Concept
Testing an Enforcement Statute
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power
Testing an Enforcement Statute
Section 1 of the Nineteenth Amendment forbids the United States and every State to deny or abridge the right of citizens to vote on account of sex, and Section 2 gives Congress power “to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”1 A statute that invokes Section 2 therefore faces two questions: does it enforce what Section 1 forbids, and is it appropriate? The earlier sections supplied the parts, namely what the prohibition covers, where its edges lie, how broad the enforcement power is, and where that power stops. Here they become a method you can run on a statute you have never seen.
The method borrows from other amendments. The decisions that define “appropriate legislation” arise under the Fifteenth Amendment’s parallel enforcement clause2 and under the Fourteenth Amendment,3 and at least one opinion reads the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments together as forbidding any voter qualification that makes race or sex a but-for cause of the denial of the vote.4 A Nineteenth Amendment answer should therefore present each step as reasoning by analogy and credit the decision that announced it.
Run the four questions in order.
Most statutes that look doubtful on an exam fail at step 1 or step 3, because step 2 gives Congress wide room. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach the Court held that Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional ban on racial discrimination in voting, even as against the powers reserved to the States.9 It rejected the argument that Congress may only forbid violations in general terms and leave specific remedies to the courts, and it quoted Chief Justice Marshall: the power “is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”10 Steps 1 and 3 apply those constitutional limits. On the rare occasions when the Court has found an unconstitutional exercise of the power, Congress had attacked evils the amendment did not comprehend.11
Congress may also aim its remedies at the individuals through whom a State acts. Enforcement legislation, the Court said in upholding the act of March 1, 1875, “must act upon persons, not upon the abstract thing denominated a State, but upon the persons who are the agents of the State in the denial of the rights which were intended to be secured.”12 Under the Nineteenth Amendment those agents are the registrars, clerks, and election judges who turn voters away, so a statute built on this model clears step 2 easily.
A statute can use the right kind of means and still miss its target, as the next pair shows.
Both statutes fail step 1, so the quality of their means never matters. Each needs support from a different source of power. Congress has addressed employer sex discrimination directly in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, which regulate employers and say nothing about the ballot,15 and it has used its commerce and spending powers for other anti-discrimination statutes.16 The jury statute would need a footing such as equal protection, whose suspect classifications the Court has not confined to race.17
The tempting shortcut at step 3 is to treat any statute that helps women vote as enforcement of the Amendment, whatever violation the statute declares. Congress may create enforcement mechanisms and remedies, such as criminal penalties or civil liability, against those who deprive others of constitutional rights. It may not change the substantive right in either direction, and under City of Boerne v. Flores it has no power to determine what conduct violates the Constitution in the first place.18 On the reading that pairs the Nineteenth Amendment with the Fifteenth, the right is violated when sex is a but-for cause of the denial of the vote; treat that as a useful formulation, not settled doctrine.19 A statute that defines the violation more broadly than that has done the defining itself.
The boundary at step 3 is contested. Katzenbach upheld the Voting Rights Act’s ban on literacy tests in all elections in certain areas.21 It also approved confining the Act’s remedies to the places where Congress had found discrimination, because Congress had no way to forecast whether the evil would spread and could limit its attention to the areas where action seemed necessary.22 A statute banning a neutral registration device only in counties where Congress had found the device used to turn women away would follow that pattern and has a fair claim to validity. The declaration statute does not, because it rests on no findings and no sex-based cause, so it looks less like a remedy than like a new definition of the right. The Court has been most jealous of congressional efforts to push the envelope when Congress acts to benefit non-suspect classes or to protect non-fundamental rights.23 Even for a statute tied to the ballot, the line between a prophylactic remedy and a redefinition stays uncertain in a close case, and an answer should say so.
Step 4 treats the Amendment as only one possible foundation. The Constitution allotted to the States the power to make laws for national elections but provided that Congress could alter them. On that basis Justice Black, writing separately in a case about lowering the voting age, concluded that Congress has ultimate supervisory power over congressional elections and may set the qualifications for voters for presidential electors.24 That is one Justice’s view, so it shows how the power is arranged and does not state a holding. It matters because a statute resting on the Elections Clause needs no connection to sex at all. For state and local elections, the same opinion demanded a foundation in enforcing the ban on discrimination and found none for lowering the voting age.25
Run together, the four steps sort the statutes in this section. The registrar-suit statute passes steps 1 through 3 and ends the analysis there. The jury and wage statutes fail step 1 and must find power elsewhere. The declaration statute passes step 1 and fails step 3, at the contested edge between remedy and redefinition. The mail-registration statute fails Section 2 altogether and survives only as to federal elections, at step 4. Because step 1 controls what Section 2 can support at all, a clean answer starts there and works down the list.