Concept
Housing Bias as a Badge
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power
Housing Bias as a Badge
Jones shows what review for rationality looks like when a court actually performs it. Congress had treated racial barriers to buying and renting property as a badge or incident of slavery, and the Court tested that judgment with a chain of four links, each resting on the one before.1 Every link rests on something the Court had already said or on history it could point to, and that is why the determination held.
The first link is the Court's own earlier account of what slavery took away. Whatever else the badges and incidents of slavery encompassed, the Court recalled, their “burdens and disabilities” included restraints on “those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”2 That recollection came from the Civil Rights Cases, the decision that had refused to treat denial of access to inns and theaters as a badge of slavery.3 The verbs deserve attention. Section 1982 gives all citizens “the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” Justice Douglas, concurring, noted that Congress passed the 1866 Act to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment and that enabling a Black person to buy and sell property removes one of many badges of slavery.4 A statute whose verbs track the Court's own list of slavery's burdens starts on ground the Court had already marked.
The second and third links trace how that disability outlived formal slavery. The Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free exercise of those same rights, were substitutes for the slave system, and the exclusion of Black people from white communities in turn became a substitute for the Black Codes.5 Each stage replaced the one before it. A legislature that ties the newer restraint to the older one follows an existing pattern and invents no connection. The record before Congress showed the pattern early. One of the most comprehensive studies then before it described laws virtually prohibiting Black people from owning or renting property in certain towns as “mere isolated cases,” the “local outcroppings of a spirit . . . found to prevail everywhere.” The study concluded that repealing anti-Black legislation in all the States lately in rebellion would not by itself secure equal treatment.6
The fourth link states the conclusion the first three support. When racial discrimination “herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.”7 The Court then asked what follows if Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least this much. Its answer: “the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation cannot keep.”8 The opinion elsewhere states the same view of freedom: It is idle to say that a man is free who cannot go and come at pleasure, who cannot buy and sell, who cannot enforce his rights.9 On that view, a statute securing the equal ability to buy carries out the Amendment's promise, and the congressional judgment is a rational one.
Justice Douglas's concurrence adds evidence on the same question without adding a separate test. He pointed to cases that “depict a spectacle of slavery unwilling to die”: state contrivances to thwart Black voting, exclusion of Black jurors solely on account of race, segregated seating in courtrooms, and segregated and inferior schools.10 Evidence of that kind reaches housing directly, for real estate agents use artifice to avoid selling “white property” to Black buyers.11 A court asking whether Congress acted irrationally must weigh that record, and a record showing how widely slavery's burdens persisted makes irrationality hard to find.
The Civil Rights Cases show where the chain would break. That Court treated denial of admission to an inn, a public conveyance, or a theater as a matter of “social rights.” It held that the Thirteenth Amendment vindicates “those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship” and that applying the slavery concept to such denials would carry it too far.12 A refused hotel room fell outside the category of fundamental rights. The right to purchase and convey property sits inside it, in the Court's own words.13 The first link separates the two results.
An exam question asking whether Jones supports a statute against private housing discrimination therefore calls for the chain, not just the standard. The strongest answer names each link in order, shows that the property disability came from the Court's own list, and says which link a statute aimed at a different practice would lack. The chain applies the rationality standard to one set of facts, and a statute reaching a different practice must supply its own connection to slavery's legacy.