Concept
Rational Determination of Badges
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power
Rational Determination of Badges
Under Jones, a court reviewing a Section 2 statute asks whether Congress rationally determined that the regulated conduct is a badge or incident of slavery. The Court put the power in one sentence: Congress has the power "rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation."1
The sentence has two parts. The determination is Congress's judgment that a practice is a badge or incident of slavery, one of the "burdens and disabilities" the institution left behind. The translation is the statute that puts that judgment to work against the practice. A reviewing court tests the determination for rationality and asks whether the statute is effective legislation carrying it out. It does not ask where the Justices would have drawn the line. The scope of the power is measured by the rationality of Congress's determination, a deferential standard designed to recognize the broad latitude Section 2 gives Congress.2
The Court drew that deference from the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866. A Senate sponsor of the Act asked who is to decide what appropriate legislation under the Amendment is to be, and he answered: "The Congress of the United States; and it is for Congress to adopt such appropriate legislation as it may think proper, so that it be a means to accomplish the end."3 Jones read the Enabling Clause the same way. That clause "clothed 'Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.'"4 The Court expressly left open whether the Amendment itself did more than abolish slavery, so the rationality test governs what Congress does under Section 2.5
The stakes of deference are practical. Black citizens who saw in the Amendment a promise of freedom would be left with "a mere paper guarantee" if Congress were powerless to assure that a dollar in the hands of a Black buyer purchases the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white buyer.6 At the very least, the Court said, the freedom Congress may secure includes the freedom to buy whatever a white person can buy and the right to live wherever a white person can live.7
The Court closed its analysis by endorsing an argument built on the framework of McCulloch v. Maryland. A Congressman defending the 1866 bill argued that "[t]he end is legitimate . . . because it is defined by the Constitution itself. The end is the maintenance of freedom." He added that a person "who enjoys the civil rights mentioned in this bill cannot be reduced to slavery," which "settles the appropriateness of this measure, and that settles its constitutionality."8 The Court's response was "We agree."9
The argument divides the work in two. The Amendment's own text supplies the end, the maintenance of freedom, so no litigant can seriously contest it. The live question is whether the conduct Congress regulated is rationally connected to slavery's legacy, and that link is what a court actually reviews.
Jones shows the review at work. Congress had determined that racial barriers to buying and renting property are a badge or incident of slavery, and the Court asked only whether it could call that determination irrational.10 It could not. The Court had recognized long before that the badges and incidents of slavery included restraints on "the same right . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens."11 The Black Codes had been substitutes for the slave system, and the exclusion of Black families from white communities became a substitute for the Black Codes. Racial discrimination that makes a person's ability to buy property turn on skin color is, in the Court's words, "a relic of slavery."12 The next section follows that chain in detail. What matters here is the question the Court put: it asked whether the determination was rational, and it did not ask whether the Justices would have drawn the same line.
Step three does nearly all the work on an exam. The first two steps are close to automatic, and the fourth usually follows once the link is shown. The arguments worth writing concern whether the connection to slavery's legacy is historical and concrete or merely asserted.
An exam question may hand you a statute with no obvious tie to race and ask whether Section 2 supports it. The answer turns on the link, and a label alone does not supply one.
The same logic governs step three in any variation. Where Congress identifies conduct with a plausible connection to the burdens slavery imposed, the court defers. Where the connection is only labeled and never shown, the label supplies no rational basis.