio committed an offense with no tie to military duty and was still within military jurisdiction, while the dependents in Reid lived inside the military community and killed servicemen, yet they were outside it. An exam fact pattern that piles up military connections around a civilian, such as a base address, an overseas posting, or a military victim, tests whether you notice that connection does not substitute for membership.
The limit also holds in wartime wherever the civilian courts are functioning. In Ex parte Milligan an Indiana civilian during the Civil War was convicted by a military commission of conspiring against the government and sentenced to death. The Court held that the military could not try a civilian when the civilian courts were open and able to act, because the constitutional guarantees of indictment and jury trial do not lapse in war, and military trial of civilians could be justified only where actual war had closed the courts. Enemy combatants stand on different footing. In Ex parte Quirin the Court sustained trial by military commission of German saboteurs landed in the United States, including one who claimed American citizenship, because they were belligerents associated with the enemy’s forces. They were not civilians in the sense Milligan protected. The limits that the Court later placed on military commissions are taken up in the discussion of executive action without Congress.
Even when military process is lawful, the Constitution keeps a judicial check on detention. Article I, Section 9 forbids suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus except in cases of rebellion or invasion when public safety requires it.30 In Boumediene v. Bush the Court held that noncitizens detained as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay may invoke the habeas privilege, and that Congress’s withdrawal of habeas jurisdiction in the Military Commissions Act of 2006 was an unconstitutional suspension because the review process offered in its place was not an adequate and effective substitute. The practical rule is that Congress may channel detainees into another form of review only if that review can genuinely test whether the detention is lawful. The detailed analysis of the decision lies beyond this survey.