Concept
The Civil Rights Cases Backdrop
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power
The Civil Rights Cases Backdrop
In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Supreme Court said that Congress may legislate directly against private individuals under Section 2, and then held that Congress had used that power on conduct the Amendment does not reach. Five consolidated cases, from Kansas, California, Missouri, New York, and Tennessee, arose from the exclusion of Black patrons from hotels, theaters, and railroads. Four were criminal indictments and one sought the civil penalty. All five tested the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which entitled every person to the full and equal enjoyment of inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other places of public amusement, made violation a misdemeanor, and let an aggrieved person recover $500 for each offense.1
Justice Bradley's opinion for the Court granted the premise that carries Section 2 over private conduct. The Amendment, he said, is not a mere prohibition of state laws upholding slavery but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist anywhere in the United States. The Court called it indisputable that burdens and disabilities exist that are badges of slavery, and that Congress may reach them by legislation of a direct and primary character, aimed at the badges and incidents as well as the institution itself.2 The Court then drew the contrast with the Fourteenth Amendment. Thirteenth Amendment legislation may operate on the acts of individuals, whether or not state law sanctions them, while Fourteenth Amendment legislation can only be corrective, addressed to state regulations and proceedings.3
Having conceded that premise, the Court narrowed the conclusion. The question became whether turning a person away from an inn, a conveyance, or a theater subjects that person to a form of servitude. The Court said no. To treat every private act of discrimination against a guest, a passenger, or a patron as a badge of slavery would be "running the slavery argument into the ground." The Court also observed that innkeepers and public carriers were already bound by the laws of every State to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who applied in good faith.4 In its view the Amendment protects "those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship," not "social rights," and "mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery." The Thirteenth Amendment therefore could not support the first two sections of the 1875 Act, and the Fourteenth could not either, because no state action was involved. The Court invalidated both sections.5 The limit on Section 2 lay in the definition of a badge, and the absence of state action played no part in it. That is why the definition became the contest that Jones reopened.
The narrow definition rested on a view of what emancipation had accomplished. Writing less than twenty years after the Civil War, Justice Bradley said that once a man has emerged from slavery and shaken off its inseparable concomitants, there must come a stage at which he "takes the rank of a mere citizen and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws." His rights, like other men's, are then protected in the ordinary modes.6 If freed people already stood as ordinary citizens, a hotel's refusal looked like an ordinary private wrong. The badges of slavery then shrank to the institution's own machinery: compulsory service for the master's benefit, restraint of movement except by the master's will, and disabilities such as being unable to hold property, make contracts, have a standing in court, or testify against a white person.7
That list gave Jones its footing. Compare two private acts: a hotel clerk who refuses a Black traveler a room, and a landowner who refuses to sell a Black buyer a house. The first fell under the heading of social rights and could not sustain the 1875 Act. The second touches the capacity to hold property and make contracts, which the Court's own roster lists among the incidents of slavery. Jones was candid about this. It called the present validity of the 1883 majority's position on public accommodations "largely academic" after Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It relied instead on the one proposition on which the entire 1883 Court had agreed: the Thirteenth Amendment lets Congress eradicate "the last vestiges and incidents of a society half slave and half free" by securing to all citizens, of every race and color, the same right to make and enforce contracts and to hold and convey property that white citizens enjoy.8
Justice Harlan's dissent supplies the alternative definition of a badge. He dissented vigorously, refusing to place any limitation on Congress's power to define and prohibit badges of slavery, and he insisted that discrimination on the basis of race could itself be such a badge. No class of people, he said, should be in practical subjection to another.9 His own conclusion was more modest than a general power over civil rights. Racial discrimination practiced by corporations and individuals in the exercise of their public or quasi-public functions, the kind of conduct the 1875 Act reached, was in his view a badge of servitude that Congress could prevent under Section 2.10 The two opinions disagree about what a badge is. The majority looked to the machinery of ownership. Harlan looked to racial subordination in civil life.
After 1883, the Thirteenth Amendment lay largely dormant for nearly a century.11 Hodges v. United States shows where the narrow definition led. White men had terrorized Black workers to keep them from working at a sawmill. The Court reversed their convictions, reasoning that only conduct that actually enslaves a person may be punished under legislation enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment. Jones overruled Hodges insofar as it is inconsistent with Jones's holding. Hodges rested on a concept of congressional power irreconcilable with the position every member of the Court took in the Civil Rights Cases, and incompatible with the history and purpose of the Amendment.12 Once the badge concept hardened into a demand for actual enslavement, Section 2 had almost nothing left to do. Jones, taught next, restored it.