Concept
What Section 5 Authorizes
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement power
Section 5 Enforcement Power
What Section 5 Authorizes
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress a power of its own: “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”1 Two phrases carry the weight. “Enforce” names the job, which is to put the Amendment's provisions into effect, and “appropriate legislation” names the tool, a statute suited to that job. Nearly every later dispute asks how far one of the two reaches, so this section first establishes what the clause attaches to, why the Reconstruction generation wrote it, and which statutes it plainly supports.
Section 5 enforces Section 1, and Section 1 speaks to States. It forbids any State to abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or to deny any person the equal protection of the laws.2 Because each prohibition binds a State, the power that enforces them is aimed at state action. Section 1 restrains the States, and Section 5 is a separate, affirmative grant to Congress. The Court drew that contrast in Ex parte Virginia: “It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged,” and “[s]ome legislation is contemplated to make the [Civil War] amendments fully effective.”3 The Court added that the authority “is but a limited authority, true, extending only to a single class of cases; but within its limits it is complete.”4
The reason for an express clause lies in how the federal government is built. Congress holds only enumerated powers, so a lawyer defending any federal statute must point to a specific constitutional provision that grants the power.5 A statute that commands state governments to respect the civil rights of their residents reaches into matters the states had governed alone, and the Reconstruction generation did not leave that footing to implication. After the Civil War, Congress enacted civil rights statutes to counter the Southern Black Codes, state laws designed to take from the ex-slaves the rights associated with the Thirteenth Amendment.6 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, which passed over President Andrew Johnson's veto, gave all citizens the same right “as is enjoyed by white citizens” to give evidence, sue and be sued, make and enforce contracts, and buy, sell, inherit, and lease property.7 Questions arose whether the Thirteenth Amendment alone could justify such inroads on matters previously entrusted to the states, so Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, whose last section gave it explicit power to enforce the Amendment's provisions.8 That concern was the initial impetus for the Amendment, and one of its primary purposes was to ensure that Congress could enact legislation such as the 1866 Act. Section 5 does precisely that.9 The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified several years later, added support for civil rights legislation.10
The clause also does structural work inside the Amendment. Ex parte Virginia observed that without Section 5 there might be room to argue that Section 1 is only declaratory of the moral duty of the State. The Constitution, the Court continued, now expressly gives authority for congressional interference and compulsion in the cases the Fourteenth Amendment embraces.11 The Court read the parallel clause of the Fifteenth Amendment the same way in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. By adding that clause, the Framers indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights the Amendment created, so Congress holds full remedial powers alongside the courts to effectuate the prohibition on racial discrimination in voting.12 An early case confirms the point. Strauder v. West Virginia treated a federal statute guaranteeing equal rights to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of the laws as putting in statutory form what the constitutional amendment had substantially ordained, “a step towards enforcing the constitutional provisions.” The Court then called a further statute, section 641, “an advanced step, fully warranted, we think, by the fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment.”13
In function, the clause resembles the Necessary and Proper Clause, because it too authorizes appropriate legislation.14 The final sections of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and the last paragraph of the Nineteenth each contain their own version of that clause.15 The enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments differ only slightly in wording, and the difference is generally treated as legally insignificant. All three let Congress remedy violations of the post-Civil War Amendments.16 The grant recurs in the Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments as well.17
The grant is clearest where Congress aims at conduct that Section 1 forbids. One of the first pieces of legislation passed under Section 5 was the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871.18 The dissent in Tennessee v. Lane explained why such a statute mattered. In 1866 the lower federal courts had no general jurisdiction over cases alleging deprivation of constitutional rights. Suppose that, just after ratification, a State had imposed racially discriminatory literacy tests, with different questions for different races. A citizen injured by such a test would have had no means of asserting his right to be free of it. Section 5 authorizes Congress to create a cause of action through which that citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth Amendment rights.19 A federal code regulating private dealings is a different matter. In the Civil Rights Cases the Court said that Section 5 does not invest Congress with power to legislate on subjects within the domain of state legislation, or to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights. It authorizes modes of relief against state legislation or state action, and modes of redress against the operation of state laws and the action of state officers. Civil rights guaranteed against state aggression, the Court added, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.20 A later section returns to this state-action limit.
With the grant, its target, and its purpose in view, the question that organizes the rest of the chapter comes into focus. It is generally agreed that Congress may remedy violations and may do more than declare that rights exist, but substantial disputes remain over what else Congress may do.21 Does “enforce” mean only that Congress may create criminal and civil penalties for those who violate constitutional rights? Or may Congress itself define the scope of constitutional liberty, and so move the boundary line between individual liberty and government power?22 The Lane dissent states the narrow view bluntly. Morgan notwithstanding, “one does not, within any normal meaning of the term, ‘enforce’ a prohibition by issuing a still broader prohibition directed to the same end,” and one does not “enforce” a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit by imposing a 45-mile-per-hour limit.23 That reading came in dissent, and the sections that follow show how the Court built its own answer.