Concept
Analyzing Enforcement Problems
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power
Analyzing Enforcement Problems
Every problem in this chapter, whether it involves a ban on voting tests, a freeze on changes to voting rules, or a formula that picks the covered jurisdictions, asks whether one statute fits Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which gives Congress power "to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."1 Four questions, asked in order, sort nearly any new statute:
- Is the statute aimed at racial discrimination in voting?
- Could Congress rationally have chosen these means to prevent or remedy that discrimination?
- Does the statute burden some States and spare others, and if so, do current conditions justify the difference?
- If the statute renews or extends an earlier one, did Congress shape it with current evidence?
A statute can clear the first two questions and fail the last two, as the 2006 coverage formula did, so none can be skipped.
Is the statute aimed at racial discrimination in voting?
The Fifteenth Amendment power reaches beyond Section 1 only when the prohibition is "reasonably directed toward enforcement of the Amendment's underlying principles," and those principles concern race and the vote.2 An enforcement grant carries no farther than the guarantee it enforces. A statute that bars registrars in a county with a documented record of excluding Black applicants from using a test to keep them off the rolls is aimed at that subject. A statute that caps the number of candidates on a primary ballot is aimed at something else, and however sensible it is, it must find its authority in a different power. A law that fails this first question needs no further analysis under the Fifteenth Amendment.
Could Congress rationally have chosen these means?
Congress receives broad discretion on the second question because an enforcement power is a power to select means. The Court has described Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in just these terms: Congress has a discretion, "albeit quite broad," to choose the means of enforcement, the definition of the underlying right remains largely a judicial prerogative, and whatever interpretation Congress adopts is subject to judicial review.3 Under City of Rome v. United States, the Fifteenth Amendment grant lets Congress prohibit practices that do not themselves violate Section 1, so long as the prohibition is reasonably directed toward enforcing the Amendment's underlying principles.4 A measure that tracks Section 1 closely raises little difficulty. The contested cases are those that go past it.
City of Rome shows why a preventive ban can be valid. The Court upheld a 1975, seven-year reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act because Congress could rationally have concluded that electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, so it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact.5 The prohibition does not wait for proof of intent in each case. It rests on a rational judgment about risk, drawn from the jurisdiction's own history.
The City of Seven Hills shows the second question at work. Seven Hills has a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting and is covered by preclearance. It revises its electoral system on race-neutral grounds, no evidence shows a discriminatory purpose, and the revision would dilute minority voting strength. The Act blocks the change for its discriminatory effect. The city objects that Section 1 reaches only purposeful discrimination, so Congress cannot forbid a change merely for its impact. That objection fails the second question. The effects-based ban stands on the same footing as the one sustained in City of Rome, and the city's own history supplies the risk of purposeful discrimination that makes a harmful change a likely vehicle for more of it.6
Does the statute burden some States and spare others?
A statute that applies nationwide does not raise the concern that drove Shelby County v. Holder. The Court left untouched the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and it issued no holding on Section 5 itself, only on the coverage formula.7 A statute that singles out some States is different. Shelby County held that Congress may not subject some States but not others to preclearance on the strength of outdated coverage formulas, because the Tenth Amendment and principles of equal sovereignty require extraordinary justification for such disparate treatment.8
The Court treated preclearance as an "extraordinary departure from the traditional course of relations between the States and the Federal Government," one that only "exceptional conditions" can justify. It insisted that Congress "must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions."9 The governing idea is that current burdens must be justified by current needs.10 Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions, but the Court called such a formula only an initial prerequisite to a determination that exceptional conditions still exist.11
A complete answer should also say that Shelby County leaves its standard of review unclear. Its language of irrationality suggests ordinary rationality review, while its attention to equal sovereignty suggests a limit on the enforcement power itself. Which reading is correct is for the future to determine.12 On facts like those in Shelby County the two readings reach the same result, because a formula with no logical relation to present conditions fails under either one. A sound answer states the ambiguity in a sentence and then applies the current-conditions requirement.
Did Congress use current evidence when it renewed the statute?
The fourth question applies to reauthorizations and extensions. Deference to Congress assumes that Congress matched the remedy to present conditions, so a renewal that carries an old formula forward asks a court to defer to a judgment nobody has made recently. The Court's own reasoning offers a useful check: ask whether Congress, starting from scratch, could enact the statute today. In 2006 it plainly could not have enacted the coverage formula, because it would have been irrational to distinguish among States so fundamentally on 40-year-old data, and irrational to base coverage on voting tests that had been illegal for 40 years.13 The Court also refused to insulate the formula from review merely because it had been enacted 40 years earlier, and it rejected the argument that the showing could be weaker on reenactment.14
The length of the renewal points the same way. City of Rome upheld a seven-year extension, while the 2006 reauthorization came 41 years after the original passage and extended the Act's life until 2031, 25 years out. Upholding it, even under a deferential standard of review, might have required a showing that the evidence available to Congress in 2006 warranted continuing preclearance in the covered jurisdictions.15
Seven Hills and the second objection
Seven Hills returns with a second objection: Congress had no power to extend a coverage formula resting on 40-year-old data. This objection succeeds. Congress may not subject some States but not others to preclearance on outdated coverage formulas, and basing coverage on voting tests that had long been illegal was irrational.16
The same statute therefore yields two answers. The effects-based prohibition is the kind of measure City of Rome upheld, while the formula that selected Seven Hills is not a valid way to choose jurisdictions. The usual error is to let the result on one objection decide the other. Congress remains free to draft a formula based on current conditions.17 Meanwhile Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, untouched by the decision, forbids any standard, practice, or procedure that "results in a denial or abridgement" of the vote on account of race or color, and both the Federal Government and individuals can sue to enforce it.18 The city's revision would face that ban through ordinary litigation instead of preclearance.
When the power comes from the Fourteenth Amendment
When the enforcement power comes from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the working test changes. The Court uses a congruence-and-proportionality standard to decide whether Congress is constitutionally enforcing the post-Civil War Amendments or unconstitutionally interpreting the Constitution itself.19 Katzenbach v. Morgan read Section 5 broadly, but City of Boerne v. Flores and Shelby County took the narrow view and limited Congress's power.20 Under those cases Congress may adopt measures designed to remedy or prevent violations of rights the courts define, and it may not define the scope of those rights.21 An answer on the Voting Rights Act should work through the four questions above and flag the open point about Shelby County's standard, and it should not import the Fourteenth Amendment test without saying so.