Concept
Text of the Enforcement Power
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power
Fifteenth Amendment Enforcement Power
Text of the Enforcement Power
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is a single sentence: "The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."1 The sentence reaches only as far as the article it enforces. Section 1 provides that the right of citizens of the United States to vote "shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."2 That text sets two boundaries. It binds the federal government as well as the States, and it forbids only one kind of reason for withholding the vote: race, color, or previous servitude. Every exercise of Section 2 power must therefore trace back to racial discrimination in voting.
Section 1 needs no statute to take effect. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court observed that the declaration "has always been treated as self-executing" and has repeatedly been construed, "without further legislative specification," to invalidate state voting qualifications or procedures that are discriminatory on their face or in practice.3 Judicial enforcement alone nonetheless leaves a gap. A court decides the rule in front of it, and a State whose rule falls can adopt another. Congress met this pattern: it passed statutes outlawing some discriminatory practices and facilitating litigation against them, but litigation remained slow and expensive, the States devised new methods as soon as old ones were struck down, and African-American voter registration barely improved.4 Section 2 supplies the textual basis for a legislative answer to that pattern.
Self-execution does not make Section 2 redundant. The provision is a grant of legislative power in its own right, and its text conditions the power on no prior judicial finding. A footnote in the Shelby County dissent draws a structural lesson from the wording. Five amendments use the words "right to vote," each pairs them with the same empowerment of Congress to enact "appropriate legislation," and so, the dissent concludes, Congress "holds the lead rein in making the right to vote equally real for all U. S. citizens."5
The word "appropriate" supplies the measure. The basic test is the same as in every case about Congress's express powers set against the reserved powers of the States,6 and Chief Justice Marshall gave it its classic statement in McCulloch v. Maryland:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.7
For the Fifteenth Amendment, that formula yields a standard of review: as against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.8 Congress has wide latitude over means. Section 1 fixes the end.
The fixed end also marks the outer limit of the power. On the rare occasions when the Court has found an unconstitutional exercise of it, Congress had attacked evils the Fifteenth Amendment does not comprehend, and Katzenbach cited United States v. Reese and James v. Bowman as examples.9 At the opposite pole stands the Voting Rights Act's suspension of literacy tests and devices for five years from the last occurrence of substantial voting discrimination. That suspension was "an uncommon exercise of congressional power," yet the exceptional circumstances justified it as a proper response under Section 2.10
Another source of power may still reach part of such a statute. Article I, Section 4 separately lets Congress "at any time by Law make or alter" regulations on the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives."11 The hypothetical statute might find footing there for federal elections, but it finds none in the Fifteenth Amendment.
Within its proper subject, Section 2 legislation takes two forms, and the Court's question differs slightly for each. Some legislation supplies a mechanism for redressing or preventing violations of the right itself, such as a private action for money damages. For a mechanism of that kind, the test is essentially rational basis: could Congress rationally conclude that the mechanism was an "appropriate" measure to redress or prevent violation of the right, consistent with McCulloch?12 Other legislation reaches further and prohibits practices that do not themselves violate Section 1. Under the City of Rome standard, Congress may do so as long as the prohibition is reasonably directed toward enforcing the Amendment's underlying principles.13 City of Rome applied that standard to uphold a seven-year reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act in 1975. Because Congress could rationally have concluded that electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact.14
Two decisions frame the rest of this chapter. Katzenbach supplied the standard of review, and the Court applied it to the Voting Rights Act's suspension of literacy tests. Shelby County later put a different question to the same statute: whether the Act's "extraordinary measures, including its disparate treatment of the States," continue to satisfy constitutional requirements, given that "the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs."15 The first decision stresses deference to Congress's choice of means. The second stresses that the means must fit present conditions. The sections that follow trace how the two fit together.